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ABSTRACT 
 
NEOLIBERAL DARLINGS: THE COMMODIFICATION OF GROTESQUE CHILDREN IN 
CONTEMPORARY COMICS AND LITERATURE 
 
by 
Mark Heimermann 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Peter Sands 
 
 
 
 This dissertation analyzes grotesque depictions of children in contemporary, speculative 
comics and literature: Katherine Dunn’s Geek Love, Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, Jeff 
Lemire’s Sweet Tooth, Ben Marcus’ The Flame Alphabet, and Richard Starkings’ Elephantmen. 
It argues that the grotesque in these texts embodies the tension between children as economic 
objects and children as social beings, as the protagonists’ nonhuman elements are used to justify 
their commodification. Because commodification metaphorically transforms people into hybrids, 
part human/part commodity, the grotesque, with its emphasis on hybrid forms and ontological 
destabilization, is uniquely suited for representing this tension. Concern over the transformation 
of childhood reflects anxiety over the dominance of neoliberalism, which subsumes everything 
under market logic. Realms that were recently considered social, like family and childhood, are 
increasingly understood in economic terms. These texts turn to the grotesque as a way to 
visualize the effects of an abstract ideology. 
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 Introduction: Childhood, Neoliberalism, and the Grotesque 
Childhood is a social construction which varies according to time and place (Jenks 7; 
Olson and Rampaul 23; Stearns 4). Understanding how childhood functions within a culture 
reveals as much about the culture as about childhood (Jenks 60). This dissertation argues that 
contemporary Western representations of grotesque children are a metaphor for the 
commodification of children and that these representations reflect cultural anxiety regarding the 
shifting conception of children from emotional assets to economic ones. These grotesque 
depictions give form to concerns over neoliberalism, the exploitation of children, and the 
changing nature of childhood. The grotesque bodies of children not only provide both a 
metaphor and justification for the exploitation of children, they also broaden our cultural 
understanding of childhood, neoliberalism, and the grotesque by revealing the ways in which 
these categories intersect.  
Childhood in Contemporary Western Culture 
The Western world, the United States and England in particular, is dominated by two 
conceptions of childhood: the innocent or idealized child and the evil or chaotic child. The 
innocent or idealized child is innately good and deserving of protection to help maintain its 
innocence. The evil or chaotic child requires strict regulation and oversight to restrain its natural 
tendency towards mayhem and disorder. Both constructions exist simultaneously, although the 
innocent child dominates the contemporary imagination despite evidence that its idyllic 
innocence cannot be maintained. 
Contemporary understanding of the innocent child can be traced to Romantic conceptions 
of childhood. James Kincaid explains,  
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The Romantic idealization of the child … was meant as a poetic figure, a 
metaphor, but it soon developed a quite literal, material base. For the Romantic 
poets, the child packaged a whole host of qualities that could be made into a 
poetics and a politics: the child was everything the sophisticated adult was not, 
everything the rational man of the Enlightenment was not. The child was gifted 
with spontaneity, imaginative quickness, and a closeness to God; but that’s as far 
as its positive attributes went. More prominent were the negatives, the things not 
there. The child was figured as free of adult corruptions; not yet burdened with the 
weight of responsibility, mortality, and sexuality; liberated from ‘the light of 
common day’ (Erotic Innocence 14–15) 
The innocent child is defined by its lack of experience. This is why the innocent, Romantic child 
is in need of protection (Pressler 19). It must be sheltered because experience chips away at the 
veneer of innocence and robs it of “spontaneity, imaginative quickness, and a closeness to God.” 
The unburdened nature of childhood is also why Western society categorizes a child who begins 
puberty as an adolescent: he or she is henceforth burdened with sexuality. The Romantics used 
this figuration of the child as a reaction against Enlightenment virtues such as “adulthood, 
sophistication, rational moderation, [and] judicious adjustment to the ways of the world. The 
child was used to deny these virtues, to eliminate them and substitute in their place a set of 
inversions: innocence, purity, emptiness. Childhood, to a large extent, came to be in our culture a 
coordinate set of have nots, of negations” (Kincaid, Erotic Innocence 15). Children’s freedom 
from “adult corruptions” positions them as idealized cherubs unsullied by the unclean world. 
This, of course, is a fiction. Childhood illness and mortality, for example, didn’t end when the 
Romantics reconfigured childhood to suit their ends. Other scholars also note the existence of the 
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innocent child within Western society. For example, Anne Higonnet refers to the Romantic child 
as “naturally innocent” and  explains that it “makes a good show of having no class, no gender, 
and no thoughts – of being socially, sexually, and psychically innocent” (15; 24). Higonnet is 
specifically talking about visual depictions of innocent children, which began in the mid-
eighteenth century with British portrait painters but proliferated during the nineteenth century 
due to the development of image technologies which expanded access to paintings and 
illustrations to a wider audiences (9).1 Higonnet argues that the innocent child gradually gives 
way to the “knowing” child, a child cognizant of adult realities. However, her conception of 
visual depictions of the Romantic child, that it lacks class, gender, or even interiority, aligns with 
the “emptiness” that the Romantic poets imagined.  
 The innocent child remains lodged in Western culture. Marina Warner, who critiques the 
feasibility of childhood innocence, writes, “The nostalgic worship of childhood innocence … is 
more marked today than it ever has been: the difference of the child from the adult has become a 
dominant theme in contemporary society” (45). Warner believes the Western investment in the 
innocence of children is due to the desire of adults to live through children, “including Romantic 
and Surrealist yearnings to live through the imagination, with unfettered, unrepressed fantasy” 
(54). This is perhaps why the idea of the innocent child has been so irrepressible in contemporary 
times. 
 Warner’s assertion that adult desires shape cultural understandings of childhood is 
echoed across a range of scholarship. Virginia L. Blum argues that psychoanalysis, with its 
                                                          
1 Higonnet’s mid-eighteenth century timeline coincides with Jean-Jacque Rousseau’s publication of Emile and The 
Social Contract. Both texts were published in 1762 and argue “that one finds in childhood humanity’s original state 
of natural goodness … Children, according to Rousseau, begin life neither brutish nor blank slates but naturally 
wise, just, and good” (Wall 22).  
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narratives about how the adult self is subconsciously shaped by experiences in childhood, 
subordinates the child to adult needs. She notes that “in psychoanalysis’s very articulation of the 
child as an object of study it tells the story not of the child itself but of why the adult talks about 
the child—what it is that the adult imagination pursues through the child” (4). This puts the child 
in service to his or her adult self. Blum continues, “In the effort to present the ‘reality’ of the 
child and its perceptions, we cannot help but interpret the child in light of adult motives; we 
cannot help but interpret ourselves through the child. The study of the child thus becomes a 
perpetual reenactment of the suppression of the actual child in favor of adult imperatives” (5). 
The study of the child, as undertaken by adults, is always viewed through an adult lens, and it 
becomes difficult to prevent this lens from becoming distorted by the imperatives, conscious or 
unconscious, of the adult. While this is important to keep in mind regarding any study of children 
and childhood, it especially resonates with Blum’s discussion of psychoanalysis, which leads 
Blum to question psychoanalysis’ privileged status over literary analysis. Both psychoanalysis 
and literary analysis provide narratives that help people better understand themselves and 
navigate the world. The suppression of actual children and childhood in favor of adult 
imperatives is a common occurrence even beyond psychoanalysis. Cindi Katz argues that 
concerns over various futures (political economic, geopolitical, and environmental) are “in part 
channeled in and through concerns about children and the nature of childhood” (“Cultural 
Geographies” 6). These concerns lead adults to think of children as bulwarks against disaster in a 
variety of ways. For example, some argue society must improve things for future generations, 
while others believe future generations will be the ones to save or redeem society; children are 
also responsible for the future economy; and we expect our children to take care of us as we age. 
These considerations blur the line-between childhood and adulthood (“Cultural Geographies” 
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13). Some adults, however, want to cement the boundary between adulthood and childhood. 
Warner believes, “Grown-ups want [children] to stay [innocent] for their sakes, not the 
children’s, and they want children to be simple enough to believe in fairies too, again, for 
humanity’s sake on the whole, to prove something against the evidence” (54). The desire for 
children to remain innocent may be especially powerful when one believes childhood is 
threatened, like when boundaries between adulthood and childhood are blurred.  Ellen Pifer 
notes that adults’ relationship with childhood in contemporary fiction is an ambiguous one: we 
find children innocent and vulnerable, yet we see them as fearsome.  This is because children are 
a mirror in which we see ourselves, but always from a distance.  For example, we fear children 
experimenting with drugs and sex, yet, as a culture, we may see it as a reflection of adults’ 
behaviors in the 1960s. She observes that “the child represents the other side—original or 
shameful, beautiful or monstrous, forgotten or repressed—of the adult self” (16). In this 
articulation of the child, it isn’t glorified or denigrated because that’s what it deserves, but 
because of the complex way in which adults see themselves reflected in the child. What all these 
scholars have in common is the assertion that childhood is filtered through the adult imagination. 
They also point to society’s ambiguous relationship with childhood.  
 This ambiguity becomes even more apparent when considering Pifer’s reference to the 
monstrous child. This reference invokes the dark twin of the innocent child: the evil or chaotic 
one. Marina Warner notes that “the Child has never been seen as such a menacing enemy as 
today” (56). Even as society idealizes the innocent child, it also harbors its dangerous 
doppelganger, which is in large part a legacy of the Puritans. Puritans “emphasized original sin” 
(Warner 20). Only through strict training and oversight can children overcome their tendency 
towards original sin. Steven Mintz, in his meticulous account of the history of childhood in 
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America and the active role children played throughout America’s history, discusses this Puritan 
tradition. The Puritans left England in the early seventeenth century amidst a host of challenges, 
including inflation, population growth, and a more youthful population (10). As real wages 
declined, many English children left their homes and sought employment or apprenticeships 
elsewhere. This resulted in a rise in “youthful vagrancy and delinquency,” which Puritans 
associated with “youthful vice” (10–11). As a result, many Puritans migrated in the hopes of 
improving their children’s lives: “When English Puritans during the 1620s and 1630s 
contemplated migrating to the New World, their primary motives were to protect their children 
from moral corruption and to promote their spiritual and economic well-being” (10).  
Although Puritans were not “unusually harsh,” with their children, they did not 
“sentimentalize childhood” either (10). The notion that children’s natural impulses should be 
suppressed and that children do not deserve indulgence positions Puritan childhood was 
diametrically opposed to Romantic conceptions of childhood, where childhood is celebrated 
precisely for being free of adult burdens.2 Others see the Puritan discipline as exceptionally cold. 
Kathy Jackson writes, “In colonial times the idea of the bad child prevailed. The Puritans, 
mindful of the doctrine of original sin, regarded children as innately depraved and requiring strict 
control. Thus, they treated their children with little tenderness or affection; instead, they 
disciplined them, sometimes harshly, in order to teach them to be obedient, respectful, 
hardworking, and god-fearing” (14). But Mintz isn’t arguing that the Puritans weren’t sometimes 
harsh, but that they weren’t “unusually harsh” when compared to other child-rearing practices of 
                                                          
2 The Romantics came after the Puritans, but these are the two dominant conceptions which linger today. And, as we 
shall see, the notion that children exist in a state that can provide a model for adults to follow, whether through 
innocence or wisdom, wasn’t invented by the Romantics. 
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the day. Kathy Jackson’s assertion that children didn’t receive much “tenderness or affection” is 
predicated on its opposition to discipline, but these aren’t mutually exclusive.  
The Puritans believed their attitudes toward their children were a benefit to both their 
children and to the larger society. Daniel Thomas Cook, in his analysis of the dialectical 
relationship between children and the United States clothing industry in the twentieth century, 
writes, “Children, especially infants, [according to Cotton Mathers, a Puritan minister] are in a 
state of depravity and require conversion, and an early conversion at that, lest they die before 
they are saved … Infants were seen as a danger to both the cosmic and social orders, their 
crawling placing them in postural proximity to members of the animal kingdom” (28). Not only 
did American Puritans have a different conception of childhood than the Romantics, but they 
saw the innocent conception of childhood as dangerous because “childish innocence and 
weakness were an invitation for Satan to do his works” (27). The Puritan construction requires 
adults to train children to restrain their natural tendency towards sin and disorder, and is, to John 
Wall, a top-down approach. A top-down approach “suggests that human nature starts out 
essentially unruly and therefore requires a higher moral purpose and order to be imposed 
throughout life upon it from above.  What childhood demonstrates above all, according to this 
view, is humanity’s original natural state of moral disorder or corruption.  Moral life requires, as 
a result, humanity’s careful disciplining into strong moral communities” (15). The Puritan’s 
legacy remains strong. Steven Mintz asserts, “Their legacy is a fixation on childhood corruption, 
child nurture, and schooling that remains undiminished in the United States today” (10).  
 The Romantic and Puritan legacies leave us with conflicting ideas about the nature of 
childhood. Kathy Jackson notes, “Traditionally, two opposing viewpoints have been associated 
with childhood. On the other hand, the child is wild and needing to be tamed; on the other, the 
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child is tender and innocence … In America, both of these images have persisted” (14). Jenks 
uses the terms Apollonian and Dionysian to describe childhood. The Apollonian child is the 
innocent child who is naturally good (73), which equates the innocent child with a god of art and 
knowledge. The Dionysian child is one who contains evil and corruptions (70), which associates  
such children with a god of wine and revelry, who glorifies in chaos and is worshiped by 
centaurs and satyrs, beings who straddle the line between animal and human. Jenks writes, 
“These two images of the child that I have designated as the Dionysian and the Apollonian are 
not literal descriptions of the way that children intrinsically different; they are no more than 
images.  Yet these images are immensely powerful, they live on and give force to the different 
discourses that we have about our children” (74).  
 It may seem schizophrenic that such diametrically opposed ideas regarding childhood can 
still persist, even thrive, today. However, there are similarities between Romantic and Puritan 
conceptions. They both see the child as malleable. Puritans believe the child can change for the 
better by controlling their natural state, Romantic traditions believe the child becomes burdened 
by the erosion of its natural state and its contact with the wider world. Both traditions see 
childhood as a stage which is passed through; even if Romantics might embrace an innocent 
adult, their experience tells them this is fleeting. Both conceptions also believe children require 
oversight. Puritan parents must prepare children to control themselves and become productive 
members of society, while Romantic parents should help preserve childhood innocence. 
Ironically then, Romantic and Puritanical conceptions of childhood share some general attitudes 
though they radically differ in specifics. But the Puritan’s overall attitude towards children isn’t 
just opposed to Romantic attitudes, rather it directly works to protect children and the world from 
the danger of Romantic conceptions. To Puritans, the Romantic conception is not just a different 
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perspective: it opens the door for further corruption. Despite the substantial differences between 
the Puritan and Romantic child, both exist in contemporary Western society (Pressler; Warner). 
Both groups see something innate in childhood, but that innateness does not, or need not, define 
the child throughout its life. Furthermore, these two conceptions are often reconciled within the 
same society by applying them simultaneously. For many people, their own loved ones follow 
Romantic trajectories, while other children, especially poor and minority children, may be 
dangerous. Shirley Pressler argues that Romantic and Puritan constructions of childhood should 
be jettisoned in favor of constructions that emphasize children as people in their own right. She 
writes, “Children are … seen as following a natural development aligned with a Romantic 
discourse – unless there is some deviation from the expected Romantic trajectory, in which they 
are constructed through a Puritan discourse” (22).  Thus, all children are innocent, Romantic 
children, until and unless they reveal their true nature as evil or chaotic children. This, of course, 
has its limits. Even contemporary, Western society can only allow so much deviation from 
Romantic conceptions. This is why when a child commits an especially gruesome act, like 
murder, he or she may be tried as an adult. Society cannot countenance such a heinous act from a 
youth so it revokes the mantle of childhood. There has also been a tendency to argue that 
innocent conceptions of childhood have increasingly been shown to be under siege in American 
culture since the latter half of the twentieth century, as images of evil or knowing children 
proliferate (Bruhm; Higonnet; Jackson; Pifer). Steven Bruhm, for example, believes that 
twentieth-century, Western culture increasingly depicts evil children because it’s inherited or 
invented too many contradictory theories about children (98). Bruhm argues that we have 
inherited both the child of Rousseau and the child of Freud: the former full of innocence, the 
latter full of internal conflict. This conflict manifests itself in depictions of evil children. Bruhm 
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writes, “The binary opposition between innocence and possession/corruption – which I am 
suggesting is no opposition at all, but rather a dialectic – produces in contemporary culture a 
panic about who children are and what they know” (103). Bruhm considers the innocent and evil 
child dialectical because innocence is only knowable in relation to corruption, and vice versa 
(108), and he notes that we fear children in part because although we might like children to 
absorb the best examples we can give and lessons we can teach, there’s no way to predict exactly 
what will stay with them: “But how do we know,” Bruhm asks, “What will get imitated or 
identified with?” (105). 
While Romantic and Puritan conceptions of childhood were passed down to 
contemporary Western society, they were themselves influenced by earlier periods.3 Wall notes 
that bottom-up approaches like that of the Romantics’, where children are innately good and 
wise and can provide models for adults to follow, saw thinkers as diverse as Rousseau and John 
Chrysostom share similar thoughts on children. Rousseau thought children “naturally wise, just, 
and good” and Chrysostom championed “the ethical ideal that children are not objects to be 
molded by society but subjects toward which society should mold itself.  He enjoins adults 
especially to recognize in children a deeper moral wisdom, wonder, and openness than adults 
themselves tend to attain” (22; 21). Top-down approaches, like the Puritans’, include 
philosophers like Plato, Augustine, and Kant. Plato understands children “as irrational animals in 
need of rigorous ethical training” (15). Augustine uses “childhood as the prime example of his 
new doctrine of ‘original sin.’  … Augustine confesses that ‘in your [God’s] sight no man is free 
from sin, not even a child who has lived only one day on earth’” (16). Immanuel Kant argues, 
                                                          
3 Philippe Ariès argues that paintings reveal that prior to the eighteenth century there wasn’t really a conception of 
childhood that was distinct from adulthood. Children were depicted as mini-adults, no different from their parents. 
Other scholars, however, reveal specific constructions of childhood throughout Western civilization. 
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“childhood shows that the human will is first and foremost the plaything of wan, instinct, and 
desire” (18). Wall also outlines a horizontal/developmental approach to childhood that he 
associates with Aristotle and Locke that emphasizes the child’s progression over time, but he 
rejects all these views in favor of a society where the child would be equal to the adult.4 This 
type of society would emphasize the needs of its most vulnerable citizens and lead to more social 
inclusiveness (103–104). However, Wall’s emphasis on the range of thinkers who share similar 
conceptions of childhood, whether they align with Romantic or Puritan constructions, 
demonstrates the prevalence of these constructions throughout Western society. The Romantics 
and Puritans are simply the filters through which these conceptions most distinctly pass through 
to the contemporary Western world. Wall is not alone in recognizing the longer history of 
thinking about childhood, either. Ellen Pifer notes,  “Since the Middle Ages, at least, children 
have been alternately regarded as innocent or depraved, the most vulnerable or the most vital 
representative so humankind” (20). Ewa Kuryluk argues that childhood involves both “loveliness 
and horror: spontaneous goodness and equally sudden evil” and notes that both of these 
conceptions can be traced back to Christianity (160). While the Christ child is seen as innocent, 
and children themselves are at times praised for their wisdom within Christianity, the non-
canonical Gospel of Thomas tells a story of Jesus, as a child, killing another child who bumped 
into Jesus by reprimanding him that he would go no further. Kuryluk writes,  
This picture of Jesus mirrors more accurately than the ideal biblical portrait with 
the psychology of a child … The Gospel of Thomas expresses its concern with a 
child equipped with supernatural powers and points not to the innocent paradise 
                                                          
4 The developmental model of childhood is further discussed in relation to Elephantmen and Never Let Me Go. See 
pages 85-86 and 174. 
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of childhood but to the hell created for others by a selfish, juvenile god. As if 
unaware of good and evil, young Jesus takes advantage of his magical powers and 
behaves like a trickster. Like Childhood itself, the reverie of it is characterized by 
ambiguities and contradictions. (160) 
Kurlyluk finds in the Gospel of Thomas a depiction of Jesus that more accurately captures the 
ambiguities of childhood and the ambivalence we may feel towards it, both of which continue to 
this day. Contemporary ambivalence over childhood also extends to the changing nature of 
childhood under neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism, Childhood, and Commodification 
In A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey outlines the rapid rise of neoliberalism 
and its transformation from a fringe theory to a mindset embraced by both major United States 
political parties and governments around the world. Harvey defines neoliberalism as “a theory of 
political economic practices” which involves “strong private property rights, free markets, and 
free trade” (2). Neoliberals  and their theoretical forerunners argue that free and unrestrained 
markets increase quality of life, while also spreading democracy and even providing a new way 
to understand social relationships (Becker and Murphy; Bhagwati; Friedman; Hayek). Critics 
note that the practice of neoliberalism diverges from these theoretical underpinnings. Rather than 
raising quality of life for everyone, neoliberal globalization concentrates wealth in the hands of a 
few, increasing inequality and causing other deleterious societal effects (Colas; Giroux; Harris 
and Seid; Heilbroner and Milberg; Nieuwenhuys and de Kort; Saad-Filho and Johnston; Shaikh). 
For critics of neoliberalism, “corporate welfare substitute[s] for people welfare” (Harvey 47). 
This substitution destroys social safety nets and undermines communal values by emphasizing 
individuality and bringing all aspects of life under market control.  
13 
  
 
Steven Shaviro defines neoliberalism as both production and government influenced by 
economic imperatives, like the dominance of financial institutions, “the privatization and 
commodification of what used to be common or public goods[,] … the extraction … of a surplus 
from all social activities[,] … The subjection of all aspects of life to the so-called discipline of 
the market[,] … [and] the redefinition of human beings as the private owners of their own 
‘human capital’” (7–8). When Shaviro refers to “all aspects of life” being disciplined by “the  
market,” he specifically means leisure activities, even sleep;5 but the dominance of the market 
and the interest in extracting “a surplus” from the social are central to understanding how 
children and childhood are being redefined (although many of the texts in this project posit a 
world where humans aren’t “private owners of their own ‘human capital’” because others 
already own or control them). This economic imperative, where humans and social activities, 
like raising a family or going to school, become subject to economic logic is what I am referring 
to when I use the term “neoliberalism.”6  
Henry Giroux discusses the relationship between neoliberalism and children in his book, 
Disposable Youth, Racialized Memory, and the Culture of Cruelty. For Giroux, neoliberalism 
threatens childhood in new ways (4). One threat is the placement of children into an increasingly 
privatized system of oversight that regulates their lives (Fass 11; Giroux 5): a system which 
views children as commodifiable and disposable (Giroux 4–5, 45).7 This is due to the application 
of economic matrices to areas beyond the economy, a central tenet of American neoliberalism 
                                                          
5 To generalize, you could always be working instead; or, perhaps more accurately, why aren’t you being more 
productive? 
6 Shaviro finds the redefinition of humans as owners of their own capital lamentable. People must constantly 
redefine themselves so as to maximize their value. He writes, “There is never enough … we always need to keep 
running, just to say in the same place. Precarity is the fundamental condition of our times” (8).  
7 For example, rather than investing in education and social systems, poor and minority children are increasingly 
placed into the criminal justice system; a system which is sometimes privatized, in which case the incarceration of 
children leads directly to the profit of companies.  
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(Foucault 243; Harvey 3). Under neoliberalism, it becomes acceptable to view children in 
increasingly economic terms,8 which contradicts the mid- and late- twentieth century emphasis 
on the emotional and social value of children. The increasingly economic view of children and 
childhood reverses the trend of sacralization which took place in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (Zelizer 11). Sacralization is the movement from valuing children as 
economic assets to valuing them as emotional assets. It was facilitated by economic and 
industrial changes including the advent of a living wage around the beginning of the twentieth 
century.9 This movement came to a head with the transition of youth from the workforce and into 
the educational system: a transition which was hastened due to the lack of jobs during the Great 
Depression (Mintz 236).  
Neoliberalism’s relationship with children is fraught. Cindi Katz argues that children 
across the world are trained for professions that are disappearing, as globalization spreads 
neoliberalism across the globe (Growing Up Global). She observes children in New York and 
Sudan to demonstrate how the pace at which the economy has transformed economic and 
political landscapes has left children without the skills, training, or access to succeed in a 
neoliberal world. Children often use play to internalize, practice and develop skills they’ll need 
in their future professions; but, for Katz, the heartbreaking reality of this internalization is that 
the skills children develop are often related to careers that are or will soon be unavailable. Katz 
                                                          
8 This happens in a variety of ways. For instance, in many schools, standardized tests are emphasized so that 
children can do well on exams, to get into good colleges, to get good (meaning well-paying) jobs. There’s also a 
number of reality shows that commodify children and childhood. The child is not just a consumer, with billions of 
dollars of purchases made by them or on their behalf, their bodies themselves can be grist for the mill. 
9 Sacralization and the social conditions which allowed it probably also paved the way for the dominance of the 
Romantic conception of childhood in contemporary times, as they lessened then removed economic imperatives 
from urban, middle class childhoods and instead emphasized children’s emotional value.  
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also argues that neoliberalism destroys social investment, which negatively impacts children. She 
writes,  
The demise of the social contract as a result of neoliberalism, privatization, and 
the fraying of the welfare state is a crucial aspect of this shift [towards 
“intensification of capital accumulation and exacerbating differences in wealth 
and poverty”]. Children, among others, suffer from these changes, as all manner 
of public disinvestments take place—including in education, social welfare, 
housing, health care, and public environments—as part of and in concert with a 
relative lack of corporate commitment to particular places. (“Vagabond 
Capitalism” 710) 
Helen Penn’s study of childcare in England gives a specific example of how the de-investment in 
social programs effects children and their families. Beginning with the Thatcher government, and 
accelerating after the 1997 election of the Labour government, childcare is increasingly a for-
profit industry in England. This shifts the costs of childcare from the government to parents. 
Penn concludes, “In the case of the UK where the for-profit sector has been the main vehicle for 
implementing government policy, it is particularly problematic. For-profit care is volatile, 
dependent on local markets for uptake of places, expensive for parents, and frequently of poor 
quality” (Penn 159). The UK’s shift to privatization of this social service led to deteriorating, yet 
more expensive, quality of service. Furthermore, Penn believes the expansion of economic logic 
into social spheres undermines a vibrant society. She writes, “Market precepts have expanded 
into spheres where they have not previously operated – such as education – thereby undermining 
traditional social norms and values such as citizenship, social justice and social inclusion, and 
treating as irrelevant personal values and attributes such as sharing, caring, loving, intellectual 
16 
  
 
curiosity, honesty, moral obligation or duty, etc.” (Penn 158). These social and personal values 
and attributes are the sort of communal ideals which individualistic and short-term economic 
imperatives fail to nurture.  
  The preceding examples of the ways in which neoliberalism effects childhood has 
focused on the lack of investment in childhood, but neoliberalism can turn children themselves 
into economic vehicles.  Many scholars discuss children being assigned economic value. When 
they do so, they are generally referring to the direct targeting of children as consumers. Markets 
geared towards children go back a long ways. David Grylls, for instance, writes that children’s 
literature in England emerged in the mid- to late- eighteenth century and was soon followed by 
other entertainment for children, like “circuses, puppet shows, exhibitions and educational 
games” (20). However, over time products for children were increasingly created for and 
marketed directly to them, sometimes due to external factors. From 1890 to 1940 in the United 
States, children were considered as a new market because the mass-production of goods 
outpaced (adult) consumer demand (Chan 141). The Great Depression contributed to the 
emphasis on children as an emerging market. Negative effect on jobs and wages “led financially 
hard-pressed marketers and manufacturers to target children as independent consumers” which 
resulted in a variety of products geared towards youth, such as “comic books ... movie serials … 
children’s radio shows … and new kinds of children’s toys” (Mintz 236) This had lasting 
repercussions for childhood: “By the end of the decade a new age category, the teenager, had 
emerged … One of the Depression’s lasting legacies was nationalizing and commercializing 
childhood" (Mintz 236). Since then, spending on products aimed at children also boomed. For 
example, toy sales in 1940 were $84 million. Two decades later they were $1.25 billion (Mintz 
277), and the emphasis on the commercialization of childhood has only intensified. By 2002, 
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four to twelve year olds made $30 billion in purchases and by 2004 advertising and marketing 
aimed at children was $15 billion (Schor 23; 21). The immensity of products aimed at children 
leads Marina Warner to note, “The child, as a focus of worship, has been privatised as an 
economic unit, has become a link in the circulation of money and desire” (61). 
The child as economic unit is not a cause for concern to some. David Buckingham writes, 
“Over the past few decades, children have become increasingly important both as a market in 
their own right and as a means to reach adult markets” and argues, “Contemporary childhoods 
are always-already commercial childhoods” (54, 59). Buckingham doesn’t lament this because 
even as the market can shape childhood and “its meanings and pleasures,” children may “define 
and appropriate them in very diverse ways” (59). This is evident in Daniel’s Cook’s examination 
of the children’s clothing market from 1917-1962. Cook argues that there is a dialectical 
relationship between children and the market. While children’s clothing was originally meant to 
be purchased by adults for children, the market gradually began deferring to children. He argues 
that through the marketplace “children become recognized, treated, and even deferred to as 
persons by adults on something other than an episodic basis (beyond the confines of the home, 
playground, or classroom),” and that “through consumption, children’s ‘wants,’ ‘needs,’ and 
‘desires’—be they framed as ‘authentic’ and arising from within the child or ‘manufactured’ and 
created by profit-making industries—gain legitimacy as worthy of large-scale social action, such 
as the creation of business and industries based on them” (68). In this way, Cook “adds to the 
chorus of those who deny the pragmatic separability of culture on the one hand and markets on 
the other” (6). I do not know if childhood could be separate from the market or even if it should 
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be;10 but while Cook does demonstrate that the children’s clothing market led to considerations 
of the children and their preferences, he doesn’t explore whether the marketplace is an ideal 
venue for this. What is insufficient about the home, playground and/or classroom? What about 
other social arenas that might recognize children more directly, like the community or the 
government? While not Cook’s intention, his argument aligns directly with neoliberal attitudes 
towards the market and its emancipatory potential, and as the relationship between childhood and 
consumer culture intensifies, there may be cause for concern.  
 Juliet Schor represents an alternative perspective. She explores some of the negative 
effects of the commodified or commercialized child. She writes, “Although children have long 
participated in the consumer marketplace, until recently they were bit players, purchasers of 
cheap goods. They attracted little of the industry’s talent and resources and were approached 
primarily through their mothers. That has changed. Kids and teens are now the epicenter of 
American consumer culture” (9). Schor believes that the widespread influence of corporations on 
children is altering childhood in new ways. This is evident in how advertising infiltrates schools 
and electronic media replaces other forms of play. She laments, “We have become a nation that 
places lower priority on teaching children how to thrive socially, intellectually, even spiritually, 
than it does on training them to consume” (13). For Schor, this consumption isn’t the 
emancipatory exchange which Cook notes. She writes, “Far from being a consumers’ mecca 
ruled by diverse and rich choices, children’s consumer culture is marked by bigness and 
sameness” (27). For Schor, the most ominous sign of the commercialization of children and 
childhood is in the way corporations have bought access to the captive bodies of children within 
                                                          
10 Kathryn Bond Stockton notes that some believe children are more vulnerable in our society because they lack 
money, though she questions whether having more money would make children more or less vulnerable (38). 
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the educational system, via product placement and educational products. Overall, Schor finds 
that the more caught up in consumer culture children become, the greater the negative outcomes: 
“The more they buy into commercial and materialist messages, the worse they feel about 
themselves, the more depressed they are, and the more they are beset by anxiety, headaches, 
stomachaches, and boredom. The bottom line on the culture they’re being raised in is that it’s a 
lot more pernicious than most adults have been willing to admit” (173). Schor’s lament may not 
be as bad as it seems. The emphasis on electronics in the play of children, for example, may help 
children participate in a post-Fordist economy and alleviate some of Katz’s concern over 
children being trained in skills that are disappearing.  Nonetheless, Schor provides a counterpoint 
to arguments that uphold the relationship between the child and the market.  
 While the relationship between childhood and consumption intensified during the 
twentieth century, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries escalate this relationship and 
continue to transform it. Children are becoming even more entwined with economic logic and 
imperatives. Anne Higonnet writes, “The ideal of the child as object of adoration has turned all 
too easily into the concept of the child as object, and then into the marketing of the child as 
commodity” (194), and Julian Gill-Peterson argues that the neoliberal child is viewed in terms of 
futures trading. Investments in children and childhood are measured in future economic value, 
which is why society has de-invested in teaching poor, minority children; they have a riskier 
return-on-investment. As a result, children are sometimes cast as entrepreneurs who must 
demonstrate their earnings potential in ways outside of the educational system. This is evident in 
the United Negro College Fund’s decision to include information on its website showing how 
much a donation will return in future economic development. Or in the documentary Ten9Eight’s 
depiction of African-American entrepreneurial children in New York, which recasts “education 
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as an entrepreneurial labor” (Gill-Peterson 186). Or in the prevalence of the Youtube “haul” 
video where children and adolescents post videos of the items they purchase. These videos 
monetize the viewers by forcing them to watch ads, kick back some of that money to the creator 
of the video, and encourage people what to buy or not.   
 Neoliberal children are investments. Gill-Peterson writes, “The value of the future 
contracted through neoliberal child labor assigns and speculates on the future of kids as the 
incorporation of race, gender, and class—economic coefficients that materialize as the growing 
bodies of children … Under this neoliberal social contract childhood becomes a form of futures 
trading” (Gill-Peterson 185). The neoliberal child thus becomes an individual investment, which 
is subsequently how cuts to social programs like education are justified. This has an especially 
pernicious effect on poor and minority children. Gill-Peterson also sees childhood as futures 
trading because children can generate revenue streams during childhood, which supplement or 
replace future earnings (189). Cindi Katz also argues that children in the neoliberal world are an 
investment. They “secur[e] the economic future for their parents and other members of the 
extended family … The child as commodity is niche-marketed to secure success in the insecure 
future. ” (“Cultural Geographies” 10).  
The transformation of children and childhood from emotional assets who consume to 
drivers of consumption and investments undergirds this project. As children become economic 
assets to be utilized, it challenges the dominant twentieth century notion of the child as emotional 
investment who should be sheltered, as least somewhat, from the adult world.  Neoliberalism, by 
extending market logic into all aspects of life, including social arenas, facilitates this 
transformation. The texts in this project exhibit concern over the unrestrained economic 
transformation of childhood: what I mean when I refer to the commodification of childhood. 
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Commodification refers to a specific type of objectification. Martha Nussbaum, in her attempt to 
understand the varying ways in which objectification works, defines it as “the seeing and/or 
treating of someone as an object” (251). Nussbaum complicates this definition by insisting on the 
need to understand objectification within specific contexts and objectification’s various 
manifestations (256–257). For example, parents usually deny their children autonomy, a type of 
objectification, but this is fine in contemporary American parenting. On the other hand, the 
denial of a child’s bodily integrity, another type of objectification, whether involving “battery or 
sexual abuse,” is morally reprehensible (262). Regardless of the scenario, however, 
objectification always involves treating a person as a thing  by denying them subjectivity (257). 
Commodification, in the context of this project, is the treating of a person as a commodity: a 
valuable entity capable of generating monetary, scientific, or material benefit for others; 
someone forced into an objectifying system of exploitation without their approval. The term 
“commodification,” as opposed to “objectification,” emphasizes the type of thing the children are 
turned into. Because commodification involves seeing a person as a thing,11 it is grotesque. 
The Grotesque and Childhood 
The grotesque comes from the word grottesco, which initially described paintings on the 
walls and ceilings of Nero’s “Domus Aurea (Golden Palace),” which was unearthed “around 
1480” but built as early as 100 BC (Chao 1). The paintings “offered images of a jumble of 
human and animal forms, strangely interwove with fruit, flowers, and foliage” (Chao 1). Key to 
this description is the combination of human forms with animal and natural forms and images. 
The Renaissance understood grottesco as an ornamental style that was “playfully gay and 
carelessly fantastic, but also something ominous and sinister in the face of a world totally 
                                                          
11 Whether an abstract thing, like a market, or a material thing, like an object.  
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different from the familiar one—a world in which the realm of inanimate things is no longer 
separated from those of plants, animals, and human beings, and where the laws of statics, 
symmetry, and proportion are no longer valid” (Kayser 21). The marriage of disparate forms not 
only refers to the playful marriage of seemingly incompatible elements, but also the dreadful 
imposition of chaos upon order. The grotesque spread throughout Europe over the sixteenth 
century and became prominent in a variety of artistic forms: including drawing, engraving, 
painting and sculpture (Kayser 22). As the adjective “grotesque” came into use, it retained 
similarities to its origin. Its first German usage “refers to the monstrous fusion of human and 
nonhuman elements as the most typical feature of the grotesque style.” It’s French usage retained 
these associations, as well (Kayser 24). Frances K. Barasch notes that in 1639 or 1640 the word 
grotesque, in English, was used to refer to fantastic characters and concepts (81; 83–87). The use 
of the term “grotesque,” in both art and literature, remained popular for centuries, and its 
conceptual underpinning were relatively stable, even though  “new perceptions and conceptions 
of the grotesque occurred with every new generation of artists and critics; each created its own 
grotesque art, understood the past in its own way, and invested the world with its own meanings” 
(Barasch 152). 
Successive generations can employ the grotesque in their own, often unique ways 
because the grotesque, like childhood, is culturally constructed (Carroll, “The Grotesque Today”; 
Cassuto, The Inhuman Race 6–7; Connelly, The Grotesque in Western Art and Culture 4; 
Edwards and Graulund 11–12; Schulz 3). This can make it difficult to apprehend the grotesque, 
as what is considered grotesque in one cultural-historical moment may not be grotesque to 
others. For example, some African and Indian art was considered grotesque by Europeans but not 
the makers (Connelly, “Introduction” 5), and Andrew Schulz laments that Fransico Goya’s Los 
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Caprichos has irretrievably lost some of its meaning over time (3). Despite the importance of 
context in apprehending the grotesque, it retains some common associations. The grotesque 
challenges our conceptual categories. It “derives its effectiveness from paradox, from the fusion 
of numerous and seemingly incompatible elements – the horrible with the laughable, the sinister 
with the ludicrous, the mundane with the bizarre” (Uruburu 8). For Paula Uruburu, this 
incompatibility is present in the incompatibility between pragmatism and romanticism in 
American culture. American authors employed the grotesque to get readers to confront the 
disjunctions in society, such as violence in the name of democracy or racism during the 
formation of a national identity (3). “The fusion of numerous and incompatible elements” that 
Uruburu references undermines ontological divisions by combining what society thinks of as 
separate. Other scholars define the grotesque in similar ways. Justin Edwards and Rune Graulund 
write, “Grotesque fiction, in a general sense, violates the laws of nature.  Here, clear-cut 
taxonomies, definitions and classifications break down and, as a result, there is a built-in 
narrative tension between the ludicrous and the fearful, the absurd and the terrifying” (4).12 By 
undermining ontological divisions, such as that which separates animal from human, the 
grotesque inspires ambivalent emotional reactions. A human with a pig’s head may be laughable 
because of its incongruity, but it may also be fearsome because of its unnatural existence. The 
grotesque takes the familiar (the human, the pig) and make it strange (the human-pig/the pig-
human). This estranges us from the world we thought we knew and recreates the world as a place 
where ontological categories are blurred and rules no longer apply; this new world is central to 
definitions of the grotesque. The combination of unlikely or oppositional elements remains 
central to understanding the grotesque. Scholars of the grotesque emphasize the juxtaposition or 
                                                          
12 These reactions need not be equal. 
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fusion of the familiar with strange or oppositional elements, or the transformation of familiar 
elements into something strange (Cassuto, The Inhuman Race 6; Edwards and Graulund 3; Gysin 
28; Harpham 9). The grotesque’s unsettling juxtapositions and combinations are often lauded for 
their disruptive and subversive qualities because they have the potential to force viewers and 
readers to reexamine the ways in which they order the world (Cassuto, The Inhuman Race 8; 
Edwards and Graulund 3; Gysin 28; Harpham 12). 
Wolfgang Kayser and Mikhail Bakhtin provide examples of the different ways the 
grotesque may be received. The mixture of the familiar and unfamiliar can be fearsome. For 
Wolfgang Kayser, the grotesque is violent and destructive. He writes, “The grotesque world is—
and is not—our own world. The ambiguous way in which we are affected by it results from our 
awareness that the familiar and apparently harmonious world is alienated under the impact of 
abysmal forces, which break it up and shatter its coherence” (37). Kayser’s description privileges 
order and considers its violation dangerous, but Mikhail Bakhtin glorifies in the disruptive and 
subversive qualities of the grotesque. Bakhtin identifies these qualities within the carnivalesque: 
a cognate to the grotesque involving medieval carnivals. Medieval carnivals provided people 
with respite from the feudal and ecclesiastical hierarchy that dominated the political landscape 
(5–6). In the carnival, with its emphasis on folk humor and laughter, hierarchies are overturned 
and everyone is considered equal, regardless of their station outside of the carnival world (10). 
The legacy of the carnivalesque and its subversive folk humor carries into subsequent iterations 
of the grotesque, such as grotesque realism, which Bakhtin argues is primarily concerned with 
positive images of bodily excess (18–19). Kayser and Bakhtin present two starkly different 
conceptions of the grotesque. Kayser’s emphasis on the infernal and disorienting is a far cry from 
Bakhtin’s interest in laughter and excess. What they have in common, however, is an interest in 
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fusions or juxtapositions (human/nonhuman, high/low) and systemic subversion of the natural 
order. Furthermore, while the grotesque is often associated with bodies, any fusion or 
juxtaposition which subverts the “natural” order or calls into question the schema on which we 
categorize the world may be grotesque. As Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. so eloquently puts it, “The 
grotesque is life set free of law” (The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction 190). It refuses to 
acquiesce to the political, religious, or cultural norms, and instead creates the space for 
challenging them.  
 Twentieth-century American culture is rife with the grotesque. It’s present in comic strips 
like Dick Tracy from the 1940s and in comic books like The Fantastic Four from the 1960s 
(Berger 113; 199). Arthur Asa Berger writes that the grotesque in Dick Tracy allows us to release 
our aggressions, guilt-free, on grotesque characters because the comic strip uses the grotesque to 
represent moral absolutes like good and evil (127), whereas grotesque figures in Marvel Comics 
like The Fantastic Four represent concerns over science and technology  (202). Nancy Bombaci 
argues that the American modernists Nathanael West, Djuna Barnes, Ted Browning and Carson 
McCullers utilize the grotesque “to foster a social criticism that explored issues of class, 
ethnicity, and gender” (134). Mark Fearnow demonstrates that the grotesque was the dominant 
mode of Depression Era theater, as a result of the world “not-making-sense” to audiences at the 
time, a common feature during times of “rapid social change” (7). John R. Clarke believes the 
satiric grotesque is the dominant mode of the twentieth century because “the ideal of inevitable 
progress came terribly crashing to the ground, shattered by monumental world wars, revolutions, 
indeterminacy, atomic energy, the Freudian id, and the Holocaust” (18). As the world changes 
and our ideas are increasingly challenged, the grotesque represents these distortions. Dieter 
Meindl considers the metaphysical grotesque, with its juxtaposition of concepts like life and 
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death, the thread which runs throughout American literature; while Gilbert H. Muller considers 
the grotesque to be an “informing principle” in American literature and the dominant motif in 
Flannery O’Conner’s work especially (4). Istvan Csiscery-Ronay, Jr. asserts the grotesque is 
arguably the “dominant sensibility of modernism” and postmodernism. The difference being that 
“anomalous deviations” were monstrous during modernism, but became the norm during 
postmodernism (“On the Grotesque in Science Fiction” 72–73).13 Noël Carroll asserts that the 
grotesque has proliferated in contemporary American culture and is now present “on the A list of 
mass culture,” although Carroll believes this is because of the ever-increasing market for leisure 
and not a reflection of the contemporary zeitgeist  (“The Grotesque Today” 293; 309). Kathryn 
Hume argues that contemporary fiction actively seeks to cause discomfort in readers so they 
might question their values and more critically engage with a text’s message. The grotesque is 
one of the mechanisms by which authors achieve this. She writes, “Novels presenting the 
grotesque drive home the point that our conventional ideas about meaning are inadequate. 
Meaning, after all, frequently comes from predictable form, both in plots and in physical shape; 
it relies on firm boundaries. The grotesque exists to break patterns, in particular the pattern of 
what it is to be human” (166). By extension, the question of what it means to be human is then 
also a central question in contemporary fiction.  
I argue that a strain of the grotesque, as depicted in certain speculative narratives, 
represents concern over the changing nature of childhood and the increasing obviousness that 
parents cannot always shelter and protect children as much as they may prefer. The grotesque 
                                                          
13 All of the texts I write about have postmodern elements. These elements include hybridity, pastiche, a-historicity, 
and playing with language. However, I only write specifically about postmodernism in relation to Elephantmen. 
This is because postmodernism is central to understanding this text, but not the others. I focus on the grotesque in 
each chapter instead of the postmodern because the grotesque in these texts always connects to the children’s 
commodification, whereas the postmodern does not. 
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bodies of children in the narratives within this project represent the way in which the 
proliferation of neoliberal values have overtaken what were recently considered social realms, 
thus changing conceptions of children and childhood. Children are often idealized as innocents 
and are currently the dominant symbol in political discourse; ciphers through which politicians 
and other adults assert their own values (Edelman). The ability of neoliberal logic to invade the 
supposedly sacred space of childhood is theorized through the warped and unfamiliar bodies of 
grotesque children. As society’s ideas about childhood change, the grotesque children 
metaphorically embody this change. Grotesque depictions of children have the power to show 
the extremes to which neoliberalism dehumanizes people by showing its invasion of one of 
society’s most sacred institutions: childhood. At the same time, however, the metaphor ends up 
justifying the exploitation of the children by depicting them as radically different from our 
idealized conceptions of children. Thinking about children as economic assets validates itself by 
transforming children into bodies suitable for exploitation. The grotesque bodies used to 
illustrate dehumanization also create a systemic loop where they end up providing the 
justification for their abuse. The grotesque children aren’t considered fully human. In this way, 
the logic of the grotesque in these texts offer the means to consider the humanity of the 
characters, while always effacing this humanity. Just as neoliberalism always becomes the 
solution to its own problem. When neoliberalism creates economic disparity, neoliberals call for 
more neoliberalism, thus worsening economic inequality. When grotesque bodies illustrate the 
horror of neoliberal commodification upon the body, they can’t help but acknowledge the 
plausibility that these bodies need economic justification because they are different. 
The grotesque is suited to representing tension over the commodification of bodies in part 
because it already can be understood in relation to the economy. Tensions rooted in “categories 
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of religion, polity and commerce” may be displaced into the grotesque (Webb and Enstice 96), 
and vast economic inequality and government spending on war and defense rather than 
combating poverty may also be understood as grotesque (Adams 72). The grotesque is also an 
apt metaphor for the changing nature of childhood because of their shared interest in liminality. 
In Childhood, Chris Jenks observes, “The child is familiar to us and yet strange, he or she 
inhabits our world and yet seems to answer to another, he or she is essentially of ourselves and 
yet appears to display a systematically different order of being” (3). Jenks’ description of the 
child emphasizes his or her liminal nature as a creature existing between worlds. The liminality 
inherent in Jenks’ description is strikingly similar to definitions of the grotesque. For example, 
Leonard Cassuto writes, “The grotesque is born of the violation of basic categories. It occurs 
when an image cannot be easily classified even on the most fundamental level: when it is both 
one thing and another, and thus neither one” (The Inhuman Race 6). Cassuto’s definition of the 
grotesque is similar to Jenks’ definition of childhood in its emphasis on the problems of simply 
categorizing something as one thing or another. But Jenks’ description of the child, and its 
similarity to definitions of the grotesque, does not challenge our ability to classify children 
because of startling juxtapositions or fusions. It relies on the liminal nature of childhood itself. 
Ewa Kuryluk directly connects childhood to the grotesque. She considers childhood an “anti-
world” governed by adults, and she notes that children, along with women and animals, are often 
positioned in opposition to the church and state (3; 319). It is the conceptualization of children as 
grotesque, as creatures belonging to multiple worlds (social and economic, child and adult) but 
fully belonging to none, that this project employs in an attempt to better understand 
contemporary depictions of childhood.  
Project Description 
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Within the context of the preceding framework, the following chapters each read a single 
text as illustrative of how the grotesque depiction of children or childhood embodies the 
transformative aspect of commodification, which turns people into commodities. Shun-Liang 
Chao writes, “As a metaphor, the grotesque body, whilst demanding figurative interpretations, 
makes visible the superficial or literal level of dissimilarity and thereby gives rise to a powerful 
effect of the biologically horrible and the logically absurd,” thus making metaphors literal  (57). 
The texts under examination literalize the metaphor regarding how commodification changes 
people, and, as a whole, show a persistent interest in how changing conceptions of children and 
childhood transform both bodies and relationships. Sometimes this commodification is for 
money, sometimes it provide adults with materials, like organs or test subjects, but it always 
sacrifices children for the benefit of adults. The grotesque pervades all these instances of 
commodification. Therefore, each chapter is also an argument for the primacy of the grotesque as 
the dominant aesthetic in the text under examination. 
This project follows the example of Karen Renner and considers childhood to be anyone 
below the age of eighteen (5). Any attempt to draw a clear cut division is fraught with issues. 
Most people consider children those who have yet to reach puberty, after which children become 
adolescents. However, puberty comes at different times for different people, and grouping 
adolescents with children acknowledges the political dimension of childhood, where anyone 
under age eighteen cannot vote and is not (usually) tried as an adult if they commit a crime. It 
also helps smooth over the problem of aging in the narratives. The characters in the texts under 
examination are often depicted over a period of years. Some narratives spend more time on the 
characters as adults than others, but it is in childhood where the characters are forged in the 
crucible of exploitation and commodification.  
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Because the grotesque originated in the visual arts before migrating into literature and 
because images can be especially helpful in depicting abstract concepts, this dissertation begins 
by focusing on two comic book series: Jeff Lemire’s Sweet Tooth and Richard Starkings’ 
Elephantmen. Sweet Tooth is an inherently conservative text in spite of its emphasis on 
nonhuman characters. It argues that children are inherently innocent, but that it becomes 
impossible to shelter them from the wider world, where there are always people interested in 
exploiting them.  To demonstrate this, Sweet Tooth draws on the discourse of the innocent child 
but shows how borders are incapable of preventing crossing, which metaphorically represents the 
impossibility of preserving childhood innocence. The comics eventually replace the hegemony of 
humanity with a community of animal/human hybrids, but this community is vastly similar to 
previous conceptions of human communities, as it reestablishes children as social creatures to be 
protected from exploitation. Elephantmen, on the other hand, utilizes the racial grotesque to 
demonstrate that the attempt to dehumanize a person or group of people is a process that can 
never be fully completed. In the midst of dehumanization, people always reassert their humanity. 
The series draws upon the experiences of slaves and immigrants and mashes them up into a 
postmodern pastiche, where the specifics of the individual experience of outsiders are forsaken 
for a collective emphasis on a homogenous outsider trying to leave his or her past behind and 
forge his or her own future.  
After analyzing the comics, the project shifts to novels: Katherine Dunn’s Geek Love, 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, and Ben Marcus’ The Flame Alphabet. Geek Love and Never 
Let Me Go draw upon the female grotesque to show the way in which female bodies are 
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marginalized.14 Women in Geek Love take ownership of their deformities to sexually commodify 
themselves. While these moments come with possibilities for self-expression and agency, they 
risk drawing the wrath of the powerful. Furthermore, this chapter examines the relationship 
between the freak and the grotesque. While the freak is commonly referred to as grotesque, the 
reason for this tends to be taken for granted. This chapter argues that conceptual similarities 
between the freak and the grotesque are at the heart of the relationship between the two concepts. 
In Never Let Me Go, moments of true agency are less common than they are in Geek Love, and 
the characters, who engage in feminized labor in addition to being organ donors, are overworked 
to exhaustion and lack the capacity to resist. Furthermore, while Geek Love draws upon a typical 
representations of the grotesque—deformed bodies—Never Let Me Go recalls the ontological 
uncertainty of the grotesque, as clones challenge what it means to be human by being 
indistinguishable from humans. The final chapter on The Flame Alphabet complicates the 
dynamic of the first four chapters. While children are commodified in the novel and are 
metaphorically grotesque due to their association with animals and objects, it’s the adults whose 
bodies are warped beyond comprehension. The novel posits a world where adults are at the 
whims of children, until they forcibly reassert their dominance. In doing so, The Flame Alphabet 
draws upon the power of language and metaphor to depict the grotesque and to explore what 
happens when meaning breaks down.  
Together these texts demonstrate the perverseness of the commodification of children by 
depicting it in relation to military and scientific communities and corporations (Elephantmen, 
                                                          
14 While Bakhtin’s emphasis on the carnival would make sense as a frame for Geek Love, Bakhtin over-emphasizes, 
I think, subversion and positivity. But Geek Love, while it has moments of subversion and encourages bodily 
acceptance, reflects a dominant ideology rather than upending it. There are subversive moments within the novel, 
but, as a whole, it leaves little room for alternatives. 
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Sweet Tooth), the state (Never Let Me Go), and the family (The Flame Alphabet, Geek Love). 
Whether children should be kept separate from markets or not, they are sacred social beings (as 
fraught as these constructions are) in contemporary culture. Therefore, objectifying them causes 
anxiety even as it reflects a potentially disturbing reality. The grotesque provides a way of 
thinking about childhood in uncertain and confusing times due to the relationship of the 
grotesque with incongruity and opposition. All of the chapters demonstrate that not only are the 
children grotesque metaphors, but that adults can be metaphorically grotesque due to their 
actions. In this way, the theoretically value-neutral concept of the grotesque also works in 
tandem with the linguistically pejorative adjective “grotesque.” The texts draw upon various 
Western conceptions of childhood, some innocent, some chaotic, but situate them in worlds that 
posit how neoliberalism fundamentally changes our understanding of humanity and social 
relationships. This is done by estranging us from children, who are commonly considered 
symbols of reproductive futurity and are simultaneously some of the people most in need of 
protection. Because of the emphasis on Western conceptions of childhood and on the Western 
tradition of the grotesque, the texts under exanimation are themselves Western. Jeff Lemire is a 
Canadian, and Sweet Tooth was published by an American comics publisher for a primarily 
American audience. It takes place in the Western United States. Richard Starkings was born in 
England but immigrated to the United States, and Elephantmen is also published by an American 
comics company and takes place primarily in the United States. Katherine Dunn and Ben Marcus 
are both from the United States, and Kazuo Ishiguro is British. They all foresee a world where 
the invasiveness of neoliberalism transforms and dehumanizes. 
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The Grotesque Child: Animal/Human Hybridity in Sweet Tooth 
Sweet Tooth1 is a serialized comic book that takes place in a post-apocalyptic United 
States approximately seven years after a plague ravages the human population. The beginning of 
the plague coincides with human newborns being born as animal/human hybrids. These hybrids 
are immune to the plague. The titular character, Gus (nicknamed Sweet Tooth), is a mostly 
human-looking hybrid with antlers and deer-like ears. Some hybrids appear predominantly 
human, some animal, but all blur the line between the categories of animal and human, unsettling 
their ontological status. Gus is raised in isolation in Nebraska by his religious father, Richard, 
who hides him from hunters. These hunters trade the hybrid children, alive or dead, to a 
military/scientific compound for resources. In the compound, pregnant women and hybrid 
children are experimented upon in the hopes of unlocking a cure for the plague. These 
experiments often kill the women and children. Richard eventually dies from the plague, and Gus 
is left alone. He decides to go with a man named Jepperd who promises to take him to a wildlife 
sanctuary where other children are kept safe.  Instead, Jepperd takes Gus to the compound where 
he trades Gus for the body of his dead wife. Jepperd regrets his actions and enlists a hybrid-
worshiping cult to attack the compound. During the attack, Jepperd and Gus are separated, but 
Gus and some other hybrid children escape. This escape sets off a chain of events in which 
Jepperd seeks to reunite with and protect Gus. Gus, meanwhile, learns he may have been born or 
created before the onset of the plague and that his father was a worker at a scientific compound 
in Alaska. Gus travels to Alaska in search of answers, while being pursued by the men he 
escaped from. Gus eventually learns Native American gods once walked the Earth. Scientists 
found these gods buried in Alaska and cloned them to create the first hybrid babies. This, 
                                                          
1 Contributing artists, including colorists and letterers, include Pat Brosseau, Matt Kindt, Emi Lenox, Carlos M. 
Mangual, Nate Powell, and José Villarrubia 
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according to Singh, a scientist turned religious devotee, led to retribution in the form of the 
plague and the accompanying birth of the hybrids to humans (Wild Game 88–90).2 A showdown 
then occurs between Gus and his fellowship and their pursuers. Some friendly adults, including 
Jepperd, give their lives so that Gus and some of his companions escape. They eventually join 
with other hybrids and form a community that outlasts the humans. 
While Sweet Tooth take place in a speculative future, this future is a commentary on the 
contemporary, Western world. This is commonplace in science fiction and other speculative 
fictions. David Ketterer argues that science fictional worlds are related to the real world through 
“rational extrapolation and analogy or of religious belief” (13). Science fiction deals with the 
contemporary by considering its logical development or placing it in new contexts. The comic 
book’s narrative fits neatly within the post-apocalyptic genre which currently figures so 
prominently in contemporary United States entertainment. The narrative complicates the post-
apocalyptic genre, however, by focusing not on the survival of the human race, but on the 
survival of the replacement for the human race: the hybrids. In doing so, the series utilizes the 
animal/human hybridity of the children as a metaphor for contemporary anxiety over the 
exploitation of children. The grotesque bodies of Sweet Tooth’s animal/human hybrids provide a 
metaphor for commodification; they literalize what the abstract concept of commodification does 
to corporeal bodies.3  The pressures that neoliberalism places on children as it reverses the 
twentieth century’s emphasis on children as emotional assets in the Western world are theorized 
                                                          
2 Gus is one of the hybrids initially created at the Alaskan facility. After the plague ravages the facility, Richard, 
who is a janitor there, finds and takes the infant Gus. Gus is raised without any knowledge of his origin. The hybrids 
experimented upon for a cure are all born of human parents. The specific origins of the hybrids and the plague are 
not fully revealed until the end of the series, years after the series began, and the scientists and military at the 
compound where the experiments on the hybrids and pregnant women take place are not aware of the origins either.  
3 I borrow the language of Evan Calder Williams in his analysis of how zombie films depicting late capitalism 
demonstrate “how real abstractions affect real bodies” (73). However, the grotesque bodies I examine extend beyond 
the single and specific figure of the zombie. 
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in Sweet Tooth via the grotesque, manifested in the representational hybridity of the child 
characters as part animal/part human. This “making” of the hybrid is effectuated through the 
commodification process itself, in which children function as commodities. This leads to a 
never-ending “cross between a human” and something else (an animal, an object), which is 
grotesque (Chao 45). This causes some adults to no longer consider the children human. 
Animal/Human Hybridity and Exploitation 
 Katherine Kelp-Stebbins argues that the series participates in a renegotiation of what it 
means to be human by destabilizing traditional hierarchies, such as word/image and 
human/animal relationships. This destabilization involves the hybridity of the comics form and 
the comic book’s narrative. This renegotiation allows for a post-humanist reimagining of being. 
Kelp-Stebbins notes, “The boundaries between nature and culture, human and animal, man and 
god, and mind and body are sketchy and seamy … expectations about the diegetic world are 
frustrated or overturned so that the knowledge of the world it presents is always only 
speculative” (339). This speculation is the result of the indeterminacy of the narrative. Because 
boundaries in the narrative are “sketchy and seamy,” clearly classifying the “diegetic world” is 
difficult. The liminality between elements that one might consider separate (nature/culture, 
human/animal, etc.) is analogous to the grotesque.4 
The hybrid boy Gus cannot be easily classified because he is a cross between animal and 
human. Furthermore, he often looks older than his age. He is under ten years old, but the long, 
sometimes angular line-work of Lemire ages Gus, which reinforces some adults’ refusal to see 
Gus as a child (Figure 1.1). This refusal is partially because Gus is part animal, but it is also 
                                                          
4 More broadly, Michael Chaney observes that comics’ association with childhood and their “resistan[ce] to 
maturity” make them “uniquely suited to representing what early anthropology defined as liminality, the condition 
of being on the boundary par excellence, in the penumbra between youth and adulthood” (133). 
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because, in the society in which Gus lives, adults are always cognizant of Gus’s value as a 
commodity. While Lemire’s use of long lines when drawing faces is a common aesthetic across 
his work, the style works particularly well here: Gus’s older appearance reflects the harsh world 
in which he lives, where hunters trade children for resources and adults battle each other.  
The implications of this grotesque hybridity create provocative tensions that speak to larger 
social questions and concerns about childhood. In one panel, for example, Gus and five other 
hybrid children are caged and waiting for their captors to return (Figure 1.2). The caging of 
children is perverse, of course; the caging of animals may also be perverse, but it is acceptable in 
contemporary United States society. Therefore, there is a clash between what a society may or 
may not condone that becomes complicated by the hybrid nature of the children. When Gus 
introduces himself to the rest of the hybrids, Wendy, the human/pig, calls the other hybrids 
“ignorants” (In Captivity 19) because they cannot effectively communicate.5 That some of these 
child characters are incapable of language begs consideration of when the dehumanization of 
others’ bodies is acceptable.  
The United States has an abject history involving experimentation on those who lack the 
power to speak for themselves, literally and metaphorically. Mike Stobbe details some of this 
history in an Associated Press article preceding a 2011 biomedical ethics commission. In his 
abbreviated history, Stobbe notes experimentation on United States prisoners increased 
dramatically in the 1940s and 1950s as the pharmaceutical and health care industries grew. 
Backlash in the 1970s over the use of powerless populations in experiments led to their decline 
(3). These experiments were driven by economic considerations: “In 1973, pharmaceutical 
industry officials acknowledged they were using prisoners for testing because they were cheaper 
                                                          
5 The ineffectiveness of communication is discussed further in Chapter 5 in regards to The Flame Alphabet. 
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than chimpanzees” (3). This comparison coincides with the hybridity of the children in Sweet 
Tooth and is indicative of the dehumanizing nature of commodification. Examples of the types of 
experiments being conducted on humans kept separate from mainstream society abound. 
American scientists conducting a study from 1946-1948 at a mental hospital in Guatemala 
“infected prisoners and patients … with syphilis … to test whether penicillin could prevent some 
sexually transmitted diseases” (4). From 1963-1966, administrators of one study at the 
Willowbrook State School infected intellectually disabled children with hepatitis to test a 
potential cure (3). Professionals administering these tests may feel the benefits outweigh the 
risks. Saul Krugman, who was involved in the Willowbrook hepatitis study, defends it. He notes 
they obtained permission from parents and that most of the child subjects would have contacted 
the virus anyway in the course of their stay. He also asserts that those who were infected were 
kept separate from the general population and thus avoided contracting other viruses that were 
present in the population. He writes, “The fact that the children were mentally retarded was 
relevant only to the extent that society placed them in an institution where hepatitis was 
prevalent. The primary objective of our studies was to protect the children and employees while 
acquiring new knowledge in the process” (160). Even if one accepts Krugman’s rationale, the 
tests were still only administered on vulnerable populations. Were the children not vulnerable 
already, they would never have been there. Furthermore, it is apparent that not everyone shared 
concern for their test subjects. Faculty members in the dermatology department of the University 
of Pennsylvania Medical School, including Dr. Albert Kligman, had a "cavalier attitude toward 
using institutionalized groups as research subjects" and would sometimes joke about them 
(Hornblum 35). Dr. Kligman was the force behind experiments on prisoners in Holmesburg 
Prison from the 1950s-1970s. Upon entering the prison for the first time, he recalls: “All I saw 
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before me were acres of skin. It was like a farmer seeing a fertile field for the first time” (qtd in 
Hornblum 37). The emphasis on people’s skin, rather than their personhood, and the comparison 
to farming, where soil is worked, sometimes violently, to feed and support people situates the 
prisoners as objects and resources to be used for the sake of others. This figuration of the 
vulnerable as resources to be exploited connects to the use of the hybrid children in Sweet Tooth. 
One particularly evocative image of this in Sweet Tooth shows a horse/human hybrid on an 
operating table in the compound in which the hybrids are experimented upon (Figure 1.3). Its 
chest cavity is ripped open and blood is sprayed everywhere. This panel would be shocking if the 
hybrid was all animal, but adding human elements, like the human-like body and the positioning 
of the hybrid on his back, makes these images even more obscene. The panel is especially 
disturbing because the mutilated body is out in the open, and blood is splattered across the floor 
and wall, which may indicate the hybrid was cut open while alive when blood still pumped in his 
arteries. These elements reveal the butchery underneath the clinical setting of the tiled room and 
dissection table: an artifice meant to add an air of legitimacy to the experimentation taking place 
on the hybrids.  
The experimentation on hybrids in Sweet Tooth is a perverse continuation of Western 
society’s experimentation on not just animals, but humans who have been treated as such due to 
certain conditions, disorders, or situations. The hybrid’s exploitation is complicated by their 
uncertain ontological status. Leaving aside the significant ethical considerations of the 
exploitation of nonhuman animals, the nonhuman aspects of the characters is what makes them 
ripe for exploitation. It is tied up in their immunity to the plague ravaging adult populations. It 
also distances them from adults because they can inspire horror as easily as maternal and 
paternal affection. Regardless of their ability to inspire horror or disgust, however, the hybrids 
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are the children of humans. While legal institutions that might advocate for them have crumbled 
into the ruins of the new world, they remain the heirs of humanity. Sweet Tooth leaves little 
doubt that the exploitation of the hybrids is morally reprehensible. At the same time, their 
exploitation opens up space for consideration of the history of such mistreatment in the United 
States, as well as readers’ own complicity in the exploitation of others. People want to reject 
exploitation, but people also accept or ignore it.  
The comic books consider readers’ complicity by utilizing direct address. One example of 
this is the caged hybrids, all facing Gus, who are drawn at an angle so they face the reader, as if 
challenging the reader regarding his or her own complicity in what is transpiring (Figure 1.2). Of 
course the reader is an observer and has no power over the narrative; at the same time, however, 
the reader’s enjoyment of the narrative is predicated on the exploitation of the hybrids. The 
hybrids’ persecution heightens the satisfaction of their escape. When Gus is subsequently 
questioned by Doctor Singh, the scientist running the experiments, the comic book engages in a 
series of mostly alternating point-of-view panels as the characters take turns speaking, although 
Singh’s dialogue intrudes into Gus’s panel in the second row (Figure 1.4).6 In the last row of 
panels, however, Singh has the first two panels and Gus has the last one. The break in the 
alternating images extends Singh’s narrative space as he continue articulating his reasoning for 
why he is not a “bad man” (In Captivity 65). Singh asserts, “We are the only semblance of order 
left in this world. And I know it’s hard to understand…but the things we do here…we are 
humanity’s last hope.” Gus rejects Singh’s rationalization: “You cut up animal kids…I saw it! 
You think you’re doing good, but you’re just a sinner…the worst sinner” (In Captivity 65). Gus’s 
response is part of a panel where Gus is drawn directly facing the reader and pointing his finger 
                                                          
6 The alternating series of panels is initially established on the preceding page. 
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in accusation. The alternating panels are broken so that Gus’s rejection is in the final, rather than 
the middle, panel. This ends the page in rebuttal and subtly reinforces Gus’s stance over Singh’s. 
The use of “you” in Gus’s accusation, combined with the pointed finger, further confronts the 
reader. Gus’s moral position is all the more powerful because of the tag on his ear, which 
catalogs him as an object of experimentation and study. From a compositional standpoint, Gus is 
addressing not only Singh, but the reader, as well (as is Singh).7 To the extent that the series 
critiques contemporary structures of exploitation, this exchange challenges the reader’s 
complicity in processes of objectification. Singh does not give up rationalizing his behavior: He 
explains that he has done horrible things, but that “we must keep trying” because “soon we’ll be 
gone…all of us.” Gus responds, “Not me…Not us animal kids” (In Captivity 66). Gus’s response 
is incisive. These adults are engaging in short-sighted thinking that will harm future generations 
for the sake of the present.8 To some extent this is understandable because they are scared and 
dying; but, for many people, harming others requires some sort of estrangement. Singh excludes 
Gus from his vision of collective humanity—Gus isn’t included in Singh’s “us”— not because 
he’s unaware that Gus will live on, but rather because Singh does not consider him fully human. 
It is striking then that Gus’s critique co-opts Singh’s rhetoric of difference. By reminding Singh 
that the “animal kids” will survive, Gus’s rebuttal undermines Singh’s rationale on two registers. 
Metaphorically, it rejects short-term ideologies that sacrifice futurity for the sake of the present 
by announcing that the desires of one generation are not always in line with the desires of 
subsequent ones; literally, it reorients the rationale for exploiting hybrids—that they are 
                                                          
7 While direct address wasn’t Lemire’s intent, it is an effect of the POV. Lemire’s art is also “expressive” and meant 
to capture “emotional mood.” This may contribute to the feeling of being directly addressed (Lemire, “Interview”). 
8 While the villains would argue that they are working towards the long-term good, the narrative undercuts such an 
argument by showing the butchery the adults commit without any noticeable strides towards curing the plague. In 
flashbacks, the primary villain is also depicted as a brutal man before the experiments. 
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different—as an argument for not exploiting hybrids: the problems of the humans are not the 
problems of the hybrids.   
The tension between adults seeing children as nonhuman objects of study and 
experimentation arises from some adults’ objectification and is aided by the grotesque 
representations of the hybrids, but it also evokes the ways in which society exploits children and 
others in contemporary society. Treating humans as objects is itself a grotesque hybridization 
that often benefits the economic elite at the expense of lower classes. But the objectification of 
people, in reality and in fiction, is never completely realized. The series consistently emphasizes 
the humanity of the children (Figure 1.5). It would be difficult to argue that the humanity of 
these characters does not supersede their hybridity. Three hybrids, embracing, with fear and 
uncertainty etched into their faces, comforting each other against the harsh situation in which 
they find themselves. All having lost family and friends and believing they will be the next to go. 
While Gus’s argument that the concerns of the hybrid kids are not the concerns of the human 
adults is persuasive, if ineffective, a more powerful appeal involves their shared humanity. 
Shared humanity so evocatively expressed by Lemire’s interest in “emotional truth” 
(“Interview”). The hybrids aren’t always depicted as humans who happen to have some of the 
physical features of animals. There are some hybrids that are almost exclusively animal, like a 
bird/human hybrid and dog/human hybrids; and there is Bobby, a groundhog hybrid who feels 
the need to hibernate in the winter. Yet in the major cases, Gus and Wendy, the hybrids are 
shown to be different from humans physically, but not intellectually or emotionally. This is in-
line with Michael Chaney’s argument that the anthropomorphization of animals and use of 
animal/human hybridity9 in comics almost always connotes otherness but eventually reasserts the 
                                                          
9 This has a long history in comics. Consider George Herriman’s Krazy Kat, Walt Kelly’s Pogo, Disney’s Donald 
Duck (which was especially popular with Carl Banks as creator), or Art Spiegelman’s Maus, for example. 
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“superiority of the human” (132). Consider, for example, that these characters often walk as 
humans do. Such animal or animal/human characters always reinforce the human because the 
human doesn’t need to be visualized. Rather it functions by being the invisible ideal against 
which the animal character is judged (133). The animal character is a mask, “beneath which lies 
the human” (135). In this way, the “visual distortion” behind the depictions of such characters is 
“radically conservative,” even though it may not appear to be (133). This is part of the reason the 
humanity of the hybrids is emphasized. They may not be humans visually, but their appearance 
(and behaviors) are usually re-inscribing their humanity.10  
It is Gus’s humanity which wins Gus his most loyal adult ally. The specific moment when 
Jepperd recognizes Gus’s humanity is depicted early in the series (Figure 1.6). Jepperd tracks 
Gus to his home. He will convince Gus to go with him to an animal sanctuary, then instead take 
him to the compound where these experiments are taking place and trade him for the body of his 
dead wife, who died giving birth to a hybrid in the same compound: a trade that treats Gus as a 
commodity. Jepperd will eventually experience regret, stage a break out, and become Gus’s 
protector; but at this moment, Jepperd is a predator. Jepperd observes, “I ain’t never seen a deer-
one before” (Out of the Deep Woods 36). This emphasizes Gus’s animal aspect while refusing to 
recognize the human aspect. He says “one” rather than “child” or “kid” or even “hybrid.” This 
phrasing positions Gus as other. It reflects the estrangement necessary for Jepperd to harm him. 
In the first, large panel, which occupies the top two thirds of the page, Jepperd is holding Gus by 
the antler with one hand and a gun in the other. The next panel is small and thin, focusing on 
                                                          
10 In addition to Chaney’s assertion regarding the prevalence of animals subjects in comics, the animal/human 
hybrids in Sweet Tooth are also an effective vehicle for representing grotesque children not only because animal 
elements are, historically, often used in depictions of the grotesque, but also because real animals have the capacity 
to be grotesque. Wolfgang Kayser writes, “Real animals also frequently recur in the grotesques.  Even in animals 
that are familiar to him, modern man may experience the strangeness of something totally different from himself and 
suggestive of abysmal ominousness. Certain animals are especially suitable to the grotesque—snakes, owls, toads, 
spiders—the nocturnal and creeping animals which inhabit realms apart from and inaccessible to man” (182).  
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Jepperd’s eyes. Like the panel, they are narrow, and the suspicion he feels is made evident in 
their glare. The next panel, composed of the same size and basic composition, cuts to Gus’s eyes, 
which are wide in fear. Despite the longer ears, Gus looks just as human as Jepperd does, 
especially because in this narrow framing his antlers are no longer visible. The fourth and final 
panel returns again to Jepperd’s eyes, which are now wide in belated recognition of Gus’s 
humanity. In the next page he says “Relax kid…I ain’t gonna hurt you” (Out of the Deep Woods 
37). Of course, Jepperd will take advantage of Gus, but at this moment Jepperd’s physical 
dominance of Gus ends. Over the course of their journey Jepperd bonds with Gus, which sets the 
stage for Jepperd’s rescue attempt. That bond begins here, with Jepperd seeing Gus’s humanity 
through his expressive eyes and recognizing him as a “kid” rather than a “deer-one.” Looking 
solely at a hybrid’s animal aspects may allow some to delude themselves into thinking that 
hybrids lack humanity, but, when confronted with Gus’s humanity, Jepperd cannot ignore it. 
This sequence is especially interesting coming, as it does, after one from an animal 
perspective. After burying his father, Gus encounters a buck (Figure 1.7). The first panel is a 
large establishing image of Gus and the buck, and the entirely page has a similar composition to 
the encounter between Gus and Jepperd: a large panel that takes up most of the page and depicts 
an initial confrontation followed by narrow panels emphasizing the eyes of the characters. In the 
large panel, the buck seems to be creeping exceptionally close to Gus. It could be slowly 
approaching, leg raised in careful consideration of his next step. It could be confidently striding 
towards Gus, as if Gus were another buck to be challenged for invading his territory. Either way, 
the buck is approaching incredibly close, something bucks do not generally do around humans. 
The antlers, of course, tie these two creatures together, but it is the emphasis on the eyes that 
truly connects them. Gus’s expression is hard to trace. It could be sadness at his father’s burial or 
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apprehension regarding the approaching buck. The buck seems focused. Despite these 
differences, the eyes of Gus and the buck are similar in appearance, as are their other features, 
such as the angle of their noses and slope of their ears. The placement of these panels beneath the 
image of the buck potentially advancing on Gus creates a pause allowing for recognition to take 
place. As opposed to the potential for movement in the top image implied by the buck’s upraised 
hoof, the narrow panels emphasizing their eyes lacks any implied movement. The lack of 
movement provides the space for consideration between the two beings. It is interesting that the 
eyes detailed in the previously discussed series of panels convey the shared humanity of Jepperd 
and Gus, despite Gus’s hybridity, while the eyes here emphasis shared animality. 
Despite their differences, these scenes are both about potential connections, even if for the 
briefest of moments. In fact, even though the latter example involves Gus’s identification with 
the deer, the bottom panel actually makes the buck appear more human, too, thus reinforcing the 
connection between different forms of alterity. Showing Gus looking like a buck and the buck 
looking like a human is one way to emphasize the fluid nature regarding how one understands 
both difference and similarity. Sadly, that fluidity gets the buck killed, as hunters who are trying 
to capture Gus accidentally shoot the buck instead. These moments highlight the uncertain nature 
of Gus’s ontological status, but they also allow for the possibility of recognizing different forms 
of being based on similarities rather than differences.  
Childhood Innocence 
 Part of the reason the hybrids are so sympathetic is because of their reliance on childhood 
and innocence. Lemire states, “Sweet Tooth was about childhood and innocence and the things 
that destroy them. Making the children animal/human hybrids added yet another level of 
innocence to it. What's more innocent than animals[?] They aren't good or evil. They just are[.] 
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They are nature” (“Interview”). While the hybridity of the animals has ramifications beyond 
exploring innocence, innocence and its destruction are central themes of the narrative. The 
butchery present in the earlier image of the dissected hybrid, for example, is purposefully 
shocking and contrasts with Gus’ personality and innocence (“Interview”).  The innocence of 
children to which Lemire refers is one of the dominant constructions of childhood in the Western 
world.11 Lemire’s assertion that animals, as part of nature, represent innocence is interesting 
because it associates innocence with existence unconstrained by morality.12 In this light, the 
innocence of nature can be maintained indefinitely because it’s not free from adult burdens and 
corruptions, but from questions of good and evil entirely.  
Lemire depicts the destruction of innocence most concretely with Gus. Gus’s father, 
Richard, seeks to completely shelter him from the outside world in the hopes of protecting him. 
Gus is raised in isolation because Richard fears Gus will be kidnapped and stolen for 
experimentation. At the beginning of the series, Gus, who has never interacted with anyone other 
than Richard, finds a candy bar and takes it. When Richard finds out, he chastises Gus because 
candy is sometimes used to lure out hybrids: “Where did you get this?!” Gus’s father asks. Gus 
responds, “In the woods.” Richard warns, “They’ll try to trick you with these … you have to be 
more careful. It’s in me bad now… you know I’m going soon” (Out of the Deep Woods 15–16). 
This incident highlights Gus’s sheltered upbringing. It also notes the inability of Richard to truly 
protect Gus, as the hunters eventually find Gus in spite of Richard’s best efforts. This exchange 
begins to highlight the limits of parental protection and the nature of borders and their inability to 
keep worlds separate: the world outside of Richard and Gus’s home is a place to fear and 
Richard is powerless to keep others away. The necessity of protecting children and the fluid 
                                                          
11 See the introduction, pages 1-12. 
12 This approach also takes one of the elements of chaotic children, animality, and destigmatizes it. 
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nature of borders, and the ease with which they may be transgressed, provide insight into the 
impossibility of keeping childhood separate from adult realities like, in Gus’s case, adult 
predators and knowledge of death and destruction within the wider world.  
After Richard dies, Gus must leave the protection of his childhood home: a place where 
he already knew of certain dangers but where he avoided them. Jepperd offers to take Gus to a 
wilderness preserve where hybrids are kept safe: a different form of shelter.  Gus takes a chance 
and goes with him. This moment of transition is exemplified in Gus’s passing of the borders of 
his former home (Figure 1.8). Gus, despite being alone, originally refuses to accompany Jepperd; 
so Jepperd starts to leave without him. The top half of the page shows Jepperd on the highway, 
saddling his horse, no cars in sight. The highway cuts through the image. The fence that keeps 
animals from crossing the highway, and people from entering the forest, is missing a section. 
Telephone poles are leaning and broken. Modern society has collapsed. On the forest side, a 
forest so neatly rowed it was clearly planted by human hands, is the space where Gus’s parents 
are buried, as evidenced by the graves and the dead buck. The placement of the graves by the 
highway seem counter-intuitive considering Gus’s father hid from others, and so it is strange that 
he would initially bury his wife by the highway.13 Nonetheless, this section of the page shows the 
porous nature of the divide between worlds. The fence is ineffectual, and no figurative walls 
could prevent the plague from finding Gus’s parents. But this image also shows the 
encroachment of nature onto society, which the hybrids also represent. Despite the clear planting 
lines and hollowed spaces humans made, the trees surround the highway; and while the wooden 
telephone poles crumble, the trees stand erect. The lone tree, particularly, stands tall and straight 
                                                          
13 Not because of traffic, there isn’t any, but because it seems more visible to travelers than if the grave was hidden 
further in the trees. Perhaps an explanation for this might be that the grave was put further away from the home. 
Either way, there are dangers. 
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above the graves of Gus’s parents. These images metaphorically demonstrate that nature cannot 
be completely subjugated to civilization, just as civilizing influences cannot completely shelter 
children. Gus must leave behind Richard’s legacy and the shelter he provided and make his own 
way in the world. His father was unable to completely shelter Gus, and now he is gone. Gus 
can’t remain behind; his lone source of protection from the outside world no longer exists. 
Inset within the top right of the page are speech bubbles relaying Gus’s thoughts. He 
recalls his happiness and his isolation. However, as Gus tells Jepperd, “I don’t wanna be alone 
no more.” Gus’s narrative continues on the next, right-hand page (Figure 1.9). These pages are 
basically symmetrical. The right page continues with the interior monologue of Gus, but also 
focuses more specifically on his body. In the top panel, the woods behind Gus symbolize both 
the overwhelming presence this location has had in Gus’s life, and also that Gus is leaving.  The 
speech balloons provide narration that justifies Gus’s exodus: “My dad said I ain’t never 
supposed to leave the woods. Said if I did, I’d catch fire and burn up forever. Said I’d be safe in 
the trees, that outside was only sinners and pain and hell. My dad said a lot of things. But my 
daddy ain’t here no more… Now it’s just me” (Out of the Deep Woods 41). As the narration goes 
on, the row of three panels emphasizes the importance of Gus’s movement past the broken fence. 
Although the actions in this row of panels could have taken a long or short time, the cut between 
these panels implies hesitancy as Gus stops directly in front of the fence as he contemplates the 
ramifications of his actions. The middle panel implies movement, but also a sort of stillness, 
which slows down the step which Gus takes. Then Gus is depicted from the front, outside the 
fence. The ending of Gus’s narration here, “Now it’s just me…” (Out of the Deep Woods 41) is 
juxtaposed by the bottom two panels, where we see Jepperd extend his hand, and then Gus’s 
small hand reaching up to grasp Jepperd’s larger one. It is a moment of connection as poignant as 
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Jepperd’s earlier recognition of Gus’s humanity. And while Jepperd will betray Gus, this 
betrayal is due to the complicated history of Jepperd, not any inherent desire to exploit others. 
The top third of the left page is structurally similar to other images, like the page where Jepperd 
leaves Gus at the compound (Figure 1.10). A fence crosses the page diagonally. The compound’s 
fence is certainly more secure than the highway fence, and keeps hybrids in rather than hunters 
out. Yet the fence cannot protect against the plague and Jepperd will eventually breach it. The 
difficulty in maintaining borders and boundaries exemplifies how children, and others, cannot be 
sealed off from the outside world. It provides a metaphor for the impossibility of extended 
periods of sheltering children from the outside world by depicting their constant transgression; 
they are unable to keep people either in or out. Roads and streets also serves as a border, 
especially for younger children. In this light, the crossing of the boundary of Gus’s childhood 
home is not just about the movement into a more dangerous area because of the failure of the 
boundaries in keeping potential predators out. It is also about the failure of regulation and 
structure to guarantee safety. It was only a matter of time before Gus’s cabin was discovered, 
regardless of the rules restricting Gus’s movements. The implication of this is that the rules 
Gus’s father put in place to protect Gus (don’t wander off to far, don’t take strange candy) carry 
short term benefits, but they lack long term viability. Others do not abide by Richard’s rules or 
share his concerns.  
The initial connection in Sweet Tooth between candy and predators is analogous to 
contemporary society, and it demonstrates how sometimes the protection of children and the 
maintenance of innocence are at odds. It was common practice in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
and remains so today, to warn children not to accept candy from strangers. Persistent warnings 
also crop up every year relating to potentially harmful Halloween candy. Reporters warn parents 
 
 
49 
 
that some hostile adults might slip razor blades or other harmful items or substances into candy; 
some parents then warn children. The paradox of these warnings is they destabilize the 
innocence of children in the hopes of protecting them.14 By conditioning children to be on their 
guard, society also creates the conditions by which potential innocence gives way to awareness 
of the dangers of the world. This awareness is not a bad thing, but it undermines constructions of 
innocence because it entails knowledge of the world that is at odds with innocence unburdened 
by knowledge.  
The interest in children and spatial borders has historical precedent. Viviana Zelizer 
argues that around the turn of the twentieth century children in the United States began being 
valued increasingly for their emotional worth, rather than their worth as economic contributors. 
She writes, “While in the nineteenth century, the market value of children was culturally 
acceptable, later the new normative ideal of the child as an exclusively emotional and affective 
asset precluded instrumental or fiscal considerations” (11). This shift involved changes in the 
ways children were raised, as adults increasingly sheltered children. For example, concern over 
automobile accidents in cities led to familial regulations on children’s activities:  
Saving child life meant changing the daily activities of city children, pushing 
them indoors into playrooms and schoolrooms or designing special ‘child’ public 
spaces, such as playgrounds.  Streets were not only physically dangerous, but 
socially inadequate; the proper place for a ‘sacred’ child was a protected 
environment, segregated from adult activities. (54) 
While not specifically talking about sheltering children from predators, the motivations for 
protecting children’s lives connects to the transgression of boundaries in Sweet Tooth. Sheltering 
                                                          
14 This is not to say that knowledge should neither be shared to protect children nor withheld until they might 
process it more effectively. Rather, it illustrates the tension between innocence and protection. 
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children involves the structuring, or restructuring, of their environment. Children were pulled off  
of the streets to protect them from cars and from people whom they might encounter outside, 
including adults (Zelizer 54). Not that all adults were unsavory, but children’s lives were 
increasingly structured so their encounters with all unrelated adults dwindled. The rise of forced 
schooling in the early twentieth century, which culminated during the Great Depression, helped 
reinforce this separation and played a role in creating an adolescent culture and life stage distinct 
from adults (Mintz 239). Marina Warner argues, “[C]hildhood doesn’t occupy some sealed Eden 
or Neverland set apart from the grown-up world: our children can’t be better than we are” (60). 
That Eden or Neverland cannot be sealed is indicative of the porous nature of borders. We 
cannot provide children with a world unfettered by sin or enlivened by perpetual youth. The 
metaphor of Eden, however, is more attainable than Warner gives it credit for, when we factor in 
the fall. We can protect children initially, after all, from the outside world. We just cannot 
maintain it.15 In this light, Eden is the appropriate metaphor; it represents innocence one can 
initially protect, until children inevitable encounter knowledge and thus can no longer exist in 
their sheltered Eden. This is not to make the loss of innocence sound sinister; children simply 
grow up, even if it is sometimes sooner than some would prefer.  
The inability to construct a sheltered Eden or Neverland, and its association with the 
inability to shelter children from the outside world, echoes throughout Sweet Tooth; but the 
porous nature of borders is not the only way that the comics accomplish this. Before Jepperd 
betrays Gus, they encounter a run-down building where a couple preys on other human survivors 
and forces women into prostitution. Jepperd and Gus are initially unaware of the purpose of the 
                                                          
15 This is a moment where theory and practice may clash. Most parents probably do recognize that too much 
sheltering can be harmful to childhood. Yet the idea of the innocent child, for however long parents may try and 
reinforce it, is still a powerful symbol. 
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building; they enter after seeing what appears to be a hybrid in a window. The hybrid turns out to 
be a prostitute wearing animal ears. The prostitute is only a teenager, although there are older 
women in the building too. But the ears facilitate the fantasy of having sex with a hybrid, which 
is a fantasy of child abuse. Other than Gus, who is approximately nine at this point, the oldest 
hybrids are only seven years old. No humans are younger than the hybrids, so the hybrids are the 
beings most imbued with perceived innocence and purity.16 The purity of the hybrid child carries 
additional connotations because they are physically pure because of their immunity to the 
plague.17 Children are ideally uncontaminated from the adult world; hybrids are uncontaminated 
from sickness.  
The first clear image of the prostitute, Becky, reinforces the way in which innocence and 
purity are a façade, a construction easily undermined (Figure 1.11). Becky is positioned slightly 
to the left of center, and her eye line is another example of direct address. Like Gus’s peeping 
over Jepperd’s soldier, the reader peeps over Gus to see Becky. This highlights the seedy nature 
of the situation in which Gus and Jepperd find themselves, particularly in that the reader is, at 
this moment, a voyeur seeing something both private and upsetting. Despite Becky’s pink make-
up and negligee, which reinforce her sexuality, she appears distant. Her bunny ears look realistic, 
but they are fake, a mockery of Gus’s antlers. The juxtaposition of Becky and Gus is highlighted 
because of their mirroring positions. Becky, however, at fifteen, has long ago lost her innocence 
despite her adolescent age. She is a dark harbinger of one of the ways in which hybrids might be 
exploited, of youth forced into a system of exploitation. The dingy room, with muck on the bed 
                                                          
16 This coincides with James Kincaid’s argument that constructing childhood innocence simultaneously creates the 
desire in adults to possess such innocence (Child-Loving 5). Kincaid’s emphasis is on how childhood innocence 
leads to child sexual abuse, but more benign forms of adults possessing childhood innocence can include adults who 
simply desire to have and raise innocent children of their own. 
17 Richard sees Gus as a “New Adam” who will lead a “new race … forever innocent and pure” (In Captivity 113). 
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and a broken spring protruding, emphasizes the artificiality of this pretend innocence. The walls 
are crumbling and the landscape picture is askew, subtly reinforcing the way in which nature is 
now off-kilter. This moment helps demonstrate the impossibility of maintaining childhood 
innocence, but it also connects to commodification. To her pimp, Becky is valuable solely for her 
body’s ability to generate income. While Becky isn’t as young as Gus, she’s still an adolescent 
who lacks any sort of social agency. It’s made clear that Becky and the other women in the house 
are forced to be there. By depicting Becky with the bunny ears (a nod to the role Playboy plays 
in commodifying female bodies and its association with animals: the playboy bunny), Becky’s 
commodification evokes the hybrids. Becky is sexually commodified; the hybrids are 
scientifically commodified. Both are more valuable because of their youth, their closeness to 
innocence and purity (even though these aren’t tenable).  
Sympathizing with the Grotesque  
The narrative posits three approaches to the hybrids: there is a human-led cult that forms 
around the hybrids and embraces the animal nature of children but uses them for their own 
purposes; some adults reject the hybrids and experiment on them regardless of where the hybrids 
fall on the animal/human spectrum; and some adults protect the hybrids, but these adults engage 
predominantly with the hybrid children who most remind them of human children. The multiple 
reactions of the adults makes clear that, like our own, these children inspire mixed reactions. 
There is ambivalence within individuals, like Jepperd, but also within larger groups of people; 
groups that classify hybrids differently. Ambivalent reactions and ambiguity are part of the 
grotesque, and these elements are often registered at the point of reception. Wolfgang Kayser 
argues that the grotesque applies to “the creative process, the work of art itself, and its reception” 
(180). An artist may set out to create a grotesque work and end up with a product that those who 
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view the work consider grotesque. But, despite the potentially trivariate approach to the 
grotesque, Kayser emphasizes reception: “Even in defining the structural properties of the 
grotesque we have to refer to its reception, with which we cannot dispense under any 
circumstances” (181). If the grotesque doesn’t impact viewers by unsettling them, it fails to be 
grotesque. Of course, individual interpretation and response is subjective, so this must be taken 
in a general sense. The problem of individual reception is perhaps why many scholars note its 
potential to inspire emotional reactions, often contradictory ones, but prefer to emphasize other 
aspects, like the grotesque’s corporeal nature. For example, in Edwards and Graulund’s overview 
of the grotesque, they note that bodies are often depicted as grotesque, such as when limbs are 
missing or added or when combinations of various types of bodies are created. These corporeal 
bodies raise ontological concerns:  
The discombobulating juxtapositions and bizarre combinations found in grotesque 
figures in literature and the other arts open up an indeterminate space of 
conflicting possibilities, images and figures.  A grotesque body that is incomplete 
or deformed forces us to question what it means to be human:  there queries 
sometimes arise out of the literal combination of human and animal traits or, at 
other times, through the conceptual questions about what it means to deviate from 
the norm. (3) 
Edwards and Graulund’s description of grotesque bodies implicitly connects with Kayser’s 
interest in reception. The discombobulating or bizarre nature of the grotesque body impacts how 
an audience might digest it. Furthermore, these corporeal bodies challenge the audience’s world 
view by challenging the concept of humanity. Thus, some descriptions of the grotesque 
acknowledge reception through the emphasis on the effects grotesque bodies or images have. 
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This does not mean that all scholars focus on the reception of the grotesque, but that some 
scholars still recognize how an audience may or may not process grotesque elements, such as 
being repulsed by unusual bodies or attracted to the possibilities these bodies represent, without 
specifically referencing the “reception” that Kayser discusses. 
 In Sweet Tooth the existence of the hybrids causes various reactions in the narrative’s 
human individuals and groups, but the hybrids benefit from their verisimilitude to humans 
because it allows certain characters, as well as readers, to more easily relate to them and see 
them as human. Shun-Liang Chao notes that verisimilitude has been prominent within the 
grotesque since early modern depictions. He writes, “fantastic hybrid creatures are rendered 
verisimilar as though they were real beings” and that “verisimilitude – or rather, making fantastic 
hybrids look verisimilar – has become a prominent attribute of grotesque representations” (10). 
That is, hybrids like those in Sweet Tooth, by appearing as natural creatures despite their clearly 
unnatural state, fit into a common category of grotesque depictions, which can take the unnatural 
and makes it appear natural.18 This is part of what makes the grotesque subversive, as it unsettles 
one’s understanding of what is natural or not: “The ability of the grotesque to trigger uncannily 
our imagination of a monstrous world in everyday reality introduces us to its emotional content. 
Horror or terror is the emotion most often associated with the grotesque, since the physically in-
between fits in the category of the (biologically) impure” (10). Horror or terror may alternate 
with humor depending on which is the most appropriate reaction at the time, but, in the case of 
Sweet Tooth, the horror the reader feels at the grotesque is mostly based on how the hybrids are 
treated, not on the grotesque children themselves. The grotesque is turned back upon the abusers. 
The characters, if they existed in the real world, would be deemed grotesque and potentially 
                                                          
18 Or vice versa. Making grotesque creatures verisimilar makes the unfamiliar appear familiar, but a grotesque 
creature may also take recognizable elements and makes them strange. 
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inspire horror; but in the context of the world of the comic, a world startling similar to our own, 
they instead inspire compassion.19 The horror which the comic inspires comes less from the 
grotesque bodies than from how the grotesque bodies are treated. It is often humans who inspire 
horror. Only humans can be inhuman. 
There are hybrids who can be understoond as genuinely horrifying within the context of 
the narrative, but they are introduced long after Gus and other sympathetic hybrids, so the horror 
gets relegated to individual hybrids rather than all hybrids. These more horrifying hybrids are the 
children of chaos. They are more animal than human and cannot or do not master their animal 
drives. They are hybrid children unrestrained by civilizing influences like Richard. Gus and his 
cell-mates encounter one such hybrid during their escape from the compound where the 
experiments take place. After they hear some ominous movement in the sewer water, an 
alligator/human hybrid jumps out and attacks Wendy (Figure 1.12). Gus kills it with a brick. This 
alligator/human hybrid is viewed by the other characters as a monster. Despite its human-like 
arms, the reptilian body is more animal than any of the escapees, even hybrids like the mute 
Buddy, Jepperd’s son. Its attack from underneath the water represents this hybrid as a monster 
via traditional horror conventions (the children are in a cramped space and the moment is 
preceded by a darkly colored page with noises coming from the water). Even in death, this 
hybrid does not elicit the same level of sympathy as do the protagonist and his group. In death, it 
has a monstrous visage with sharp, angular teeth, an oversized mouth, and long, sharp nails 
(Figure 1.13); and yet the gator hybrid is an innocent. In light of Lemire’s comment that animals 
just are, the gator/child is behaving according to its nature. He’s not good or bad; he just is a 
predator. Wendy laments, “He--he was just a little animal kid like us. Probably scared. Thought 
                                                          
19 This is due to the visual nature of the hybrids, who look cute rather than intimidating. But prose also often causes 
readers to feel compassion for (seeming) monsters. 
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we were gonna hurt him.” Gus responds, “… Don’t matter now. Had no choice” (Animal Armies 
66). Wendy’s initial shock is based on the recognition that the gator is also a hybrid; but, Gus 
dismisses this concern by also appealing to instinct. The dead hybrid’s violent, natural action 
compels a violent action in response. Even if the reader takes this rationale at face value, it still 
feels inadequate. In this moment, the killer of the hybrid child is not an adult in a position of 
power, but Gus; and another hybrid child, as well as the readers, forgive him this killing. While 
this death may seem justified since the gator attacked first, it also reveals some of the moral or 
empathic limits of the hybrid children. The further on the animal side of the spectrum a hybrid 
resides, the more alien he becomes. For people to sympathize with the grotesque, they must see a 
bit of themselves in it. The harder this becomes, the less sympathy a grotesque character can 
garner.  
The cult leader’s canine/human litter exemplifies this too. While Jepperd, Becky and 
Lucy, another former prostitute rescued by Jepperd and Gus, are traveling with the hybrid-
worshipping cult, two cultists try to rape Lucy. The canine hybrids immediately attack and kill 
the rapists because Lucy is under the protection of the cult leader. While the reader is relieved 
that Lucy is saved, her rescue at the hands of the hybrids leads to horrific images of animals 
ripping apart humans (Figure 1.14). Strangely, had Jepperd shot the cultists, or beat them to 
death, the reader might find that outcome more comforting or satisfying or understandable than 
the horror of seeing beasts ripping apart men. Jepperd cannot hide his horror: “Oh, Jesus,” he 
says. Lucy, who was almost raped, comforts the younger Becky by telling her not to look 
(Animal Armies 80). The canine/children inspire outright horror because they appear more 
animal than human and they attack a human. Even though the actions of the cultists are 
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abhorrent, the primal image of animals ripping apart humans is so disturbing that it produces 
terror. 
 The canine/human hybrids entire existence is upsetting. The cult leader, their father, tells 
Jepperd the story of their birth. After a long labor that nearly kills the mother, the hybrids eat her. 
The cult leader says, “She was nearly dead by the time the last one came out. I don’t know… 
Maybe it was cruel of me… But they were so hungry, and we didn’t have any food left. So I let 
them eat her. She gave her life so they could live. And that was how our great faith was born. It 
was a beautiful day” (Animal Armies 102). Although the language positions the horror of the 
hybrids’ first feeding as one of a mother’s sacrifice, the language is euphemistic. There is no 
other indication that the mother would have willingly sacrificed herself, especially because 
initially many expectant parents, including these ones, had heard of the hybrid children but did 
not believe the rumors. This scenario is terrifying in its use of primal fears over cannibalism, as 
well as chaotic and animalistic children.20 It melds the fears in classical mythology of children 
overthrowing their parent or parents, like Oedipus, or consuming their family, like Tantalus, with 
the possibility for children who are little monsters. These primal fears are grounded in the 
transgression of the elementary structure of the family. In these examples, what one fears is an 
unspeakable, but entirely possible, transgression. A child usurps a parent; a human feeds on 
another human rather than animal. All of these moments are especially fitting in that they engage 
with transgressive feelings or behaviors: the fertile ground of the grotesque. 
  Although the reader isn’t likely to sympathize with all hybrids equally, prompting the 
reader to sympathize with the freak or reject is subversive. This is not new; there are numerous 
texts from across media that do similar work, but it is theoretically aligned with the subversive 
                                                          
20 The fear this conception of childhood generates is taken up further in relation to The Flame Alphabet. 
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aspect of the grotesque and its ability to destabilize boundaries. Alan Spiegel argues that the 
Southern grotesque is epitomized by physically and mentally “deformed” characters capable of 
connecting with readers (429). Spiegel is primarily interested in differentiating the Southern 
grotesque and its deformed characters from the Northern gothic and its rebellious characters. 
Whereas the grotesque character is rejected, the gothic character rejects. One inspires “pity and 
compassion”; the other “terror and admiration” (Spiegel 433). An implication of Spiegel’s work 
is that texts by authors like Nathaniel Hawthorne and Djuna Barnes do not fit his definition of 
the grotesque. Without granting Spiegel this premise, his insight into the way the grotesque is 
employed in Southern fiction is helful.21 For Spiegel, these pitiable characters reveal something 
about the society that creates them; “[their] punishments always exceed [their] crimes” (429). 
Most of the Sweet Tooth hybrids are sympathetic characters punished for the sins of their parents, 
and they highlight fears over unrestrained commodification. But the hybrid’s sympathetic nature 
is aided by aspects of long-form narrative. When discussing the grotesque in relation to art, like 
Nero’s underground palace or Arcimboldo’s “Feast for the Eyes,” one does not sympathize with 
the grotesque. A human face comprised of food might look horrific and blur lines between 
human and vegetable, the consumer and the consumed, but it probably does not elicit sympathy 
for the drawn character. But the grotesque in narrative adds another dimension. Victor Hugo and 
his hunchback, Scylla and her transformation at the hands of jealous Circe, these characters elicit 
pity. Readers may or may not identify with them, but they are not entirely repulsed by them 
either. Their bodies may look repulsive, but the character does not have to be. Art can elicit 
sympathy, but this is more easily done in narrative (whether visual or prose), where the reader is 
                                                          
21 Lemire is a Canadian, not a Southern (United States) writer. Sweet Tooth, however, takes place in the United 
States and was published by a United States publisher for a (primarily) United States market. 
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often given the point of view of one or more characters and where the reader spends more time 
with the protagonists. 
 Even with the aid of the narrative, however, the grotesque bodies of the hybrids call 
attention to their nature; the images draw this attention. Grotesque bodies may exist in a state of 
transformation. The grotesque  involves a “perpetual, never-ending metamorphosis of one 
substance into another” (45). A human princess turning into a frog is not grotesque; a human 
princess who is part frog is grotesque. For Chao, another way to think about the state of 
transformation and its relationship to the grotesque is to consider perpetual metamorphosis as 
incomplete (168). Chao understands perpetual metamorphosis as incomplete because the 
metamorphosis appears never to end. However, calling it perpetual metamorphosis implies a 
process, even if a never-ending one. But not all grotesque bodies exist in a state of constant 
transformation. It is not that the grotesque body is constantly metamorphosing, but that the 
grotesque body is not metamorphosing but looks like it is or may have been, even if this is not 
the case. It exists in a state of in-betweenness (Chao 26). Chao’s understanding of the grotesque 
as a state of never-ending transformation is well suited to his use of mythology. For example, he 
describes Scylla as grotesque because she exists between human and monster, but rejects Daphne 
as grotesque because her transformation into a tree is a complete one (45). Both Scylla and 
Daphne both start as human before their identities become complicated.  
Bakhtin is also interested in metamorphosis. He writes,  
The grotesque image reflects a phenomenon in transformation, an as yet 
unfinished metamorphosis, of death and birth, growing and becoming. The 
relation to time is one determining trait of the grotesque image. The other 
indispensable trait is ambivalence. For in this image we find poles of 
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transformation, the old and the new, the dying and the procreating, the beginning 
and the end of the metamorphosis. (24) 
Both Chao and Bakhtin see the grotesque in transformation or metamorphosis. But whereas Chao 
emphasizes transformation as an unending process, Bakhtin highlights the way in which 
transformation, by virtue of its in-between status, suggests both its beginning and its end. That 
the metamorphosis is “as yet unfinished” leaves the possibility for its completion, even though 
the metamorphosis never completes. Bakthin writes, “The grotesque body, as we have often 
stressed, is a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, never completed; it is continually 
built, created, and builds and creates another body” (317). Even though the grotesque body may 
suggest both a beginning and an end, it cannot, in fact, achieve either. This is why although 
grotesque bodies may appear as if they have been transformed, they can be biologically 
complete. The hybrids, for example, are born with their hybridity. It defines them from birth. 
They look as though they were in a transformative state, but the individual hybrids are not 
actually transforming.22 The hybrids exist as complete biological entities blurring categories 
while generating new ones. The hybrids of Sweet Tooth exist on a spectrum between animal and 
human, but they belong to neither group. They form their own category. Yet readers understand 
the hybrids by comparing them to that which readers already understand: the separate, although 
increasingly complicated, domains of the animal and the human. To borrow Chao’s wording on 
classification: The hybrids are not either animal or human. They are both animal and human, (or 
neither animal nor human) (45). This wording mirrors that of Leonard Cassuto, who writes that 
the grotesque is “a breach of fundamental categories surrounding the definition of what is 
human. Neither one thing nor another, the grotesque is instead a distortion, conflation, or 
                                                          
22 One can argue that humanity itself is changing, but I believe the comic is less subversive in that regard than it 
might appear to be. 
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truncation that is simultaneously both and neither – and it thus questions the image of the 
human” (“Jack London’s Class-Based Grotesque” 115). But Sweet Tooth, as a relatively 
conservative text, doesn’t question what it means to be human, so much as it questions the 
objectifying behavior of certain humans and uses the grotesque to highlight the behavior in 
question. 
Conclusion 
The transformative aspect of the hybrids in Sweet Tooth seems to extend to society itself. 
The series teeters between the old, adult guard, and the new, hybrid guard. In the end, traditional 
humanity gives way to hybridity. At the end of human society, the hybrids escape their 
exploitation. They establish a haven where hybrids exist peacefully with the dwindling number 
of humans. Doctor Singh lives among them and teaches the hybrid youths. These youths are no 
more or less hybrid, no closer to a completed transformation to an animal state or return to a 
human one, than previous hybrids.23 But society is transforming. This transformation of society 
supposedly sets up a new paradigm that depicts the hybrids as more in touch with nature and free 
from abuse. This conclusion is a hopeful one that resolves contemporary anxieties over the 
exploitation of children. The new hybrid community does not appear to exploit any subset of 
their community on behalf of another subset (although there is an initial argument over whether 
remaining humans should be killed or integrated).24 They have different animal aspects but come 
together based on their desire to form a community against the remaining adults who would 
harm them. The hybridity of the characters in light of contemporary issues facing the 
exploitation of others, often lower-class or racial minorities, helps overcome this exploitation by 
                                                          
23 Though the children of hybrids sometimes contain multiple animal aspects, depending on their heritage. One of 
Gus and Wendy’s children has antlers and a pig nose, for example. 
24 The pro-violence faction of the hybrids is led by Buddy, who prior to being an adult didn’t speak at all. So the first 
time we see Buddy utilize language, an integral part of civilization, it’s to call for violence.  
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acknowledging the otherness of everyone. The hybrids are treated as different from previous 
generations, but the hybrids also demonstrate that a society sacrificing its children for the benefit 
of adults is a society on the brink of destruction, but that society can be redeemed when it 
reevaluates its relationship between generations. This reevaluation is made possible in Sweet 
Tooth because of the hybrid’s grotesque bodies. The animal/human hybrids of Sweet Tooth exist 
along a spectrum of alterity that challenges one’s ability to classify what it means to be human. 
By highlighting humanity in the midst of dehumanizing characterizations, Sweet Tooth 
challenges processes of dehumanization. The children are grotesque, yet remain children; and 
while their grotesque nature may repulse adult characters, for the readers the grotesque elements 
beg consideration of their altered states. 
However, the text is not as radically as one might think. While the series does critique 
contemporary exploitation of children, it ends with a recognizably society. The tension between 
animals and humans resolves itself because the hybrids outlive and eventually outnumber 
humans. Hybrids become commonplace and exist in a communal environment where some 
surviving humans remain with them until they die. Thus, humanity is replaced by the hybrids. 
Gus’s relationships register this change. He initially loves the human Becky but ends up 
marrying the hybrid Wendy. This resolution, however, reasserts human systems and structures. 
The community is led by the hybrids most in touch with their human element, such as those who 
can speak human language. The comic book does not build a society of those who embrace their 
animalistic side; it builds a society of those who accept their animalistic side but still behave in 
recognizable ways. The hybrids live a life more in touch with nature, but not one radically 
different from current conceptions of humanity.25 This may be because the hybrids are not 
                                                          
25 And the emphasis on nature coincides with the decline of civilization brought on by the plague. This is not to say 
that the hybrids wouldn’t prefer to live in a more natural than industrial setting, but none of the hybrids that we are 
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supposed to be a radical break from humanity, but a return to Edenic innocence. Metaphorically, 
they return to a nostalgic state that allows for the protection of their children against unrestrained 
commodification and exploitation. The series reasserts the desire for childhood to be a protected 
social space, sheltered from the dangers that adults can pose to children and childhood by 
treating them as commodities.    
                                                          
aware of have the knowledge of science or engineering to reconstitute the pre-plague world at the ending of the 
series, though with Singh teaching the children, this might be possible in the future. 
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Figure 1.1 ( Out of the Deep Woods 10) 
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Figure 1.2 (In Captivity 21) 
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Figure 1.3 (In Captivity 44) 
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Figure 1.4 (In Captivity 65) 
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Figure 1.5 (Animal Armies 23) 
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Figure 1.6 (Out of the Deep Woods 36) 
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Figure 1.7 (Out of the Deep Woods 23) 
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Figure 1.8 (Out of the Deep Woods 40) 
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Figure 1.9 (Out of the Deep Woods 41) 
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Figure 1.10 (Out of the Deep Woods 124) 
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Figure 1.11 (Out of the Deep Woods 77) 
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Figure 1.12 (Animal Armies 63) 
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Figure 1.13 (Animal Armies 67) 
 
Figure 1.14 (Animal Armies 80) 
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Beautiful Monsters: The Grotesque and Postmodernism in Elephantmen 
Elephantmen and the Racial Grotesque 
Elephantmen is an ongoing comic book series launched in 2006, written primarily by 
Richard Starkings and drawn by various artists.1 In the series, animal/human hybrids, called 
Elephantmen,2 are created by a transnational corporation in Africa as super-soldiers. The 
MAPPO corporation, led by a Japanese geneticist named Nikken, creates the hybrids using 
kidnapped African women as incubators. After coming to term, the women die as the hybrid 
children are ripped from their wombs. MAPPO then trains the hybrids through childhood and 
adolescence to be military commodities. Upon adulthood, the Elephantmen are deployed against 
Asian forces in a war fought on a European battle front. After the war, the United Nations votes 
to integrate the Elephantmen into mainstream society, primarily in the United States, and 
rehabilitate them. While this decision is initially considered altruistic, eventually it’s revealed 
that the Elephantmen are allowed to live because they may be of future use. The series primarily 
focuses on the adult hybrids after the war. However, the hybrids are shaped extensively by their 
origins, and the comic books, especially early ones, often depict the circumstances surrounding 
their birth and childhood. This chapter situates these characters in relation to the racial grotesque. 
Furthermore, The Elephantmen inhabit a world between animal and human, and, as a result, 
broaden conceptions of humanity. 
As adults, the hybrids are commonly referred to as animals or “munts,” a derogatory term 
for Elephantmen. Even the name Elephantmen, though seemingly benign, is disparaging. 
                                                          
1 Contributors to the series, including colorers and letterers, include Monifa Aldridge, Blond, Steve Buccellato, 
Chris Burnham, Greg Capullo, J. Scott Campbell, Keu Cha, Marian Churchland, Boo Cook, Ian Churchill, Camilla 
D’Errico, Jenny Frison, Brandon Graham, Peter Gross, David Hine, Stuart Immonen, Shaky Kane, Ryan Kelly, 
Ladrönn, Tula Lotay, Eric Larsen, Ed McGuinness, Axel Medellin, Fiona Meng, Moritat, Tony Parker, Nei Ruffino, 
J.G. Roshell, Dave Sim, Rob Steen, André Szymanowicz, Shannon Wheeler, and Gregory Wright. 
2 Elephentmen refers to hybrids of all types, not just elephant/human hybrids. In fact, the primary protagonist of the 
series is a hippo/human hybrid. 
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Starkings notes the name “is a derogatory term referring to all human/animal hybrids” 
(Starkings, “Strange Times, Stranger Heroes in Elephantmen”). Many of the comics contain a 
panel with the following definition: 
   El·e·phant·men [el-uh-fuhnt-men] 
Noun: 
1. Transgenics; human/animal hybrids, genetically engineered by the MAPPO 
Corporation for military deployment in the Afro-Sino war (2239-2243). 
Rehabilitated by the United Nations, these creatures were gradually inculcated 
into human society. 
2. Derogatory term for such. (Issue 58) 
The dictionary definition serves two purposes. It introduces readers who may be jumping into the 
comics mid-narrative to the overall premise of the hybrids. It also adds a sense of legitimacy to 
the hybrids. By giving them a dictionary entry, the comics give them official recognition. This 
official recognition, however, codifies the dehumanization they experience. It makes their 
dehumanization inseparable from their being. To be an Elephantman is to always be inferior. 
This is because the Elephantmen are created to be used, valued not for their humanity but their 
purpose.  
Leonard Cassuto argues that the grotesque is culturally constructed and often used to 
dehumanize other races, and it cannot be understood outside of cultural contexts. For example, 
American Indians were grotesque to American Puritans because American Indians were not 
“seen consistently as a person in the Western worldview”  (The Inhuman Race 7). The relentless 
dehumanization of the American Indians involved European settlers and their descendants 
assuming Indians “not to be persons,” but rather “savages” (Drinnon 13); savages who, 
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according to some, were placed “Between man proper and animals in the chain of being” 
(Drinnon 51). Puritans cast themselves as victims under threat from American Indians (Drinnon 
38). The Puritans’ attitude towards the American Indians is an example of the grotesque as an 
“anomalous embodiment of cultural anxiety” (Cassuto, The Inhuman Race 6). Cassuto, however, 
focuses on Antebellum American literature and culture and the objectification of African 
American slaves by whites who marginalized and dehumanized them so they could exploit them.  
This dehumanization involves liminality, as peoples’ status exist in-between categories. 
Elephantmen, for example, are both, and neither, animal and human. They have elements of both 
but do not fit neatly into either category. This liminality creates the space for the grotesque. The 
grotesque involves the inability to easily classify something because multiple elements make it 
impossible to fully belong to a single category (Cassuto, The Inhuman Race 6). This does not 
require literal transformation of the human body, it can be figurative transformation (Cassuto, 
The Inhuman Race 3). African American slaves were classified as both human and property, as 
person and thing, and thus were considered nonhuman. The Elephantmen literalize the figurative 
transformation of African and African American bodies. Racial objectification, however, 
“reverberates back to the white subjects, calling their humanity into question in a different way, 
and thereby making them grotesque also” (Cassuto, The Inhuman Race 6). The ramifications of 
this statement, that those dehumanizing others end up dehumanizing themselves, is central to 
understanding the racial grotesque in Cassuto’s work and in Elephantmen.3 Racial objectification 
is never complete, it’s always a process: what Cassuto calls “attempted objectification” (The 
Inhuman Race 16). One can never fully turn a person into an object, even if one might treat them 
as such. Even those who objectify others cannot help but recognize that “human life is at stake” 
                                                          
3 This idea applies throughout this project, but Cassuto, overall, speaks most directly to the issues in Elephantmen. 
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(The Inhuman Race 16). Because humans cannot be turned completely into objects, the 
incomplete process provides a gap wherein questions of humanity can be considered. This causes 
the grotesque to function on two different levels. Those being objectified are grotesque in the 
categorical sense. They exist in an “ontological netherword” that denies them complete 
association with one category or the other (The Inhuman Race 16). Calling slaves grotesque 
bodies, in this sense, is an acknowledgement of the process that dehumanizes them and places 
them between worlds, not a pejorative aimed at the slaves themselves. However, the grotesque 
nature of the objectifiers functions in a different way. They too become grotesque for promoting 
racial objectification. Their actions are repulsive to those who disagree with their treatment of 
others. Even in the pejorative sense, the term “grotesque” retains meanings associated with 
liminality and ontological uncertainty. When used to describe ugly appearance or behavior, the 
term functions as an act of disavowal. If someone’s appearance or behavior seems monstrous, 
they become metaphorically grotesque. This is because we refuse to acknowledge or accept 
extreme ugliness, both literally and metaphorically, as part of the human condition. We tell 
ourselves something is wrong with a person who is pejoratively grotesque; we refuse to allow 
them complete entry into our shared community. We see them as part human, part monster. They 
cannot, must not, be fully human; yet we cannot ignore that they are human. When the grotesque 
is used to describe horrific behavior or appearance, it is also an attempt at separating traits we 
wish were nonhuman from more culturally acceptable actions and appearances.  
Other scholars support the notion that the grotesque is sometimes employed to depict 
racial objectification. Fritz Gysin, in The Grotesque in American Negro Fiction: Jean Toomer, 
Richard Wright, and Ralph Ellison, argues that the authors he discusses use the grotesque to 
mirror the complexity of African American life.  He argues that African Americans live as 
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outsiders in American society and therefore these authors turn to the grotesque to depict this 
existence.  Furthermore, Gysin believes that studies of the grotesque must concentrate on 
individual authors because authors employ the grotesque in unique ways.  Although Gysin notes 
the authors’ varying success at social criticism, all of the authors criticize racial divides. The 
grotesque is often used to depict outsiders.4 Frances Connelly observes that the grotesque is “the 
quintessential voice of the outsider, and it is not surprising that it is embraced by artists 
concerned with issues of gender or race” (The Grotesque in Western Art and Culture 23). Even 
though grotesque bodies can be fearsome or provide estrangement, they can also, for Connelly, 
encourage empathy, a powerful tool for combating racism and objectification. The 
transformative aspect of the grotesque is also a fresh way to approach topics because “the 
grotesque’s urge to turn the world upside down and to play among broken boundaries is 
infectious” (The Grotesque in Western Art and Culture 23). Connelly’s interest in the grotesque 
as always being at play figures the grotesque as essentially subversive. It tackles serious issues, 
but glorifies in chaos and disorder.56  
Cassuto also notes that “economic objectification” shares “many of the complexities” of 
“racially motivated objectification” but he is skeptical of conflating them. He argues that 
objectification is about domination rather than profit (The Inhuman Race 18–19). While not 
every instance of dehumanization involves economic objectification, the dehumanization and 
enslavement of African and African Americans makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
completely disentangle racial and economic objectification. In Elephantmen, these factors 
                                                          
4 This can often be seen in the Southern grotesque as well. Flannery O’Conner and, more recently, Nathan 
Ballingrud are good examples of this. 
5 A far cry from Kayser’s trepidation over the abysmal world of the grotesque. Connelly is more closely aligned 
with the subversive view of Bakhtin.  
6 It would be difficult to overemphasize how playful the Elephantmen creators are in their approach to the subject 
matter too. While the content is serious, the creator’s exalt in the pulp-science fictional world. 
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certainly intertwine: the grotesque bodies of the titular, African hybrids are created for the sake 
of corporate domination and profit.  
Elephantmen and Childhood 
Although most of Elephantmen takes place when the hybrids are adults, their corporate 
slavery is established at birth. The horror of the hybrids’ birth is depicted in a series of early 
pages. In one panel, drawn from an overhead perspective, the geneticist Nikken triumphantly 
holds the first hybrid aloft, as if to heaven, while the light in the room is centered on them like a 
stage light (Figure 2.1). His eyes look upwards, towards the sky and/or God (although the 
diegetic world clearly contains a ceiling). Nikken intones, “Welcome to my world, feeble 
creature. Breathe deep. With each gasp of oxygen, you will grow stronger” (Starkings, Moritat, 
Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland).7 Referring to the hybrid as a “creature” rather than a 
“child” emphasizes his otherness, but the hybrid is eerily human. He is crying, something most 
animals do not do. So while the hybrid’s first moment outside the womb is a distinctly human 
one, this is immediately neglected in favor of casting him as nonhuman. This moment also 
connects thematically with various instances in the series where Nikken positions himself as 
God, the creator of a new species. This panel comes within the midst of movement, as the other 
scientists’ hands are suspended in applause and the hybrid’s mouth is frozen in a cry. The 
indefinitely suspended cry of the hybrid is a harbinger of their tortured existence, as the hybrids 
are dehumanized from the moment of their birth.8  
The birth of the hybrid is juxtaposed against the violent death of his mother; her womb 
ripped apart. She is positioned behind and off to the side of Nikken and the hybrid. This image 
and its composition demonstrates the lack of sentimental value given to the mother. The 
                                                          
7 Elephantmen, both the individual comic books and collected trades, lack page numbers. 
8 This suspended cry recurs in the second panels of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 as well. 
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scientists all exalt the child, as the mother’s corpse lies splayed behind the hybrid, ignored. The 
panel which precedes this one explains, “The females indigenous to this region have proven to be 
excellent engines of reproduction… The fact that no one has missed them is merely an added 
bonus”(Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland). This language 
dehumanizes the women via the detached anthropological description of indigenous females 
rather than women or mothers. The “engines of reproduction” metaphor and the reference to the 
fact that no one misses them positions the women as disposable commodities with no value 
beyond that which the corporation ascribes. Its rhetoric of science and engineering in relation to 
human life turns the woman, and others like her, into cogs in a machine; they aren’t unique 
individuals with their own wants and needs, but objects that are made to contribute to the desires 
of the corporation. The emphasis on the child's life over the mother's dead body is a dark mirror 
reflecting a contemporary Western world that draws upon the idealized child as the most urgent 
rhetorical symbol (Edelman). For many, this extends to the unborn, which is sometimes 
privileged over the health and well-being of the mother. Despite the dead mother being largely 
ignored within the panel, however, the image’s perspective connects her to Nikken and her 
hybrid child. She is forgotten behind Nikken in the narrative, yet the overhead perspective 
positions her excavated womb between her child and Nikken. From Nikken’s perspective, this 
composition contributes to the sense that the mother is a means to an end. He needs human 
wombs to bring the hybrids to term, which provides him with the object of his scientific desire. 
Yet the placement of the forgotten mother also creates the sense that Nikken cannot completely 
separate the hybrid child from its human origin.  
The subsequent page, which comes after a page turn, continues with the dehumanization 
of hybrids (Figure 2.2). This page is comprised of three symmetrical panels stacked on top of one 
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another against a black background, with small gutters between them. The panels focus on the 
hybrid, but gradually hone in on the corporate brand seared into his flesh. Nikken says, “These 
animals are completely unique. Perhaps the term ‘animal’ no longer even applies. Brand it” 
(Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland). The middle shows the hybrid 
screaming as his flesh steams. Nikken intones, “MAPPO shall name them. MAPPO will own 
them” (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland). This reinscribes the 
hybrids as property rather than individuals. The branding of the hybrid is doubly perverse. On 
the one hand, the branding of Elephantman is akin to the branding of animals as property.9 Even 
more disturbing, however, is the connection between branding and slavery. Frederick Douglass’s 
description of the process of slave branding, given in England in 1861, is similar to this scene. 
Douglass recalls,  “A person was tied to a post, and his back, or such other part as was to be 
branded, laid bare; the iron was then delivered red hot (sensation), and applied to the quivering 
flesh, imprinting upon it the name of the monster who claimed the slave” (Blassingame 377–
378). The second and third panels evoke Douglass' description of slave branding. The child is 
held down and imprinted, leaving behind seared and puckered flesh. Douglass' assertion that the 
imprint is of the "name of the monster who claimed the slave" resonates with Leonard Cassuto's 
assertion that the grotesque can turn back upon those who are doing the dehumanizing. The 
reader feels empathy for the hybrid, screaming out in pain, but doesn't connect with the detached 
scientists in their scrubs who are harming the child. This empathy is built on the powerlessness 
of the hybrid, which, at this moment, is tied up in his status as a newborn child, which mobilizes 
the readers’ desire to protect children. The images from the branded child, the hybrid as object, 
to the swaddled child on the next page (Figure 2.3), the hybrid as human, present themselves 
                                                          
9 This also employs a perverse application of corporate branding. 
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simultaneously and sequentially. When viewing these panels as a tableau, the hybrid is in the 
process of both asserting and being denied its humanity. Nick Sousanis notes that comics readers 
make connections “not just from one panel to the next, but across the page and back and forth, in 
all directions” (Paragraph 2).  
The dehumanization of the Elephantmen continues with the indoctrination they 
experience during their formative years (Figure 2.4). A man tells the hybrids that “thinking for 
himself is the nature of man” but that the hybrids, who he refers to as “monkeys,” are beneath 
man. When one of the hybrids tries to ask a question, he is punished. The trainer says, “There is 
no sense of self outside of MAPPO. No independent thought … Your lives are not your own, 
Monkeys. You have been born into servitude… and your master is MAPPO” (Starkings, Moritat, 
Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland). The final panel is an image of a child or adolescent 
hybrid, imprisoned in a cell clearly designed to hold adult hybrids. The child is sitting in the 
corner of his cage, positioned centrally and looking outward, as if to directly challenge readers 
regarding their complicity in processes of dehumanization.10 This page depicts the relegation of 
the hybrids as inferior to humans, but it also subverts the hybrid’s objectification by making 
MAPPO and their trainer the metaphoric monsters. 
The trainer uses language that evokes slavery: “monkey,” their “lives are not their own,” 
“master,” etc. He focuses on the hybrids’ potential as assets rather than their status as individuals 
with their own wants and needs. The trainer’s emphasis on what the hybrids will be, rather than 
what they are, provides a perverse take on the developmental discourse of childhood, which 
emphasizes the gradual accumulation of knowledge and acclimation to the world and focuses on 
children-as-becoming. John Wall argues this discourse is problematic because it assumes a 
                                                          
10 The appeal on behalf of an abused child recalls other narratives, such as Ursula Le Guin's famous short story, 
"The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas," as well as similar moments from Sweet Tooth. 
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similar life-path and end result for individuals, which results in a lack of “moral diversity” (29). 
Wall notes that Western thought has developed developmental approaches to childhood 
throughout its intellectual history. Thinkers as disparate as Aristotle and John Locke believed 
that parents, for Aristotle, and society, for Locke, could help children realize and master their 
potential over time (25–27). This approach has its benefits, specifically “its temporality and 
realism. It refuses to either demonize or sentimentalize childhood but instead assumes a starting 
position of ethical neutrality. This allows it to recognize children’s dual goodness and potential 
for harm” (28). However, the emphasis on the end result of the child—the type of adult a child 
will be—opens up developmental approaches to criticism. For example, “Childhood, as 
Rousseau complained, is given value chiefly as a means to adulthood. Childhood is interpreted 
through the lens of what children are not yet, namely, developed adults. What it means to be a 
child is paradoxically secondary, for children, to becoming an adult” (29).11 While it makes sense 
to prepare children to become productive members of society, Rousseau’s concern is that the 
emphasis on preparation can sometimes lead to the future overshadowing the present. This is 
what the trainer in Elephantmen wants. He wants all the hybrids to be remorseless, killing 
machines who will obey orders without question, and he values them only for what they become. 
This is why the hybrids are dehumanized; not because they lack independent thought, but 
because MAPPO wants to suppress such thought to better turn them into objects by placing them 
outside the bounds of humanity, along with the rights people might attribute to human hybrids, 
                                                          
11 This again places the child in service to the adult, though in a different way. Recall the critique by Warner and 
others that childhood is constructed through adult desires. See pages 3-5.  
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as opposed to animal hybrids. This is why the trainer refers to Hip by his number rather than his 
name.12 
This entire page, however, fundamentally reasserts the humanity of the hybrid children in 
the midst of their dehumanization. Immediately after the trainer tells the hybrids they lack the 
“capacity to have an original behavioral impulse,” the elephantman Hip raises his hand to ask a 
question. The act of asking a question is itself a direct rebuttal of the trainer’s logic because it 
shows Hip is thinking for himself. This second panel would be delightful out of context: six 
children or adolescent hybrids, all gangly and awkward. Their eyes are large. Some, like the 
giraffe and camel hybrids, seem particularly skinny. Some, like the elephant hybrid, are chubby. 
They all look awkward and simultaneously cute and ugly in that strange adolescent way, which 
Leslie Fiedler argues is a time when humans feel grotesque (32). These are a far cry from the 
sleek, and often sexualized, bodies of the adult hybrids. They capture the awkwardness many 
experience in youth, even as they embody a youth drastically different from our own. Hip’s 
“huh,” which carries with it so much uncertainty and discomfort, also conveys awkwardness. 
Their humanity asserts itself even in the most dehumanizing circumstances, as the hybrids 
contradict the trainer in both their behavior and appearance.  
Elephantmen and Racial Objectification 
The Elephantmen’s arrival in the United States mirrors the arrival of African slaves. 
Slave ships had cramped quarters, where slaves were confined and chained, sometimes on top of 
each other (Figure 2.5). Modern slaves ships carry the restrained hybrids to America, which 
recalls the deadly Middle Passage which so many millions of Africans went through on the way 
                                                          
12 The dehumanization of soldiers, so they can be molded to obey without question, and even their “enemies,” so 
they can be killed without remorse, aren’t uncommon; but in the case of Elephantmen, the training is an integral part 
of the hybrids’ childhood.  
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to the United States (Figures 2.6 and 2.7). In a preceding panel, the narration says, “Obadiah 
Horn came to America in chains… like a slave” (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook). 
Horn and the others are in chains because they are dangerous military assets, but this moment 
draws upon the historical reality of slavery even as it redeploys it. Images of slavery give way to 
images of immigration. Later issues, for example, depict the arrival of the Elephantmen at Ellis 
Island.  
In addition to slavery imagery, the comics also foreground the objectification of African 
American bodies in the United States in other ways. Tusk is a wart hog/human hybrid, but, 
unlike the other hybrids, his body is broken down and he’s lost his mental capacity. Ebony Hide 
tells his friend, Miki, about Tusk:  
If we suffered at Nikken’s bidding, we were told that it was for our own benefit… 
Nikken did not tolerate weakness. His children had to be perfect. The weakest 
among us were weeded out. And disposed of… Ironically, Tusk was the strongest 
of the weak links. His body was subjected to every poison in MAPPO’s arsenal. 
Every nerve agent, every chemical weapon known to man was poured into him. 
His system was designed to resist and flush the toxins and it succeeded. But not 
before the poisons destroyed his mind. (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, 
and Cook) 
This dialogue takes place over the span of two pages comprised of seven panels. The first panel 
contains a scientist observing a number of Elephantmen in restraints and hooked up to machines. 
Five of the next six panels contain images of Tusk: hooked up to tubes, or in a straightjacket 
inside a padded cell. These panels often lack background detail, a minimalism that highlights 
Tusk’s broken and isolated body. Ebony calls Tusk’s system a success because it rid his body of 
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toxins, even as Ebony acknowledges that Tusk’s mind was ravaged before the toxins were 
flushed. Even with the caveat, Tusk's system is only a success if his body is all that's important. 
If Tusk's identity and consciousness are important, then his system is a failure because it can't 
save what makes Tusk an individual. Tusk’s system is only successful in relation to MAPPO’s 
perversion of the developmental approach to childhood, the child-as-becoming. MAPPO’s plan 
for Tusk is to use him as a test subject and, if he survives, to use as a soldier. This includes 
testing his body in ways that might make him and others more powerful and resilient on the 
battlefield. In that light, he helps MAPPO improve the weaponization of the other Elephantmen. 
Tusk himself is no longer fit to serve as a soldier, but his role as a test subject helped strengthen 
his brethren. The objectification of Tusk begins from his childhood, as the hybrid children are 
trained to think of themselves only in relation to MAPPO and MAPPO sees them as 
commodities rather than individuals.  
 While the image of Tusk dominates this scene, one panel doesn't depict him. In this 
panel, a body is tossed into an unmarked, mass grave, with the text “And disposed of…” (Figure 
2.8). That hybrids considered weak are thrown in unmarked mass graves is a horrifying allusion 
to the way in which people have been disposed of after being subjected to brutal treatment at the 
hands of others. Of course, the dominant images of the twentieth century involving mass graves 
are those of the World War II concentration camps that were filled with Jewish people and other 
Nazi victims, and Elephantmen can be read in some ways as an amalgamation of allusions to 
various atrocities and mistreatments; yet MAPPO's kidnapping of African women recalls the 
violence and instability of some African countries.  
Tusk’s trials, and his name, bring to mind another horrifying incident that specifically 
resonates with the racialized bodies of the hybrids: The Tuskegee syphilis experiment. This 
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Public Health Services study ran from 1932 into the 1970s. It studied the effects of untreated 
syphilis on rural African Americans. The subjects and interns involved were not told the real 
reason for the study (Jones 7). In the 1970s, when this dehumanizing study came to light, some 
contended that it was only allowed because the subjects were poor and black; some went as far 
as comparing it to Nazism (Jones 12–13). This comparison, like Elephantmen, draws on the 
association between Nazism and racial objectification. A later storyline returns to Tusk’s 
dehumanization. Tusk is depicted in a pair of panels.  In the top panel, he’s restrained and 
attached to various tubes (Figure 2.9). The narration intones the horrors he was put through. The 
bottom panel shows Tusk in a straightjacket in a padded cell. The cell is dirty, fluids are on the 
floor and wall. Tusk is missing one of his tusks. One eye is glazed over; it no longer functions. 
He’s drooling. Part of his scalp is missing; the skull is showing. It appears to have been drilled 
into. He still has a tag on his ear.13 Tusk’s body, as opposed to the triumphant, muscled bodies of 
the other Elephantmen, makes his abuse visible. As a result, he’s hidden, while the other 
Elephantmen are free to be seen in society, as their bodies don’t overtly display their abuse. 
The hybrids all register their African heritage through their animal aspect. The series 
engages with immigration, miscegenation, and racism. These issues are not exclusive to Africans 
and African Americans, especially when discussing immigration in addition to slavery, but the 
series combines them in a post-modern mash-up where the Elephantmen stand in for all fears 
over racial groups marked as other, while still retaining the complex history of African 
Americans, specifically. Starkings, though white, is himself an immigrant to the United States 
and draws upon this experiences while writing (Starkings, “Strange Times, Stranger Heroes in 
Elephantmen”).This is most poignantly expressed in Issue 50, an issue almost entirely comprised 
                                                          
13 Like Gus in Sweet Tooth. See page 40. 
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of pages depicting paintings of immigrant Elephantmen working at a host of labor-intensive jobs, 
with narration reflecting on their experience. One image, of hybrids sitting on the foundation of a 
building high up in the air, is reminiscent of a famous image of working-class labor in American 
(Figure 2.10). This image blends past and future. Its reference to an iconic image that represents 
the part of laborers in building the industrialized world is placed against a backdrop of sleek, 
subtly futuristic buildings. It draws upon nostalgia for a past, while the inclusion of both 
Elephantmen and humans deemphasizes racial differences in favor of immigrant and working-
class solidarity. 
Animals, Humans, Monsters 
Elephantmen draws upon the reprehensible treatment of African and African American 
bodies as it illustrates what commodification does to people: it attempts to transform them into 
nonhumans. The hybrids are a metaphor for objectification. Metaphors can be used to exert 
power. David Punter writes, "the control of public metaphor is a way of gaining and securing 
power" (47). By creating hybrid super soldiers, rather than human ones, MAPPO ends up 
creating creatures who metaphorically embody their own dehumanization. This is done by 
showing how dissimilar the hybrids are from humans. Dissimilarity, like similarity, is also part 
of metaphor: "[A]lthough metaphor undoubtedly deals in likeness, similarity, it also deals in 
unlikeness and dissimilarity. Metaphor makes us look at the world afresh, but it often does so by 
challenging our notions of the similarity that exists between things; how alike they are; and in 
what ways, in fact, they are irreconcilably unalike” (Punter 9).14 As metaphors, the bodies of the 
Elephantmen seem to justify their dehumanization, even as the same bodies constantly work 
against it. Punter argues, "Where the classical metaphor posits the possibility of furthering the 
                                                          
14 This dissimilarity might also be necessary because of the uncanny valley, where nonhumans who appear too 
similar to humans are disturbing because they look human, but slightly off. 
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search for meaning through aligning one object, word or phenomenon with another, this variant 
on the postmodern metaphor takes as its ground the impossibility of assigning meaning" (61). It 
is impossible to assign definitive meaning in the hybrids’ case because their bodies are in a 
constant state of tension. 
Due the ontological uncertainty over the hybrids’ nature, some consider them monsters. 
Scholars occasionally discuss monsters when writing about the grotesque.15 Wolfgang Kayser, 
for example, notes that all monsters are grotesque (181). Mark Dorrian provides a more 
comprehensive accounting for the similarities and differences between the monstrous and the 
grotesque. Dorrian uses the classical world and its ideas of beauty and form to discuss these 
“closely aligned” terms (315). Initially using the terms almost interchangeably, Dorrian 
understands monsters via Platonic metaphysics: as beings that transgress nature through either 
fragmentation of the body, such as a being with two heads, or combination, such as man-beasts 
or hermaphrodites (310). Monsters undermine the cosmic order by transgressing accepted forms, 
a description which resonates with discussions of the grotesque in contemporary times. As 
Dorrian explains, “The operative principle of monstrosity might be described as the coming 
together of what should be kept apart” (313). In their joining of the animal and human kingdoms, 
the hybrids are monsters. More specifically, humans are part of the animal kingdom, but the 
joining of disparate animals (human/elephant, human/giraffe, human/hippo, etc) is where 
boundaries collapse. For Dorrian, “The grotesque enfolds the monstrous,” but the terms diverge 
when “power changes to paranoia” and the monstrous seems to collapse representational distance 
and appear as if it may enter into the viewer’s world (316). Dorrian is referring to the collapse of 
                                                          
15 The Elephantmen are literally monstrous bodies, as opposed to the clones in Never Let Me Go who unsettle others 
because they look like humans or the children in The Flame Alphabet who are compared to animals and behave like 
little monsters. 
 
 
93 
 
representational distance between viewers and art, but this makes sense in relation to the diegetic 
world of Elephantmen. When the hybrids become immigrants who integrate into the Western 
world, they cease to be an unknown fear that resides far away and instead force those human 
characters who fear or despise them to confront such feelings head on. The monster, in this case, 
forces others to confront its grotesque embodiment. 
Noel Carroll believes that monsters "are beings whose existence science denies" (“Horror 
and Humor” 148). This is an elegant conception of the monster, but it feels inadequate for 
Elephantmen. It might be more accurate to say that the hybrids are beings that current science 
denies. Even though there is a scientific explanation for them in the series, it isn’t available to us. 
Jeffrey Jerome Cohen locates the monster within the realm of culture. He writes, “The monstrous 
body is pure culture” and that monsters “are disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent 
bodies resist attempts to include them in any systematic structuration.  And so the monster is 
dangerous, a form suspended between forms that threatens to smash distinctions” (4; 6). Cohen’s 
definition of the monster is reminiscent of the grotesque, which is not surprising given their close 
relationship. Grotesque bodies are anomalous and “‘monster’ is the oldest word in our tongue for 
human anomalies” (Fiedler 16). For Cohen, the monster’s importance, like the grotesque itself, is 
to discover what it reveals about society: “These monsters ask us how to perceive the world, and 
how we have misrepresented what we have attempted to place.  They ask us to reevaluate our 
cultural assumptions about race, gender, sexuality, our perception of difference, our tolerance 
toward its expression.  They ask us why we have created them” (20). In the Elephantmen’s case, 
they also force  people to consider how they could have been created in the first place. The 
hybrids weren’t created, fully formed, like militaristic Adams. Instead, they were gestated, 
birthed, and raised, over the course of years, with the express intent to create monsters capable of 
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dominating opposing armies. The hybrids are products of their childhood abuse. They rise above 
it in many ways, but they are the end result of childhood objectification: the culmination of a 
process of commodification, which shapes their existence from (and before) childhood.16  
Cohen’s monsters follow the logic of the Gothic monster, whose “body … produces 
meaning and can represent any horrible trait that the reader feeds into the narrative. The monster 
functions as monster, in other words, when it is able to condense as many fear-producing traits as 
possible into one body” (Halberstam 21). The way the hybrids become repositories of a 
cavalcade of fears over immigration and race, while also blurring various racial atrocities, is 
bound up in their status as monsters. However, Gothic monsters in the nineteenth century 
combined “the features of deviant race, class, and gender,” whereas contemporary monsters 
emphasize "deviant sexualities and gendering but [show] less clearly the signs of class or race” 
(Halberstam 3–4). Elephantmen is a contemporary narrative that clearly shows the signs of race, 
class and gender. Furthermore, while the physical difference in the hybrids’ being manifests as 
ontologically confusing bodies, the fundamental reason some consider them nonhuman may 
include the way hybrids are created and brought into the world and the intent behind their 
creation. The hybrids’ conception and birth are strange and horrifying. This coincides with Peter 
Brooks’ understanding of what makes Frankenstein’s monster monstrous:  
The creation of the Monster … takes place on the borderline of nature and culture. 
The Monster is a product of nature—his ingredients are 100 percent natural—yet 
                                                          
16 As opposed to the characters in other chapters, who are valuable as or because they are children. Only in Never 
Let Me Go do we also see children commodified solely for use as adults. In Never Let Me Go, however, the 
protagonist constantly recalls her childhood, and therefore the connection between the commodified child and adult 
is constantly reinforced. The novel also shows how adults fear grotesque children, and so increases the pathos one 
feels towards them throughout their life. Elephantmen, on the other hand, quickly sets up the hybrid’s 
commodification as one that began in childhood, but spends the majority of its pages on their adult life, with the 
occasional reference to their past. This reflects the desire of the hybrids to leave their pasts behind, even as the entire 
trajectory of their lives can be traced to their creation and subsequent childhood. 
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by the process and the very fact of his creation, he is unnatural, the product of 
philosophical overreaching. Since he is a unique creation, without precedence or 
replication, he lacks cultural as well as natural context. (217) 
In their science fictional world, the lack of cultural and natural precedent for the hybrids is 
fearsome. This fear is then displaced onto the chimerical bodies of the hybrids. But just as 
Elephantmen may appear human despite their monstrosity, so too can humans become monsters.  
In the opening pages of an issue that follows Trench, a zebra/human hybrid, during his 
time as a police officer immediately following integration into the United States, Trench 
narrates: “MAPPO’s engineers took sovereignty of the animal kingdom even further, they made 
us like man, but not man. We remained creatures to conquer or fear once again, not brothers they 
could relate to. Better Products … We became Elephantmen, neither one nor the other” 
(Schweikert, Kane, and Starkings). Trench articulates a conception of the hybrids that directly 
coincides with Cassuto’s observation that grotesque bodies are neither human nor object. While 
Cassuto is dealing with objectification based on race, not species, the animal aspect of the 
Elephantmen resonate with the racial grotesque because, in addition to their African heritage, 
they provide a metaphor for one of the ways in which humans are dehumanized: by comparisons 
to animals. It is for this reason that their status of “like man” is emphasized with bolding.  
 Trench is called to a crime scene where an African American man high on cough syrup 
has murdered a child related to him. This leads to a panel that captures the horror of people in 
dehumanizing circumstances (Figure 2.11). The panel encompasses approximately two thirds of 
the page. A dead African American child is in bed, his throat cut. This panel juxtaposes what 
should be a child’s safe space, their bedroom, with the horrors of his circumstance. The boy, 
were it not for his cut throat, appears peaceful, almost as if he was asleep. His dog is laying 
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quietly by him, and the boy’s hand is touching a stuffed animal. Yet the boy is murdered; blood 
covers the sheets. There is dog excrement on the bed. Unpacked boxes sit in the corner of the 
room, while a large bong is on the child’s bed. The solid, clearly defined images and lines 
combined with a bright, rich color palette provides a vibrancy that contributes to the 
juxtaposition of innocence and violence.17 The child’s face, as well as his upper body, look like 
that of an adult. His body and face seem larger than his legs, and his face could be that of a 
young man rather than the child he is, an aesthetic recognition of the inability to shelter his 
childhood. The following page shows the floor in this room littered with junk and garbage, as the 
murderer is curled up next to the bed holding a box cutter.  The shattering of the illusion of the 
child safe in his bedroom highlights the grotesque nature of the humans in this story. The series 
returns to the image of the child to garner sympathy for those trapped in a dehumanizing system. 
A human police officer enters and says, “What kind of animals are they breeding, out here?” 
This moment contributes to the human becoming grotesque through his own behavior. Trench 
responds, “Animals. We call them that when we don’t understand. When we’re afraid of what a 
man can become” (Schweikert, Kane, and Starkings). The emphasis on what a man or woman 
can become resonates with the grotesque as transformation. Trench also demonstrates that fear 
can be a factor in the grotesque. Society may dehumanize or objectify that which scares it so that 
it becomes unrecognizable. The other officer's question creates a gap between himself and the 
people he wants to distance himself from, which allows him to project the blame for their 
heinous circumstances onto the victims, rather than the structural issues at play, like poverty and 
racial discrimination. By seeing the individual or a small group of individuals as grotesque, he 
can ignore the larger ramifications. Generally speaking, some people, rather than embracing the 
                                                          
17 For more on the tension between innocence and danger, see pages 44-52. 
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idea that the grotesque can force us to more fully explore what it means to be human and/or 
embrace incongruity, instead reject grotesque beings outright as in- or nonhuman.  
While Trench’s experience illustrates the way in which humans can be considered 
animals, one woman transforms her entire existence. Yvette is a French resistance fighter who 
faces the Elephantmen before their emancipation, when they fight in Europe. Yvette lost family 
and friends to the Elephantmen, so she fights for her homeland against the foreign military 
presence. The Elephantmen, engines of death and destruction, fear her. Years after the war, 
Yvette travels to the United States and begins murdering Elephantmen before confronting her 
ultimate target, Obadiah Horn. During the war, Horn made it his mission to kill Yvette. During 
their final confrontation after the war, Yvette commits suicide rather than be spared by the 
hybrids and their allies. She would rather die than be used as “evidence” of the hybrids’ 
humanity (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook). Yvette’s inability to put aside her 
vengeance signifies how she has been reshaped by her circumstances. Shun-Liang Chao writes,  
Grotesque trans-formation is an excessive pursuit of incompleteness and contradiction: it 
transgresses the natural order of things and produces within itself a self-contradictory (or 
in-between) physical structure, one that, as we shall see, displeases classicists because of 
its ability to feed the feelings of (dis)pleasure and to obscure the borderline between life 
and death, beauty and deformity, the central and peripheral. (26) 
Even though contradictory topics, like life and death, often help inform each other, classicists 
prefer they be kept separate. This is why the grotesque is so displeasing to them. They reject, for 
example, animal/human hybridity because the classical human body is predicated on its 
adherence to proportion and symmetry and altering them makes the sacred into something 
profane. To excessively pursue incompleteness and contradiction warps a person so that his or 
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her incongruity becomes written on the body. Chao’s emphasis on grotesque transformation as 
an excessive pursuit contextualizes Yvette’s experience, as her excessive pursuit of vengeance 
causes her to forsake all else and changes her into the living embodiment of death. Yvette is 
initially depicted as a French freedom fighter who can somehow go toe-to-toe with the 
Elephantmen. In an early recollection of Yvette, the text reflects on the Elephantmen’s presence 
in Europe: “We were confronted by enemies just as ferocious as ourselves, some were perhaps 
even more deadly” (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook). This narration appears in a 
panel where Yvette slashes the face of a hybrid with a knife (Figure 2.12). Over the hybrid’s 
shoulder we see Yvette: blood on her face, eyebrow raised, mouth open mid-speech or 
exclamation. Even though the back of the hybrid’s head is the centerpiece of the panel, the 
speech balloons frame Yvette’s head, thus facilitating the transition of the viewer’s gaze from the 
hybrid to Yvette. While the narration in this panel doesn’t specifically reference Yvette, the 
positioning of the speech balloons next to an image of Yvette makes clear to whom the narration 
refers. But the narration seems absurd. While the ferocity of the humans may be equal to the 
Elephantmen, how could a human be more deadly than a being bio-engineered for war? Yet this 
is the case. Hip Flask later recalls, “[Yvette] was the scourge of the Elephantmen… We marched 
into Europe with the most sophisticated state-of-the-art weaponry known to man… We could 
have easily brushed armies aside… But when we were confronted by a young French girl who 
had lost everything… We may as well have raised bows and arrows against the 
lightning”(Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook). Yvette becomes a force of nature: 
lightning, able to quickly strike and withdraw. All of the Elephantmen’s advanced weaponry is 
for naught, as it gets technologically reduced from bullets to arrows. Of course, bullets are also 
no good against lightning, but the metaphor of bows and arrows against lightning highlights, 
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even more so, the futility and power differential between Yvette and the hybrids. A few pages 
later, after a description of Yvette surviving being shot and falling hundreds of feet, a panel that 
captures Yvette’s grotesque transformation coincides with Chao’s description of the blurring of 
the border between life and death (Figure 2.13). Yvette is depicted on the left half of the panel 
from the shoulders up, against a black backdrop. The left half of her face has three tears 
streaming down it. The right half is a skull, with an empty socket incapable of tears. The left side 
of the panel includes the narration “It was as if Yvette had become death itself” above the image 
(Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook). The panel shows a contradiction within Yvette, 
as a simultaneously living and dead being. The fully fleshed left half of the face juxtaposed 
against the skull on the right, without any sort of transition between the two halves, leads to 
contradictions between life and death and beauty and deformity. She becomes the embodiment of 
death, at least to the Elephantmen. The right half of the panel is wreathed in flames that seem to 
be born of, and partially framed by, Yvette’s flaming red hair. Her beret also blends into the right 
half of the panel as it burns. Within these flames is an image of Yvette walking out of a firestorm 
as she fires her rifle. She is unburnt, an avenging angel or rising phoenix, seemingly immune to 
and unfazed by the fire she walks out of, come to deliver death and retribution to her attackers. 
The narration, “The hunted became the hunter,” repositions Yvette from a position lacking 
power to one containing power. Both sides of this panel capture Yvette’s transformation: a 
moment of metaphorical rebirth where Yvette redefines herself as the Elephantmen’s enemy.  
When Yvette follows the hybrids to the United States to finally kill Horn, she engages in 
a campaign of terror where she kills other Elephantmen and leaves behind the phrase “No 
Mercy.” This harkens back to her days as a freedom fighter when she carved her name into the 
flesh of at least one dead hybrid. In the United States, Yvette begins wearing the skull of Tusk 
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(Figures 2.14 and 2.15). In doing so, Yvette is reflecting back to the hybrids the image of their 
own death, as she delivers it. But she is also transforming herself. She remains human but 
becomes so consumed by her role that she transforms a part of herself into something that is less 
recognizably human. Her excessive pursuit of vengeance requires her to sacrifice much of her 
humanity and transforms her into a reaper. Two (of six) panels take this even further (Figure 
2.14). The emphasis on the eyes of Yvette and her victim create the impression that they are of 
the same kind. The dimensions of them are the same, and the reader is denied a view of any of 
Yvette’s actual, human body, and is instead forced to confront the mask she wears. The mask is 
unable to convey emotion; even the eyeholes are inscrutable pits of darkness with no indication 
of what lies beneath. This is in contrast to the clearly frightened hybrid. He is sweating and 
appears incredulous. The subsequent panels show Yvette killing him. The living creature of the 
second panel is dead meat with no future, whereas the creature in the first panel, wearing a mask 
of death, lives. The mask completes the grotesque transformation that Chao describes. Rather 
than being half human and half death, Yvette is now all death. This is reinforced when Yvette 
murders another hybrid in his bedroom (Figure 2.15). In the first panel, Yvette stands against a 
backdrop of the sky, her bloody axes in-hand, as the dead hybrid collapses on the floor. But the 
background of Yvette, rather than depicting a discernible daytime skyline, instead looks like a 
flaming backdrop. It thus resonates with the image of Yvette emerging from flames, guns 
blazing.18 Here, she also emerges from flames, but now she covers her face in a full skull. In the 
bottom panel of Figure 2.15, the image emphasizes the inscrutability of her left socket, which 
also resonates with Figure 2.13 because in that image it’s the left side of Yvette’s face that is still 
human. Yvette’s ability to become an instrument of destruction is predicated on her ability to 
                                                          
18 Figure 2.13 comes after Figures 2.14 and 2.15 in the comics, but occurs before these latter figures, as it describes 
her time in Europe. 
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take on the characteristics of that which she kills, which is the Elephantmen at the peak of their 
war years. She doesn’t just hunt Elephantmen, she becomes an agent of their death by embracing 
the violence she abhorred in them, which the hybrid skull she now wears represents. Just as 
Elephantmen were created to be perfect military specimens, Yvette has turned herself into a 
perfect specimen for hunting and killing them. Her self-imposed mission completely defines her. 
When Yvette finally confronts Horn, he says, “I know who you are. Yvette. The freedom 
fighter. At least you were then. Now? Now you are nothing. Look at yourself. You are little more 
than an animated cadaver. A spectre clinging to delusions of morality” (Starkings, Medellin, 
Kane, Roshell, and Cook). Horn’s references to her as an “animated cadaver” and a “spectre 
clinging to delusions of morality” recognize the transformation of Yvette into a manifestation of 
death, animated by her vengeance. Horn says, “… I will be mourned by the society that 
celebrates me now and they will marvel at my achievements long after I am gone… You will be 
executed as an assassin, a psychopath. An animal” (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and 
Cook). In some respects, it’s remarkable that Horn, having been dehumanized throughout his 
life, calls Yvette an animal. Biologically, Yvette is more human than Horn, and their capacity for 
logic and emotion is equal. Horn, like Yvette, taps into the pejorative connotations of the 
grotesque, the unwillingness to associate extremely distasteful behavior with humanity. Yvette 
rejects this: “I am not an animal! I am a human being and none of your bullshit will stop me 
from exterminating you” (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook). This exclamation, 
ironically, takes place in a panel that showcases Yvette’s mask, which complicates her defense. 
The red font connotes a rage, more powerful for its rare use in the comics. The words shift from 
a rejection of her animality to an assertion of her humanity before ending with a dehumanization 
of Horn, as “extermination” is primarily used when referring to insects or rodents. This refusal to 
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give into her own dehumanization, even as she dehumanizes others, connects to Cassuto’s notion 
of the dialectical interplay between the objectifier and objectified. It also demonstrate how the 
grotesque is applied from the center to the margins. This application, however, involves 
perspective. Yvette’s behavior is monstrous, but not to her. To her, the Elephantmen are the 
monsters for what they did. To Horn, she’s the monster due to her murderous tendencies 
occurring outside the theater of war. This is why a person can be made grotesque by others with 
the power to redefine them, but it’s also why a person can become grotesque through their own 
behavior. If others see this behavior as abhorrent, they seek to expunge it. Of course, the 
grotesque most clearly describes images and bodies that trouble dominant paradigms or 
structures, but its ambivalent nature allows for multivalent possibilities. Even though the 
Elephantmen’s ambiguous bodies embody a lifetime of commodification, Horn’s assertion that 
Yvette is the true grotesque challenges MAPPO’s early dominance over the hybrids’ lives. The 
hybrids can be more than soldiers, and Yvette’s inability or unwillingness to recognize this turns 
her into a monster.   
Elephantmen as Postmodernism 
 Brian McHale notes that science fiction literature, which tends to “lag behind canonized 
or mainstream literature in its adoption of new literary modes,”19 began in the 1960s, with 
authors like J.G. Ballard, to engage in and with postmodernism (69–72). The science fictional 
Elephantmen situates the metaphor of racial objectification as grotesque hybridization within a 
postmodern context. Ihab Hassan finds that in 1982 “no clear consensus about 
[postmodernism’s] meaning exists between scholars” (263). Hassan tries to alleviate this by 
associating postmodernism with “indeterminacy,” or “a complex referent which these diverse 
                                                          
19 Even though postmodernism has often borrowed from science fiction, especially in its interest in its use of 
temporal and spatial displacement (66). 
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concepts [like ambiguity and deformation] help to delineate” and “immanence,” which 
“designate[s] the capacity of mind to generalize itself in symbols, intervene more and more into 
nature, act upon itself through its own abstractions and so become, increasingly, im-mediate, its 
own environment” (269–270).20 In Elephantmen, the ambiguous bodies of the hybrids serve as 
symbols for their own commodification and for the racial objectification they face. While 
Hassan’s emphasis on indeterminacy and immanence coincides with the function and effect of 
the grotesque, other scholars help further illuminate postmodernism’s workings.  
Fredric Jameson associates the postmodern with depthlessness and an emphasis on 
commodification. The depthlessness involves a “weakening of history.” Nostalgia films, for 
example, don’t actually reflect a specific time in our past, but rather an aesthetic or style that 
invokes a nostalgia for the idea of the past (19). They imagine the past but redeploy it as an 
aesthetic for consumption. This is why pastiche is such a prominent aspect of the postmodern. 
It’s the invocation of various forms and styles but without the satiric bite of parody (17). Pastiche 
is about commodification rather than critique or insight.21 Barry Lewis calls "pervasive and 
pointless pastiche" one of the "dominant features" of postmodernism (171). Lewis reference to 
pastiche as “pointless” coincides with Frederic Jameson’s assertion that pastiche, like parody, 
imitates a specific style but lacks subversive edge. On the other hand, John Storey believes that 
                                                          
20 Hassan provides lists of the concepts that illustrate postmodernism, I’ve chosen a few representative examples that 
fit within the context of this project, even though I do not consider this project an entirely postmodern endeavor. 
21 Jameson also resists the intrusion of the market into social domains like the family, and the notion that this 
intrusion is human nature (263-264). He considers the merger of two “separate explanatory systems … human 
behavior (preeminently the family or the oikos), on the one hand, the firm or enterprise, on the other,” championed 
by the neoliberal Gary Becker, postmodern because they combine distinct systems as if they are one (269-270). 
Jameson’s book is published in 1991, though some of the material was published in the mid-1980s, during the 
Reagan administration and the initial rise of neoliberalism. In this way, Jameson is dealing with the beginnings of 
neoliberalism, but he refers to late capitalism, which includes an emphasis on multinational and transnational 
corporations, as opposed to monopolies in a single country, and a desire for a global capitalist system (xviii–xix). 
Neoliberalism shares this emphasis on globalization and the desire to spread and create new markets across the 
world. His resistance to the intrusion of the market resonates with this project’s emphasis on how neoliberalism 
invades childhood. See pages 12-21. 
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pastiche and nostalgia are inadequate for fully understanding the intertextual nature of 
postmodern texts. He writes, “The intertextual understood as a form of borrowing from what 
already exists is always also (at least potentially) a making new from combinations of what is 
old. In this way, popular culture is, and has always been, about more than a pastiche or a 
nostalgic recycling of what has been before" (209). Pastiche alone cannot account for the ways in 
the postmodern recycles old forms or ideas into new ones.  
Another aspect of postmodernism is its ahistorical nature. Linda Hutcheon notes “One of 
the few common denominators among the detractors of postmodernism is the surprising, but 
general, agreement that the postmodern is ahistorical” (The Poetics of Postmodernism 87), but 
complicates this further. She argues that “postmodernism is a contradictory phenomenon, one 
that uses and abuses, installs and then subverts, the very concepts it challenges” (The Poetics of 
Postmodernism 3). It considers history and fiction as “human constructs,” which provides “the 
grounds for its rethinking and reworking of the forms and contents of the past” (The Poetics of 
Postmodernism 5). She names texts that engage in this tendency “historiographic metafiction.” 
Unlike Jameson, Hutcheon does see parody in postmodernism;22 parody uses irony to distance 
itself from the past, even as it wistfully “call[s] to continuity beneath the fragmented echoing,” 
thus distancing itself to the past even as it reaffirms its “connection to the past” (The Poetics of 
Postmodernism 11; 125). Thus, “Historiographic metafiction always asserts that its world is both 
resolutely fictive and yet undeniably historical” (The Poetics of Postmodernism 142). 
As Hutcheon notes, others also discuss the relationship between postmodernism and 
history. Christopher Butler writes, "History was just another narrative, whose paradigm 
                                                          
22 This may be an issue of usage. Jameson sees pastiche as parody without satire (17), but Hutcheon seems to 
consider them synonyms, or at least flattens their differences. She writes, “Parody – often called ironic quotation, 
pastiche, appropriation, or intertextuality – is usually considered central to postmodernism” (The Politics of 
Postmodernism 93) [italics added].  
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structures were no better than fictional, and was a slave to its own (often unconsciously used) 
unrealized myths, metaphors, and stereotypes … even its causal explanations could be shown to 
derive from, and hence to repeat, well-known fictional plots" (32). This doesn’t mean that 
“anything goes,” but that we should be more cognizant of “the theoretical assumptions which 
support the narratives produced by all historians” (35). This coincides with the rationale for 
historiographic metafiction: it can rework and rethink the past because it recognizes the 
narratives of the past are constructed by people. This emphasis on the past as construct makes it 
less likely to see history as linear progress. According to Simon Malpas, "... postmodern fiction 
frequently treats history ironically as a site of fragmentation rather than a progressive structure" 
(101).  
Elephantmen incorporates its grotesque hybrids within a postmodern environment of 
history, pastiche and commodification. It draws on fragments of specific atrocities even as it 
dissolves boundaries between atrocities. Nikken, speaking to a United Nations court, says, “So 
much blood has been split… So many people have died. So many atrocities have been 
committed. So many monsters have walked the earth. But you are looking for just one” 
(Starkings, Moritat, Churchill, Medellin, Steen, et al.). Whether Nikken’s accusation that he is a 
scapegoat is accurate or not, it metatextually speaks to the series’ practices. The series gives us 
one atrocity, the treatment of the hybrids, to stand in for all atrocities. The hybrids draw upon the 
history of the slave trade and the mistreatment of Africans and African Americans; the U.N. trial 
of the hybrids creator, which is juxtaposed against images of mass graves, draws upon the 
holocaust and its aftermath. The mixing of historical narratives doesn’t end there. The hybrids 
are not just freed slaves, but immigrants, as the comic uses images meant to recall Ellis Island 
and other iconic images of immigrant workers. The U.N. soldiers who free the hybrids are 
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sometimes cast as their enslavers. They load the hybrids into trains while carrying guns, and they 
put the hybrids in chains to bring them to the United States in ships. The comics often begin with 
quotes on a variety of topics from real people, like George W. Bush, Carl Jung or Ayn Rand, but 
they also include quotes from fictional people, like Dr. Nikken. This pastiche of atrocity, of 
victimizers and saviors, and of real and fictional people are elements of how the narrative 
consciously recalls a variety of events and perspectives, without fully affirming a historical 
narrative.  
The dissolution of boundaries is prominent in its blurring of historical atrocities, but it 
also takes place on the formal level of the art and materiality of the comics. Richard Starkings is 
interested in bringing a “sense of fun” to Elephantmen (Starkings, “Interview: Richard 
Starkings”). In a more recent interview, he reiterates: “… we wanted to have FUN … I love 
having a book where I can channel all my love for comics – Sword and Sorcery! Science Fiction! 
Horror! I love it all. That’s what the book is really about” (Starkings, “Strange Times, Stranger 
Heroes in Elephantmen”). This sense of fun is present in the constant homage to pulp influences. 
Starking’s describes Elephantmen as pulp science fiction in the vein of precursors like the “60s 
Marvel comics and 70s issues of 2000 AD” (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and 
Churchland Afterword). Pulp science fiction is, to Starkings, “Action and adventure with a SF 
[science fiction] twist” (Starkings, “Interview: Richard Starkings”). The term is even used in the 
comics’ marketing. For example, it can sometimes be found on the covers of the individual 
comics as paratextual information. The pulp influences of the comic can be found in the pastiche 
of imagery and styles within the comic books.  
The comics often explicitly reference genre fiction and sometimes the overall aesthetic 
style of the art changes drastically. One issue of the comics has a title page that embodies the 
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emphasis on detective fiction (Figure 2.16).23 Ebony Hide looks like a gumshoe, with his trench 
coat and flashlight. The comic's title, "The Elephant in the Room," is a joke that references both 
the hybrid skeleton on display, Ebony Hide himself, and the mystery the detective is 
investigating. Another comic depicts a femme fatale, who ends up going upstairs into a 
detective's office (Figure 2.17). In addition to drawing on tropes and images from the pulp 
detective genre, Elephantmen also reference specific texts, like Blade Runner (Figure 2.18). 
"Glade Runner" is a clear take on the sci-fi detective film, except it replaces clones as the beings 
that challenges ontological divides with hybrids. "Glade Runner" is a comic within a comic. 
Some characters in Elephantmen read the "Glade Runner" or other comics. Another comic-
within-a-comic, "The Victory of Sammy Thrace" from the series Hip Flask, is an homage to Will 
Eisner's famous detective comic The Spirit (Figure 2.19). Part of Eisner's fame is due to his 
innovative and meticulous title pages, which incorporated the name of the series into the 
architecture of the page in stunning ways. Elephantmen mimics this by spelling "Hip" with the 
laundry hanging on the clothes line and "Flask" painted perpendicular on the building. 
Contributors names are integrated into the cityscape, with "Busiek Arms" and "Immonen Barber 
Shop." The "Created by Richard Starkings" signature mirrors the appearance of Eisner's credits 
in The Spirit, down to the circles atop the letters "I." While homage to detective fiction is 
common in the series, it isn’t the only type of homage. "The Slaughter House Five" is a direct 
reference to Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five, only the carnage in Starkings' take references 
crocodile hybrids, notorious for their ferocity, rather than the Dresden bombing (Figure 2.20). 
Ebony Hide is often cast as Conan the Barbarian during his drug-induced dreams and 
hallucinations, an homage to Robert E. Howard's pulp sword and sorcery creation and the focus 
                                                          
23 Hip Flask and Ebony Hide work as detectives after the war. 
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of the 1970s Marvel comics by Roy Thomas (Figure 2.21). "The Tower of the Elephant," which 
is the title of an homage to Conan, is also the title of one of Howard's short stories, which 
Thomas adapted. While the point of the pastiche is homage, Starkings wants to have fun. This 
desire surfaces in the loving homage to his influences, but this homage does not help readers 
reimagine or reinterpret the stylistic forerunners. 
The list of these examples isn't meant to account for the complexity of each individual 
image, or the sheer volume of all the references. Rather, it illustrates the propensity of the comic 
to directly reference its influences. The multitude of references also coincides with a variety of 
aesthetic styles used in the comics. While it isn't surprising that a comics series that has 
employed a number of artists has differences in styles, the aesthetic differences are often 
drastic;24 and while sometimes the changes in style coincide with diegetic reasons (to depict a 
dream or comic or story within the overarching narrative), oftentimes the changing aesthetics do 
not coincide with a temporal or spatial shift in the diegetic world. The comics’ art often has 
realist elements, although bodies and guns are usually exaggerated. It alternates between dark, 
noir settings and vivid, energetic scenes. It's usually full of kinetic energy and movement, but not 
always. In some instances, the art is lush, full of delicate and precise watercolors (Figure 2.22). 
Some stories are done in bright pastels (Figure 2.23). One story depicts three disembodied heads 
                                                          
24 It’s often the case that aesthetic differences between artists are drastic. Jack Kirby’s kinetic and rambunctious 
fight scenes are often easily recognizable, as our J.H. Williams III’s gorgeous palettes, which often break or 
redeploy generic conventions regarding panels and movement. But individual series often do not look drastically 
different. Many Marvel and DC superhero series, for example, don’t have an aesthetic that varies greatly from one 
title to the other, at least to the lay-reader, much less within an individual series. This is often the case even when a 
series’ creative team changes. One famous anecdote notes that DC had Jack Kirby’s drawings of Superman redone 
because they didn’t look enough like the house style at the time (Cronin). Of course, there are times when a 
publisher or creators significantly change the aesthetic of a series, like with David Aja’s art on his recent, critically-
acclaimed run on Hawkeye with Matt Fraction. Yet these aesthetic differences rely on their “newness” to generate 
interest in the series, therefore they are predicated in part on the idea that the comics often look the same to set 
themselves off from other titles. Sweet Tooth does occasionally shift aesthetics, usually, though not always, this is 
during the few occasions there is an artist other than Lemire. However, Sweet Tooth’s aesthetic shifts function 
differently, as they often reflect different states, like dreams or memories of childhood. 
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that are realistically drawn which surround miniature, cartoonish depictions of some of the 
comics main characters, all against a psychedelic backdrop of mushrooms and an explosive burst 
(Figure 2.24). Elephantmen more freely blends aesthetics than most other comics. This artistic 
promiscuity is in line with its pastiche, in that it constantly draws attention to itself (through its 
references/through its art) and its constructed nature. 
The comics also commodify the characters in various ways, which contributes to the 
series’ postmodernism sensibility. After the Elephantmen come to the United States, and despite 
the fear and derision some people feel towards them, Ebony Hide capitalizes on the fascination 
the public has with them by commodifying their likeness. They are featured in comics within the 
comic, turned into toys (Figure 2.25) and placed on clothing (Figure 2.26) and television (Figure 
2.27). The awe and fear the hybrids generate as grotesque beings gives them cultural appeal. The 
toys, specifically, seem to have a further purpose than simply commodification, as they make 
imposing creatures diminutive and cute. Ngai argues that “cute” is a prominent aesthetic 
category which emerged over the course of the twentieth century. In terms of Elephantmen, what 
seems most important about Ngai’s argument is that “cuteness solicits a regard of the commodity 
as an anthropomorphic being less powerful than the aesthetic subject appealing specifically to us 
for protection and care” (60). In terms of the hybrids, their imposing bodies are turned into 
huggable objects in need of protection. Just as the hybrids are former slaves and current 
immigrants reliant on the largesse of the United Nations and the United States to chart a new 
future for themselves, the Elephantmen toys recast the intimidating beings as objects in need of 
support and protection from the general public, or at least the toy owner. This reverses the actual 
power differential between hybrid and human by repositioning the hybrid as the powerless one. 
This power differential is key to “cute,” as “the subject’s affective response to an imbalance of 
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power between herself and the object” is what determines whether something is cute or not (54). 
The appeal of the cute commodity, which implores its subjects to buy and care for it also inspires 
feelings of sadism in the consumer (Ngai 64–65). The rough treatment toys may receive can 
theoretically be a way for consumers to vent their fears over the Elementmen; but ultimately, the 
toys, by appealing to sentimentality through their cuteness, metaphorically resituates the hybrids, 
turning them into creatures to be protected rather than feared. The emphasis on the 
commodification of the hybrids coincides with the history of the main character. Before 
Elephantmen was a comics series, Hip Flask was initially part of a poster advertisement created 
by Ian Churchill that Starkings and Churchill published in 1998 to advertise their comics fonts 
company (Starkings, “Pertinent Points Pertaining to Pilots, Pieces and Pulchritude”).  
The actual bodies of the hybrids, in addition to their plush and commodified likenesses, 
contribute to the postmodern tone of the narrative. The hybrids bodies challenge human/animal 
binaries and ontological determinism. This often occurs in the intersections between 
postmodernism and science. Simon Malpas notes, "The cultural productions that engage with the 
developments and challenges of science and technology frequently present pictures of a future in 
which human subjectivity and identity have become profoundly problematic" (75). Iain Hamilton 
Grant situates “the hybrid” as one of the dominant figures of “postmodern science” (105). Ursula 
K. Heise notes that the line between animal and human (and human and machine) is becoming 
unstable and that “the fact that technoscientific advances are beginning to make such border 
crossings more than mere hypotheses, combined with a willingness, at least in some quarters, to 
put in question conventional definitions of humanness, do mark a point of departure from the 
modernist conviction that human beings stand apart, and should remain apart, from other forms 
of existence" (144). The relationship between these three points is that postmodernism in science 
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often involves questions regarding what it means to be human, and these questions are often 
evoked through hybrid figures, like in Elephantmen. 
Elephantmen is a site where the grotesque and the postmodern meet. The grotesque 
bodies of the hybrids, which both embody their dehumanization (part animal/part human) and 
provide the rationalization for it (they are created and trained throughout childhood to be 
corporate commodities), are postmodern because they challenge ontological classifications of the 
human, a point of intersection between the grotesque and the nonhuman, while the comic itself 
glorifies in a postmodern world that blends the future with the past, engages in pastiche of styles 
and homages, and incorporates an emphasis on commodification throughout the comic, while 
simultaneously highlighting the ongoing struggle to overcome dehumanization.    
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Figure 2.1 (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland)
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Figure 2.2 (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland) 
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Figure 2.3 (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland) 
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Figure 2.4 (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland) 
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Figure 2.5 (“Slave Ship”) 
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Figure 2.6 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.7 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.8 (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland) 
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Figure 2.9 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, and Cook) 
 
 
121 
 
 
Figure 2.10 (Starkings, Medellin, and Bautista) 
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Figure 2.11 (Schweikert, Kane, and Starkings) 
 
Figure 2.12 (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.13 (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook) 
 
 
Figure 2.14 (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook) 
 
 
124 
 
 
Figure 2.15 (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.16 (Starkings, Moritat, Ladrönn, Roshell, Cook, and Churchland) 
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Figure 2.17 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.18 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchill, Medellin, Steen, et al.) 
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Figure 2.19 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchill, Medellin, Steen, et al.) 
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Figure 2.20 (Starkings, Medellin, Churchland, Moritat, Churchland, et al.) 
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Figure 2.21 (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.22 (Starkings, Aldridge, Hine, Medellin, Parker, et al.) 
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Figure 2.23 (Starkings, Medellin, Kane, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.24 (Starkings, Aldridge, Hine, Medellin, Parker, et al.)
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Figure 2.25 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.26 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, and Cook) 
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Figure 2.27 (Starkings, Moritat, Churchland, Roshell, and Cook)  
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“We Are Masterpieces”: The Commodification of Grotesque Children in Geek Love 
Introduction 
Geek Love, a novel by Katherine Dunn published in 1989, depicts the Binewski family 
and their traveling carnival. The Binewski family consists of Aloysius (or Al), his wife Lillian 
(or Lil), and their children: Arturo, Electra, Iphigenia, Olympia, and Fortunato (or Arty, Elly, 
Iphy, Oly and Chick). The story is told from Oly’s perspective as a record of the family history 
for her daughter, Miranda. The Binewski’s history involves the display of grotesque children in 
the carnival. Arty is born with flippers, Elly and Iphy are Siamese twins conjoined at the torso, 
Oly is a hunchback, albino dwarf, and Chick is telekinetic and empathic. He can move things 
with his mind, even at the molecular level, and he experiences the feelings of others. The 
inclusion of children in a traveling carnival is in line with real world freak shows and carnivals 
because they showcased people, often children, for profit (Bogdan 8–9; 112–113). Freak shows, 
whether in dime museums or traveling circuses, have a long history in the United States and 
were especially popular between 1840-1940 (Bogdan 2).1 However, the primary difference 
between these earlier displays of children for profit and the display of children for profit in Geek 
Love is that the Binewski parents engineer their children from conception to be carnival 
attractions, which informs from birth how the children understand themselves. 
The Binewski children are grotesque because of their parents. Al suggests that Lil take 
drugs and other harmful compounds during ovulation and pregnancy. They desire unique 
children who can be displayed at their carnival, thus reversing its declining fortunes. As the 
children grow up, they base their self-worth on their ability to draw spectators and make money 
for the family. This leads to tension between Arty and the twins, the carnival’s two biggest 
                                                          
1 Going back even further, “the bodies of children [were] stunted and twisted in late Renaissance Europe so that they 
could be used as props by beggars or peddled to exhibitors” (Fiedler 251). 
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attractions. Arty eventually takes control of the carnival after he learns he has a gift for 
persuasion that enables him to draw bigger crowds than his unique body would by itself. He 
ultimately creates a cult based on the gradual dismemberment of limbs: a process he abets by 
recruiting Dr. Phyllis, a woman willing to engage in Arty’s unethical work, and by using Chick’s 
ability to numb the pain of others. Cult members give up their life savings to join and follow the 
carnival around, until their limbs are all amputated and they are sent to live in homes funded by 
the money they donated to join the cult. Arty’s rise to power coincides with his parents’ mental 
decline. It also involves the domination of the twins. He finds out they have been prostituting 
themselves and is so jealous  and upset that he cannot control access to their bodies that he 
eventually gives them to his right-hand man, the Bag Man, and has Elly, who hates Arty, 
lobotomized. Chick is able to use his powers to revive Elly. Upon her revival, Elly kills the child 
she had with Iphy and the Bag Man. The twins then kill each other.2 Chick, devastated by the 
pain he feels over the family’s suffering and disgusted by the behavior of Arty, uses his power to 
blow up the carnival. Only Oly and Lil survive the inferno. 
Before the carnival is destroyed, Oly convinces Chick to transport some of Arty’s sperm 
into her body so that she might have his child, and she gives birth to Miranda. Oly uses some of 
the carnival’s money to place Miranda in an orphanage. After the carnival is destroyed, Oly 
shadows Miranda; she looks over Miranda without revealing herself as her mother. She also 
takes care of Lil, whose memory and sight are gone. Miranda, who has a tail, eventually meets a 
rich woman named Miss Lick, who offers to pay for an operation to remove it. Oly, upset over 
the possibility her daughter might cut off what makes her special, befriends and ultimately kills 
Miss Lick. Oly also dies in the process. 
                                                          
2 Sadly, the potential for a model of odd sisterhood that Siamese twins provide for Mary Russo fails in this case (12). 
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The novel, through the Binewski children, employs grotesque metaphors for the 
commodification of children, while simultaneously providing the rationale for such 
commodification. The children’s bodies are valuable because they are human but still radically 
different. Furthermore, because the children’s bodies are grotesque, they seem to belong in the 
carnival. While Oly eventually works in the outside world, the children’s bodies are the reason 
and justification for their exploitation. This dynamic causes the children to define themselves by 
the same systems which exploit them. The terminology which dominates the novel is one of 
“freaks” versus “norms.”3 This paper situates the discourse of “freaks” within the realm of the 
grotesque and argues that the Binewski children’s grotesque bodies are aesthetic embodiments of 
some of the effects of neoliberal capitalism. This aesthetic disguises itself as one of individuality, 
but ultimately narrows all possibilities for individual expression. The novel shows how adult 
desires dominate the lived experiences of children. 
Freaks and the Grotesque 
Scholars consider the physically abnormal as part of the grotesque (Slay Jr. 100), but they 
usually take this connection as a given based solely on the bodily differences of freaks.4 
However, the connection between freaks and the grotesque works because physically abnormal 
bodies function similarly to grotesque forms. In Leslie Fiedler’s 1978 book, Freaks, he examines 
strange and extraordinary bodies, like those of dwarves or Siamese twins, while also discussing 
their treatment historically, including their relation to the carnival. While he is writing about 
“freaks,” his discussion resonates with the grotesque, even though he doesn’t specifically engage 
                                                          
3  For the sake of consistency with the novel, I use the “freak” and “norm” terminology throughout this chapter. In 
Dunn’s work, freaks are unique individuals born with (usually) physical features that are so unique that they are 
easily distinguishable from norms, or people without such features. To the Binewskis, being a freak is far preferable 
to being a norm and is a source of pride.  
4 Mary Russo differentiates the freak from the grotesque by associating the freak with spectacle (78–79). 
  
140 
 
with the grotesque. Fiedler spends much of his introduction discussing why the term “freak” is 
the most appropriate for his project. He writes, “Euphemisms lack the resonance necessary to 
represent the sense of quasi-religious awe which we experience first and most strongly as 
children: face to face with fellow humans more marginal than the poorest sharecroppers or black 
convicts on a Mississippi chain gain” (17). This justification is notable because it positions 
freaks beneath exploited groups like poor sharecroppers, who had to give some of the fruits of 
their labor to landowners, and prisoners forced to work for the state. This comparison 
foreshadows the ways in which freaks may be exploited. The other notable aspect about Fiedler’s 
quote is the emphasis on the affective response the freak engenders: the “quasi-religious awe.” 
The emotional experience which Fiedler associates with the freak is central to its being. When 
discussing the film Mutations, Fiedler argues it fails because of the unconvincing special effects, 
which “move the audience to snicker in embarrassment and condescension instead of crying out 
in terror” before noting that many normals (his term of choice for those not considered freaks) 
actually laugh at freaks, “making … jokes at their expense” (19). This quote reveals two 
appropriate reactions freaks: terror and laughter.5 This laughter, to Fiedler, is a coping 
mechanism: “ambiguous and defensive” (20). Fiedler later affirms the terror inspired by the freak 
but combines it with a different reaction: sympathy. He explains, “The true Freak … stirs both 
supernatural terror and natural sympathy, since, unlike the fabulous monsters, he is one of us, the 
human child of human parents, however altered by forces we do not quite understand into 
something mythic and mysterious” (24). This tension between a “human child of human parents” 
and something “mythic and mysterious” is part of what makes the freak grotesque. He or she is 
biologically human, but aesthetically situated between the human and nonhuman. After 
                                                          
5 See page 23 for more on the grotesque’s ability to inspire multiple reactions. 
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establishing the freak’s capacity to inspire multiple emotional reactions, Fiedler asserts its 
capacity for upending ontological classifications. “The true Freak, “ he writes,  “challenges the 
conventional boundaries between male and female, sexed and sexless, animal and human, large 
and small, self and other, and consequently between reality and illusion, experience and fantasy, 
fact and myth” before qualifying that “no actual Freak threatens all of these limits at once” (24). 
The ability to generate seemingly contradictory emotional reactions, along with the 
ability to challenge boundaries, places Fiedler’s definition of the freak alongside definitions of 
the grotesque. Justin Edwards and Rune Graulund note the “tension between the ludicrous and 
the fearful, the absurd and the terrifying” (4). Shun-Liang Chao argues that the grotesque is most 
often associated with “horror and terror” because grotesque bodies are “(biologically) impure,” 
which causes people to fear things like pain and sickness. At the same time, as a transgressive 
form, the grotesque “can also yield pleasure in novelty, the comic, absurdity, and the like.” One 
experience may dominate or different experiences may be felt simultaneously, depending on the 
form (10). 
The connection between Fiedler’s freaks and the grotesque does not end with definitional 
similarities and the freak’s ability to generate ambivalent emotional reactions. Fiedler uses the 
term “grotesque’ multiple times. He refers to the “total monster” (24), The Monster of Ravenna, 
as a “grotesque fantasy” (26). This creature has female and male genitalia, a horn, an eye at its 
knee, wings instead of arms, and a scaly bottom half that ends in a giant chicken leg. It’s both 
absurd and terrifying as it blends traits from multiple species and male and female sexual organs. 
Fiedler’s use of the word “grotesque” as an adjective to describe the Monster of Ravenna is an 
accurate one, even as it comes in a section which discusses, in part, the appropriateness of 
terminology like “monster” or “freak” without considering “grotesque” as a potentially 
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appropriate term. Regarding hermaphrodites, those bodies which challenge female/male 
divisions, Fiedler observes, “[they] seem to both sexes the most grotesque of all side show 
Freaks” (32–33). Hermaphrodites are given an entire chapter in Freaks and are defined as such. 
Yet here the grotesque becomes an attribute of the freak. For Fiedler, the grotesque works in 
degrees. Not all freaks are equally grotesque; but they are grotesque. Hermaphrodites are the 
most grotesque because they upend one of the entrenched distinctions of humanity: the division 
between male and female. While Fiedler initially associates the grotesque with freaks, he 
subsequently uses the words synonymously. He describes, “Giants, Pinheads, Midgets, and other 
grotesques” when discussing the household of W. C. Fields (61). Fiedler’s grotesques all involve 
physical deformity. Of course, not everyone equates physical deformities with freak-ness or the 
grotesque. But even though the grotesque can be subjective, Arthur Clayborough notes that we 
regard physical deformities, or nonhuman creatures that suggest deformities, as “more deeply or 
abidingly grotesque than others” (109). 
Fiedler’s description of freaks connects to the grotesque. Of course, Mikhail Bakhtin 
discusses both the carnival and the grotesque in his influential Rabelais and His World, though 
he doesn’t emphasize carnival freaks.  Bakhtin situates the carnival in relation to folk humor. His 
focus on laughter and the upending of traditional hierarchical boundaries within the carnival fits 
with the ability of the grotesque to inspire laughter and challenge classifications (5–6; 10), but 
his emphasis on bodies is different than Fiedler’s. For Bakhtin, everyone has the potential for 
exhibiting the grotesque because the grotesque involves excess. The transgression of bodily 
boundaries is as much a part of the grotesque as the transgression of social and political ones. 
Fluids, excrement, and fat can all be grotesque. This conception can be deeply positive because 
the ability to overflow boundaries is associated with renewal (18–19). Fiedler is not specifically 
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concerned with the idea of excess in relation to freaks, but he does see a sort of universality in 
feelings of freakishness. Not everyone has the capacity to be truly grotesque, but anyone can feel 
as if they are a freak. This is demonstrated in Fiedler’s discussion of children and adolescents.  
Fiedler notes that childhood is the time when one is most uncertain “about the limits of 
our bodies and our egos,” as well as the boundaries between dreams and reality (27). Children 
may feel they are themselves freaks without having seen one: “compared to an adult, he [the 
child] is himself a Midget, while compared to a baby or his last year’s self, he is a Giant” (28). 
Fiedler writes, “Born unhousebroken and half wild, dabbling in their own feces and popping into 
their mouths whatever unlikely objects they can grab, they remain for a long time unsure—as the 
Alice books everywhere imply and Book IV of Gulliver explicitly states—whether they are 
beasts or men: little animals more like their pets than their parents” (28). Children seem freakish 
because they aren’t fully domesticated. In addition to scale, children may feel freakish because 
they seem to cross lines between animal and human, civilization and barbarism. The articulation 
of children as “half-wild” aligns with Puritan and Victorian conceptions of the child as one in 
need of restraint.6 Fiedler’s discussion of the animality of children is one based on an adult 
perspective. Structural divisions, even ones that may be understandable and helpful in organizing 
the world and establishing an identity, are learned. It’s highly unlikely that children are “unsure 
… whether they are beasts or men” if for no other reason than biological classifications are not 
yet fully ingrained in them. Fiedler’s assertion that infants and babies are unsure of their 
ontological status reveals more about adults than it reveals about children.7 If anything, parents 
or adult onlookers may ponder the behavior of a child and whimsically wonder into what realm, 
                                                          
6 For more on Puritan conceptions of childhood, see pages 5-11. 
7 For more on adult imperatives in constructing childhood, see pages 3-5. 
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animal or human, he or she belongs; thus revealing a small tear in the seam that humans 
construct between themselves and (other) animals. 
Fiedler’s observations regarding feelings of freakishness are more convincingly 
applicable to adolescents. His most persuasive account of youths as freaks is when they leave 
childhood behind and enter puberty, when individuals must manage their sexual impulses in 
relation to societal expectations (30). The entry into adolescence often involves accompanying 
issues of self-perception. Adolescents may feel “monstrously deficient or excessive, too tall, too 
short, too fat, too thin” (32). His stance that adolescence is a time of freakishness is especially 
convincing because so many people remember feelings of inadequacy or strangeness from 
adolescence. Nonetheless, children and adolescents are not actual freaks.  
Fiedler’s identification of youths’ feelings of freakishness is important because it helps 
him establish one of the cultural functions of the freak show: “A Victorian institution … 
intended to be finally therapeutic, cathartic, no matter what initial terror and insecurity it evokes. 
‘We are the Freaks,’ the human oddities are supposed to reassure us … ‘Not you, Not you!’” 
(31). Fiedler again focuses on multiple reactions to the grotesque. Initial feelings of terror or 
insecurity may give way to feelings of superiority as the freaks, in this context, remind the 
viewer of the social order in which the viewer is considered normal in comparison to the freak. 
Arthur Asa Berger, discussing Dick Tracy and its grotesque villains, writes “The grotesques 
facilitate a kind of ‘guilt-free aggression’ for readers. They are so repulsive and so easily 
identifiable that we can release our own hostile antipathies against them” (127). Berger’s point is 
that Dick Tracy lacks moral complexity and the villains are drawn as grotesques so that there is 
no question they are villains and readers can root against them without complication; yet, 
Berger’s understanding of the grotesque resonates with Fiedler’s discussion of the carnival freak. 
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Both involve the displacement of one’s own feelings onto something else, though Fiedler  notes 
these feelings come from one’s own insecurities.8  
Fiedler’s emphasis on the reassuring aspect of the freak leads to a paradoxical situation in 
which one of the freak’s defining characteristics – the ability to collapse boundaries – is at odds 
with another characteristic of the freak: the ability to alleviate feelings of freakishness in the 
viewer by creating a boundary. This is because alleviating feelings of freakishness is predicated 
on the idea that “they” are freaks and “we” are not. Therefore, a boundary is created between, to 
borrow Geek Love’s terminology, freaks and norms. This boundary is reestablished after Fiedler 
initially collapses the boundary between freaks and humans by noting how children and 
adolescents may appear as, or feel themselves to be, freaks. This distinction between freak and 
norm appears to deny the possibility of fully identifying with the freak because freaks are 
generally defined by their grotesque physical form.9  
Not only are the freaks in Geek Love grotesque, but they are also predominantly female, 
and the grotesque is often associated with females. The word “grotesque” is etymologically 
connected to “grotto.” This connection relates to the excavation of Nero’s Golden Palace around 
1480, which was where the “fanciful ornamental paintings on the walls and ceilings of the 
underground chambers” that came to be called grotesque where found (Chao 1). The association 
of the grotesque with the cavern or underground, both metaphorically and literally, links to the 
female. Mary Russo writes,  
                                                          
8 Though Berger goes on to say that he believes the grotesque is more complicated than simple catharsis from 
rooting against bad guys. 
9 The association of Fiedler’s freaks with the grotesque works due to their ability to disturb classifications and 
inspire certain emotional responses. Freaks are sometimes used for didactic purposes within the Southern grotesque. 
For example, "By exaggerating the spiritual deficiency in man, by making him a freak, [Flannery O’Conner] can 
emphasize his need for morality, and in her own words, for 'grace.' ... Her characters are saved from eternal 
grotesquerie, then, by the possibility of grace, which could encourage a movement toward spirituality" (Barnes 133–
134). But the characters in Geek Love represent societal distortions, not moral deficiency (though some are clearly 
morally deficient). 
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The word itself … evokes the cave—the grotto-esque. Low, hidden, earthy, dark 
material, immanent, visceral. As a bodily metaphor, the grotesque cave tends to 
look like (and in the most gross metaphorical sense be identified with) the 
cavernous anatomical female body. These associations of the female with the 
earthly, material, and the archaic grotesque have suggested a positive and 
powerful figuration of culture and womanhood to many male and female writers 
and artists. (1) 
Other scholars note the association of the grotesque with the cave or grotto, though they aren’t 
always as positive as Russo. Francis Connelly writes, “The grotto is associated with fertility and 
the womb, as well as with death and the grave. It is earthy and material, a cave, an open mouth 
that invites our descent into other worlds. It is the space where the monsters and marvels of our 
imagination are conceived” (1). The grotto or cavern is the womb of the grotesque, where its 
forms are conceived. It’s appropriate that the grotto of the grotesque is ambivalent and evokes 
both life and death, as the grotesque is the embodiment of cultural tensions.10 Ewa Kuryluk 
argues that the cave can both protect and imprison and therefore “[b]ecause of the association 
with the womb and the cave, all closed spaces tend to be perceived as female and are associated 
with both protection and threat” (20). Kuryluk’s formation of the dual nature of the cave (and the 
female grotesque more broadly) makes it potentially threatening. Margaret Miles further 
emphasizes the threatening nature of the female grotesque. While discussing Bakhtin, she notes, 
“The association of the female body with materiality, sex, and reproduction in the female body 
makes it an essential – not an accidental – aspect of the grotesque” (90). This is why “[f]emale 
sexual organs, sexual activity, and behavior are a central object of grotesque figuration” (92–93). 
                                                          
10 As we saw with Elephantmen, Connelly also acknowledges that the grotesque is often used to give voice to the 
outsider and engage “issues of gender and race” (23). See page 81. 
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Because the female body is essential to the grotesque and the grotesque subverts normative 
ideals, the female grotesque threatens patriarchal society; and while men may also be grotesque, 
that doesn’t make the grotesque gender-neutral. Instead it gives men female attributes: “as 
grotesque, male bodies take on precisely the characteristics regularly attributed to female bodies; 
they lose form and integrity, become penetrable, suffer the addition of alien body parts, and 
become alternately huge and tiny” (91). While the female grotesque may be subversive, in the 
patriarchal imagination it is dangerous. Patriarchal societies mitigate against the subversive of 
the social order by managing women, including their representations (111–112).  Miles explains, 
“In the patriarchal societies of the Christian West, ‘woman’ was mysterious and ultimately 
grotesque because women did not represent themselves; lacking conditions for self-
representation – collective voice and access to the public sphere – women were represented by 
men’s anxieties, fears, and fantasies” (112). Miles’ association of patriarchal concerns over the 
female body and of disorder with the feminine grotesque make the grotesque fearsome. Women, 
unable to manage their own representation, become pigeon-holed by men’s representations. 
Miles asserts, “an element of grotesque is present in every women” (85). Mark Dorrian affirms 
the connection between the female grotesque within the classical imagination. He writes, “The 
monstrous is born of the unruly, unmastered feminine … The monstrous child was seen as the 
result of the displacement of the father’s image by the conjurings of the female mind during 
conception or pregnancy. The monster thus signified illegitimate female desires, an illegitimacy 
expressed in the replacement of the father’s image” (312). 
The female grotesque, and especially Miles’ argument, resonates throughout Geek Love, 
but the female grotesque doesn’t have to be completely negative, especially for those who glorify 
in disorder and subversion. For example, Julie Docet uses the female grotesque in her comics to 
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critique male dominance over female bodies. Frederik Byrn Køhlert writes, “A playful assault on 
all that is high, abstract, and hegemonic, her stories appropriate and redeploy stereotypes as 
grotesque images that unsettle authority and undermine the common order” (37). Russo argues 
that the grotesque offers alternatives and can be a type of resistance to dominant ideals and 
expectations. These possibilities extend to feminism itself, which often doesn’t account for a 
variety of different forms and bodies. It is no surprise that Russo, who sees the cave as a positive, 
earthy and feminine symbol, finds the potential for emancipation within the grotesque. Russo’s 
association of the grotesque with the feminine coincides with Miles’. Russo notes that” the 
grotesque—as superficial and to the margins—is suggestive of a certain construction of the 
feminine” (5). Once again, male grotesques “are produced through an association with the 
feminine as the body marked by difference” (13). But unlike Miles, Russo focuses on risk and 
how various spectacles, such as aerial displays or Siamese twins, create the space to resist 
“oppressive bodily containment” and can ultimately provide a “model of feminist practice” (26).  
Approaches like Miles’ and Russo’s indicate that although the grotesque can be 
understood as distinctly female, it also isn’t easily classifiable as positive or negative. Rather, it 
depends on a constellation of factors, including who is utilizing it and how. 
The Commodification of the Grotesque Child 
Geek Love is prescient in its exemplification of the dangers of neoliberal capitalism, as it 
foresaw some of the ways in which children internalize neoliberal logic. Its publication follows 
the Reagan presidency,11 which David Harvey notes is instrumental in the rise of neoliberalism 
(24–26). Anna Mae Duane writes, “The shocking premise in Geek Love that parents would create 
children as explicit commodities starkly dramatizes what, for many theorists, is nothing less than 
                                                          
11 Two pieces of the novel were published earlier, in 1983 and 1988, during the Reagan administration. 
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the dominant economic model of the late twentieth century. In an era of affective labor, 
economic production and human reproduction are inextricable” (111). Engineering the children 
as commodities is evocative of the tension between the economic and the social under 
neoliberalism.12 The tension between the social and economic resonates with discussions of the 
grotesque children.13 The Binewskis define the family by market logic and then situate their 
children in a world where their lives and work are inseparable. While it’s true the Binewski 
children grow up in an earlier time, the novel illustrates the contradictions taking place at the 
time it was published. The novel makes the Binewskis prescient forerunners who anticipate the 
effects of neoliberalism during an earlier period. Miranda’s self-commodification of her tail 
exemplifies this, as she represents the subsequent generation.14 The carnival becomes 
unnecessary for displaying abnormal bodies when society encourages everyone to be unique 
individuals who themselves “as private owners of their own ‘human capital’” (Shaviro 8). 
Miranda is able to find a market for her abnormality outside of the carnival. The redefinition of 
human beings as owners of their own capital plays out physically upon the body, as the 
children’s existence is predicated on their commodity status. The children don’t just market their 
skills, they literally market themselves; not as workers but as beings. 
This begins when Al inherits the struggling carnival.  To counteract the carnival’s 
decline, Al and Lil Binewski create their own attractions to replace aging and lost ones. Al draws 
upon traditional American values for perverse means: “Al was a standard-issue Yankee, set on 
self-determination and independence, but in that crisis his core of genius revealed itself. He 
                                                          
12 For more on these tensions, see pages 12-21. 
13 See pages 26-28. 
14 Although Miranda, who grows up without the domineering influence of Al or Arty, has more power to make her 
own decisions, her sex-work (she’s a stripper, as well as a medical illustrator) would not have been possible under 
the patriarchal gaze of her relatives, as the punishment of Elly and Iphy for their prostitution makes clear. Not to 
conflate stripping and prostitution, but Arty wouldn’t countenance either because he wants to control the type of 
access people have to his sisters. 
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decided to breed his own freak show” (7)15. The word “breed” is evocative of the tension 
inherent in the Binewski children: they are commodities as well as individuals. People 
sometimes talk about good or bad breeding in relation to people; but, in this instance, the 
language of breeding is more evocative of both eugenics and breeding animals for profit.  The 
children are ideal carnival workers because their labor is free, and they have no real desire to 
leave. If they left they would abandon their family as well as enter into a world outside of the 
carnival, where their value as freaks would be upended and they wouldn’t fit in. The carnival 
functions like Kuryluk’s cave, as shelter and a prison. In the carnival, the Binewski children’s 
bodies are assets and people come to lavish attention on them. However, outside the carnival the 
children lack the protective environment of acceptance the carnival provides. This is evidenced 
when the family takes a trip to a grocery store and a norm tries to kill the children by shooting 
them.  
Al comes up with the scheme to breed freak children, and his wife, Lil, proves a willing 
partner. During her ovulation and pregnancies, Al does her with “illicit and prescription drugs, 
insecticides, and eventually radioisotopes” (7). Although Lil eventually goes blind and loses her 
memory, she is lucky enough not to suffer severe health issues early on. The Binewski parents 
never concern themselves with the potential consequences for Lil’s health or the effect that the 
desired deformities will have on their children. Victoria Warren argues that the text interrogates 
American individualism through its use of the tall tale and through its comic qualities, which are 
both part of a tradition of American folk humor (326). Warren argues that the novel challenges 
cultural norms by giving subjectivity to the freaks, rather than the norms (329). Part of Dunn’s 
                                                          
15 Al’s Polish or Eastern European last name suggests he came from a family of immigrants, though it’s never 
commented upon. Lil’s maiden name is Hinchcliff, and she leaves behind her aristocratic Boston family to run away 
with Al. 
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critique of American culture, for Warren, involves Al’s creation of his children. Warren observes 
the exploitive nature of this process with her contention that “Al’s product is deformed children” 
(324) and that his creation and accumulation of these products “underscores the degradation and 
callousness potentially inherent in individualistic American capitalism” (331). The lack of 
concern over health risks, as well as the tension in seeing the Binewski children as both subject 
and object, exhibit and child, resonates with Warren’s assertion of degradation and callousness. 
Al is ready to abandon one of his newborn children, Chick, because Chick doesn’t appear to be a 
freak. Al tells Lil, “Give it to me” (69), so that he may dispose of him. By calling Chick “it,” Al 
dehumanizes Chick and denies him Al’s affection as a parent. It’s only at the last minute that the 
family finds out Chick is telekinetic and decides to keep him. Al associates the family’s health 
with the carnival’s health, thus associating the social with the economic.16 As a result, Al 
considers the lives of his children in relation to their value to the carnival. Rachel Adams argues 
that the novel uses “tales and tails … to invest our bodies with the weight of history and 
memory,” which is “paradigmatic of how Americans attempt to manage the problem of bodily 
difference that has persistently troubled the nation’s social and legal structure” (288; 278). She 
moreover notes, “The Binewskis are excellent interpreters of the capitalist system that constructs 
the body as a commodity” because they “recogniz[e] the significant relationship between the 
body and the ability to generate income” (280–281). This mentality begins with Al; and although 
this mentality demonstrates Al’s economic intuitiveness, it also resonates with the callousness 
Warren identifies because Al sees his children as commodities and thus potentially disposable. 
Al’s children all internalize this logic, except for Chick. Al has a difficult time capitalizing on 
Chick’s powers. Plots that require Chick to rob carnival-goers using his telekinesis and help Al 
                                                          
16 Not that these categories are ever completely separate. Rather by letting economic considerations become the 
primary lens through which he views his family, Al upends any semblance of balance.  
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cheat casinos are not very successful.17 Chick hates hurting people and always seeks the approval 
of his family. This is intensified by Chick’s ability to feel the emotions and pain of others, and it 
causes Arty to take advantage of him. Arty convinces Chick to use his powers to alleviate the 
pain of Arty’s followers during surgery so they can survive their amputations. But the brutality 
Arty exposes Chick and the family to causes Chick to blow up the carnival: Chick can no longer 
take the pain and suffering. Anna Mae Duane argues that “the Binewkis reflect … how 
extensively the logic of the marketplace permeates the allegedly sacred realm of home and 
family” (107). Chick especially represents the tension between the merger of the market and the 
family, and he undermines the notion that the child can be sheltered from such a merger. Duane 
writes,  
Dunn keeps our eye on the shiny, attractive object—Chick, the innocent and 
beautiful child—to reveal that the vision of American life he represents is a 
particularly pernicious illusion. As a lovely nineteenth-century cherub stranded in 
a cutthroat twentieth-century domicile, Chick evokes a past fetishized throughout 
the 1980s by Christian conservatives—a world in which the child occupies the 
pinnacle of the private and functions as the affective center of a home ruled solely 
by love, walled off from the harsh bargains demanded by the outside world. (104) 
But Chick, Duane teaches us, undermines this construction.18 He appears to resist the economic 
logic that informs his siblings and spends his time helping others rather than making money. He 
is “loving, innocent, and seemingly incapable of malice” (108). But this is an illusion, as he 
represents “a new domestic space reflecting an affective economy that undoes the division 
                                                          
17 Arty sabotages the casino scheme because he doesn’t want Chick to become too valuable to Al. 
18 For more on childhood innocence, see pages 1-12. For other examples of how these texts demonstrate childhood 
innocence is a construction easily undermined, see pages 44-52 and 95-96. 
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between home and work, and between love and money. In the process, the novel chronicles the 
destruction of the individual subject created by the supposed tension between the home and the 
market” (106).19 Within this domestic space, “ the desire to imagine children existing in a state of 
fetishized innocence, and thereby separate from a primary source of American value—the ability 
to produce capital—masks the emotional labor that children are expected to do” (110). Chick’s 
emotional labor facilitates the ability of his more overtly capitalistic family members to achieve 
their desires, and it places Chick at the mercenary whims of his father and brother. While Duane 
notes that the entrance of the child’s affective labor “into the marketplace might alter the existing 
models of value” (118), Chick’s destruction of himself and the carnival suggests that “the 
affective labor of childhood can be as coercive and as destructive as paid labor” (119).20 Chick 
demonstrates the illusory nature of the innocent child by revealing how the innocent child cannot 
be separated from the way in which market logic invades the family. Chick provides an effective 
vehicle for critique because of the powerful rhetoric power of the innocent child. While affective 
labor is generally associated with females, the early twentieth century’s removal of children from 
economic considerations placed them firmly in the domestic sphere with mothers.21 
 Duane’s argument that Chick undermines the construction of the innocent child at a time 
when market forces permeate the family, and how he illustrates the destructive capacity of 
affective labor, convincingly illustrates one of the problems of the current economic model, 
where the work of caring for others is feminized and devalued, supposedly done for its own sake, 
                                                          
19 For more on the merger of social and economic realms, see pages 12-21. 
20 In the next chapter on Never Let Me Go, this affective labor is done by clones, most visibly the female 
protagonist. In the concluding chapter, on The Flame Alphabet, this affective labor is shifted to the parents.  
21 Although we are witnessing changes to the domestic space, particularly in that single-parent incomes are often no 
longer enough to support most households. 
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under-paid and emotionally-exhausting. Duane needs not spend much time on the other children 
of the novel to construct her argument, yet the other children dominate the novel.  
Arty is the oldest living Binewski child22 and the most invested in his body’s economic 
worth, which is predicated on his seal-like appearance. Dunn calls Arty “Aqua Boy” and 
describes his appearance:  
His hands and feet were in the form of flippers that sprouted directly from his 
torso without intervening arms or legs. He was taught to swim in infancy and was 
displayed nude in a big clear-sided tank like an aquarium. His favorite trick at the 
ages of three and four was to put his face close to the glass, bulging his eyes out at 
the audiences, opening and closing his mouth like a river bass and then to turn his 
back and paddle off, revealing the turd trailing from his muscular little buttocks. 
(7–8)  
Arty does not need to be in water to survive, so his learning to swim in infancy is based 
exclusively on the way Al decides to market him, which is to highlight his already seal-like 
nature, as evidenced by his “flippers.”23 The words “display” and “trick” reinforce the nature of 
Arty’s status as an object created for the carnival. Arty buys into the role for which his father 
grooms him. Although he retains identifiably human features, Arty’s value to the carnival is 
based on how nonhuman he appears. Arty looks like the cross between a seal and a human. But 
Arty is biologically human. He has human parents. His deformities are the result of the toxins he 
was exposed to in-utero, but these deformities don’t erase his humanity. Arty’s heredity isn’t 
                                                          
22 Al and Lil have six dead children. Four were still-born or died during childbirth. Two died early in childhood. 
Arty killed one because his parents wanted to make them a dual act, but Arty wanted to have his own show. The 
parents display the bodies of their dead children in jars of formaldehyde in a tent of oddities which costs one dollar 
to enter.  
23 While Arty is compared to a river bass and not a seal, fish have fins not flippers. 
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grotesque, but his physical form is: a form that is marketable because it violates basic aesthetic 
categories between human and animal.  A human in an aquarium isn’t valuable. A seal in an 
aquarium isn’t very valuable (and a river bass not at all). The aqua-boy is valuable because he 
exists in a state that appears in-between animal and human.  
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, writing about monstrous children, of which he uses 
conjoined twins and a person without obviously male or female genitals as examples, concludes,  
What we call monsters are not so to God, who sees in the immensity of his work 
the infinity of forms that he has comprised in it; and it is for us to believe that this 
figure that astonishes us is related and linked to some figure of the same kind 
unknown to man. From his infinite wisdom there proceeds nothing but that is 
good and ordinary and regular; but we do not see its arrangement and 
relationships … We call contrary to nature what happens contrary to custom; 
nothing is anything but according to nature, whatever it may be. Let this universal 
and natural reason drive out of us the error and astonishment that novelty brings 
us. (539) 
Montaigne’s assertion that even drastic differences are a part of nature seems at odds with Arty’s 
status as grotesque because grotesque creatures seem to defy nature, but, for Montaigne, this 
defiance is an illusion. We cannot completely comprehend nature because we cannot completely 
comprehend God or its plan. In this light, the bodies of grotesque humans can’t defy nature, only 
our limited understanding of it. This also means that Arty and other grotesque people and 
characters should be considered human even if they do not look fully human. The grotesque 
resides in the astonishment to which Montaigne refers, which is inspired by a sense of difference 
despite similarity. Montaigne is right that “we call contrary to nature what happens contrary to 
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custom” and, in this respect, his thoughts align with scholars of the grotesque who recognize the 
grotesque’s social dimensions. For such scholars, however, there is no universal plan to which 
nature adheres but which humans cannot recognize or comprehend. Rather the grotesque reveals 
the artificiality of totalizing classifications, of a sane and safe world, of order. This can be 
fearsome and is part of the reason the grotesque can be terrifying; but it can also be exciting and 
is part of the grotesque’s appeal, which helps explain the popularity of Arty and his siblings. 
One might expect Arty and his siblings to harbor resentment towards the parents for 
making them into carnival attractions, but they do not. Oly notes, “Papa would tell us about the 
hard times and explain that Arty had brought success to the show, and that Elly and Iphy had 
helped the business and, because he was a kind man, that even Oly had ‘done her part.’  There 
was always work but it was good” (47). Al’s insistence that the children are integral parts of the 
family business causes the children to define themselves in those terms. Because the children are 
told their value is predicated on how money they can bring in, this becomes how they determine 
their self-worth. For example, Oly says that Arty “didn’t mind me much because money was the 
gauge of his envy and I didn’t make any” (74). The desire for money is not unique to Arty or any 
of the Binewskis, but for the Binewskis it is central to their being. This centrality is even 
registered affectively, as when Oly “quivers” after being told she isn’t as economically valuable 
as her siblings (75). 
Arty is so caught up in his status as the top earner that he gets upset if the twins sell more 
tickets than him, and he kills one of his other siblings when it becomes apparent she will be at 
least as important a commodity within the carnival. Arty eventually founds a sham cult where 
aspirants are required to pay a “dowry” to join, which amounts to giving all their wealth to Arty. 
The aspirants then follow the carnival and gradually have their limbs amputated. The cultists 
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withdraw from society and follow Arty to try and attain some sort of transcendence within their 
new forms. Colin Hutchinson notes that “the tendency towards withdrawal from, rather than 
participation within, the social, political and cultural mainstream has become an important topic 
within contemporary American fiction” (35). Hutchinson argues that contemporary novelists 
“have begun to reassess communitarian themes and secessionist strategies in terms of what 
possibilities these might offer to a dissenting liberal left” (36). Dissent based in part on “the 
iniquities of capitalism” (37). But “bad” communities sometimes subsume individual freedom 
“to a body or institution that represent … a set of untrammeled psychotic desires” (43). This is 
why the tension between individual freedom and the good of a collective should balance and that 
the search for such a balance should be “contingent, self-questioning and incessant” (50). This 
search for balance is not present in Geek Love, however. Arturan cult members put themselves 
entirely at the megalomaniacal leader’s whims. Hutchinson critiques Arty and his cult by noting, 
“Arty replicates the evolution of American society by exploiting the rhetoric of freedom and 
individual happiness in order to create essentialized beings who, being reduced to the status of 
objects, are defined by their use-value: a process that is represented by invasive surgery” (46). 
This is true, but it is worth emphasizing Arty’s own status as an object initially defined by his 
value as a commodity. The Arturan cult members’ amputations bring them closer to their 
leader’s image, but it is also a reproduction of an object. The perverse irony here is that the 
reproductions have no value because they aren’t unique enough: only the original has any value, 
and if the reproductions were more like Arty, he wouldn’t create them, as doing so would 
devalue himself.24 Arty exemplifies some of the issues inherent in the commodification of 
                                                          
24 In terms of the cult members, Donna Hayles argues that the gradual amputation of their limbs allows them to opt 
out of a world that fetishizes bodies and where people fear not looking “normal.” This is also a rejection of 
consumerism (416). 
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children. His extreme jealously and willingness to engage in violence against others and take 
advantage of the emotionally unstable represents the abhorrent side of economic systems, even 
as the pride Arty and his siblings feel over their bodies can be empowering.  
Oly takes pride in her body but feels like a let-down compared to her siblings. Her self-
worth is based on how little relative value her unique body holds. She notes, “My father spared 
no expense in [the] experiments. My mother had been liberally dosed with cocaine, 
amphetamines, and arsenic during her ovulation and throughout her pregnancy with me. It was a 
disappointment when I emerged with such commonplace deformities” (8). Oly’s remarks that her 
albinism is “the regular pin-eyed variety” and her hump “is not remarkable in size or shape” (8). 
Albinism and humpbacks may be uncommon, but they aren’t so rare that customers would pay to 
see them. Although the realization of her dwarfism is a nice surprise and “increased [her] value” 
(8) in her parents’ eyes, it does not make her unique enough to headline her own attraction. Oly’s 
appearance is not strange enough to generate the types of profit that Arty or the twins generate. 
She is a composite freak, with a myriad of unusual, but not exceedingly rare, attributes, whereas 
her siblings’ attributes are much rarer and are therefore more commodifiable. Yet Oly is also 
grotesque. Fiedler calls dwarves “grotesque,” as opposed to midgets, which are “perfectly 
proportioned and beautiful” (43). Dwarves especially challenge how one conceives of age, as 
“the achondroplastic Dwarf … appears to have been born old” (45).  
Michael Hardin believes that Geek Love “presents a world where the freakish is defined 
as normal, where the mutated body is desired and empowered” (338). This empowerment may 
exist for some, but it also takes place in a world of exploitation. Most of the Binewski children 
die in this world; more are stillborn or die in infancy than reach adolescence, and every one of 
Oly’s surviving siblings dies immediately before, or because of, Chick’s destruction of the 
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carnival. Oly lives, but she never radically alters her worldview. The children’s bodies are 
“desired and empowered” to various degrees. But they are accepted and valued as such within 
their specific familial and carnival contexts. Even Oly, the least grotesque, understands her 
unique identity. When a journalist following the carnival asks if she ever wished to be “normal,” 
Oly responds, “That’s ridiculous!  Each of us is unique. We are masterpieces. Why would I want 
to change into assembly-line items” (282). Oly’s language positions the children as things, with 
the use of the term “masterpieces” as opposed to the more common “assembly-line items,” while 
comparing birth to a process of manufacturing objects, where norms are easily reproducible 
while freaks are not. Ironically, the difference that makes the children “masterpieces” is similar 
to popular parenting rhetoric: rhetoric that valorizes each child as special. This rhetoric also 
coincides with neoliberalism’s emphasis on entrepreneurship and individuality, as opposed to 
post-war parents’ desire for “their children to be normal and average,” to “be like the others 
rather than conspicuous” (Mintz 281).  
Oly’s ugliness stands in stark contrast to the Siamese twins’ beauty. Oly describes Elly 
and Iphy as “always beautiful, slim, and huge-eyed” (8). Siamese twins are grotesque because 
they “challenge our individuality, along with the distinction between self and other upon which 
that individuality depends” (Fiedler 203). Arty fears the twins because of their popularity, which 
enables them to generate income. Oly notes, “The norm crowds loved them. In towns we passed 
through regularly pairs of young girls would come to the show dressed in a single long skirt in 
imitation of the twins” (51). What Elly and Iphy’s act reveals is the way in which their view of 
themselves shifts over time, but is always restrained by their understanding of themselves as 
spectacle. Once Elly and Iphy get older, they attempt to take control of their own destiny by 
marketing themselves outside of the normal carnival acts. They become prostitutes:  “‘You know 
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what the norms really want to ask?’ said Elly?  ‘What they want to know, all of them, but never 
do unless they’re drunk or simple, is How do we fuck?  That and who, or maybe what. Most of 
the guys wonder what it would be like to fuck us. So, I figure, why not capitalize on that 
curiosity?” (207). Elly understands that the twin’s appeal is in the tension between their 
difference and similarity to norms. Historically, this has often been the case when marketing 
Siamese twins. Robert Bogdan writes, “Many [freaks] were presented as ‘human wonders,’ but 
they did not sing opera or claim heroic feats; rather, they merely performed pedestrian tasks 
which the marks assumed were too difficult for them given their physical disabilities. They 
brandished such mundane achievements as finding a spouse and giving birth” (200), and he notes 
that “Part of the fascination of joined twins was the puzzle of how they performed such normal 
activities as walking and sitting” (201). The Binewski twins are virtuoso piano players, but they 
also rely on the interest in the day-to-day workings of the differently-abled that the carnival has 
historically capitalized on. Some spectators are interested in how extraordinary bodies engage in 
the mundane, or knowable, world; others want to experience it. Fiedler notes, “All Freaks are 
perceived to one degree or another as erotic, indeed, abnormality arouses in some ‘normal’ 
beholders a temptation to go beyond looking to knowing in the full carnal sense the ultimate 
other” (137). Elizabeth Grosz argues that the ability of the freak to inspire multiple reactions, 
like horror and fascination, involves their sexuality: “People think to themselves: ‘How do they 
do it?’ … The perverse pleasure of voyeurism and identification is counterbalanced by horror at 
the blurring of identities (sexual, corporeal, personal) that witness our chaotic and insecure 
identities.  Freaks traverse the very boundaries that secure the ‘normal’ subject in its given 
identity and sexuality” (64).25 The twins capitalize on such sexual curiosity. Elly and Iphy’s self-
                                                          
25 These descriptions of the sexual curiosity that freaks may inspire alludes to the sexual objectification of abnormal 
bodies, which, like economic objectification, denies someone their own subjectivity. 
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commodification is, in a sense, subversive. It undermines the family dynamic of the profits going 
to the carnival, which is led first by Al and then by Arty. It also gives the twins a sense of 
ownership over their own bodies: their father trains them as piano players, but they decide to 
engage in prostitution. This subversion, however, operates within the status quo. The twins 
imagine themselves as different commodities because of how ingrained this self-understanding 
is, although they are also taking some ownership over their own lives and bodies. For the twins, 
this has disastrous consequences, but it also hints at the possibilities for individual expression 
and the subversive nature of the grotesque. Al and Arty want Elly and Iphy to use their bodies 
one way, but the twins reject this and temporarily make their own decisions. While the 
patriarchal dominance wins out over the twins, their niece, Miranda, has better luck.  
Miranda has a tail that she is able to hide by curling it up and wearing skirts. Miranda 
works at a strip club that fetishizes difference: one stripper has pubic hair to her knees, for 
example, and another is a pre-operative transsexual woman. Miranda’s routine emphasizes her 
tail. As her dance reaches its pinnacle, the reader is led to believe she is going to take off her 
underwear and reveal her bare buttocks. Instead, the dance’s conclusion involves the revelation, 
both for the strip club patrons and the reader, of her tail:  
She was down to her G-string with the fluffy lace plume on her rump, she had her 
thumbs hooked in it, looking over her shoulder at the crowd, she was waving her 
ass in a slow semaphore of invitation … she pulled the plume down, unsnapped 
the G-string and whipped it off with a flourish, waving her ass still, her head 
tipped up and an unmistakable giggle bubbling out of her as she revealed the thin, 
curling tail that jutted out from the end of her spine and bounced just above her 
round buttocks. (17) 
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The striptease culminates in the reveal of her abnormality and highlights Miranda’s continuation 
of the Binewski tradition of profiting from their abnormalities and the twins’ appeal to sexual 
curiosity of their grotesque bodies. Miranda doesn’t need to work as a stripper because her living 
expenses and tuition are paid for by a mysterious benefactor (Oly). Miranda does it because she 
enjoys it. It’s ironic that the first Binewski woman completely free from her family’s patriarchal 
control still commodifies herself for men. Perhaps the difference is that she isn’t doing it for the 
men but in front of them. She accepts her body and becomes more comfortable with it. She 
makes her own decision, free from economic constraints, even as she hones her artistic skills so 
she can illustrate medical texts. 
Much of the frame narrative involves Oly trying to protect Miranda from a benefactor, 
Miss Lick, who pays women to remove that which may be used to objectify them. Miss Lick 
believes, “If all these pretty women could shed the traits that made men want them (their 
prettiness) then they would no longer depend on their own exploitability but would use their 
talents and intelligence to become powerful” (162).26 While Miss Lick’s desire to reduce the 
sexual exploitation of females seems laudable, the extremes to which Miss Lick resorts makes 
the alternatives she offers at least as horrific as the experiments of the Binewski parents. For 
example, Miss Lick gives an attractive woman a double mastectomy, has her vagina sewn shut 
and her clitoris removed, and wishes she could also seal her anus (338). Miss Lick’s offer to 
Miranda involves the amputation of Miranda’s tail, which is far less severe. Nonetheless, Miss 
Lick’s alternative is really about Miss Lick furthering her own desires (just as Al and Lil did) – 
to see women deprive themselves of the physicality which some men find appealing so that they 
can achieve their full potential – and appears similarly heinous. Miss Lick, though female, can be 
                                                          
26 It’s ironic that Miss Lick herself inherited her wealth. 
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understood as a patriarchal force. Her description takes pains to deny her any sort of traditional 
femininity: “Six foot two and 240 pounds in a grey business suit. Her high heels are each big 
enough to bury an Egyptian in. She trots alone across the parking lot, hunched under an 
umbrella” (36). While people come in all shapes and sizes, Miss Lick is associated with a 
traditionally masculine appearance. She is large, and the femininity her heels connote is 
undermined by the exaggerated description of the size of her feet. Her movement (trots) and 
demeanor (hunches) are realistic but removed from the traditional realm of the feminine. She is 
big and brusque with a “big solid belly” (152). Of course, Miss Lick’s features may contribute to 
her desire to see women valued for their self-worth and talents rather than their physicality. But 
in light of the patriarchal dominance of Arty and Al, Miss Lick also functions as a character who 
uses her position to try and get women to conform to her own desires. Miss Lick’s wealth also 
connects her to industrial capitalism. She inherits a company from her father, who “fired all the 
strikers in Portland and hired fresh help unpolluted by notions of collective bargaining,” that 
includes fifty-one plants that make portable dinners (149). The dinners are made with “old but 
reliable machinery that poops out” the contents (155). The grossness of such a description 
resonates with Oly’s rejection of norm bodies as uniform assembly items and the uniformity of 
the Arturan cult members. Miss Lick’s use of her wealth to remove anything that might make a 
women sexually attractive, whether an abnormality or not, misses the point of the changing 
economic landscape that Dunn predicts, which is that these women might “empower” themselves 
by capitalizing on what makes them appealing. Individualism triumphs over uniformity. 
Metaphorically, it’s not surprising that Miss Lick is killed. 
Conclusion 
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Marjorie Worthington positions Geek Love’s narrative (and Al’s narrative of creating the 
children within Geek Love) as one that inscribes Al as the “author of [his] technological 
creations” (109). This serves to reinscribe hierarchical boundaries between “parent and child, 
male and female, even author and character” (111). Narratives involving technological 
authorship, she argues, proliferate because they “reinforce existing lines of patriarchal and 
authorial power” (111). This leads to a Binewski family tradition that is “highly capitalist and 
patriarchal” (119). Worthington ends her article by observing that technology, like Al’s 
experiments, amplifies the tension between these supposed binaries. She concludes, “The 
resulting forms of agency that these techno-textual creations acquire take on an ambiguous  
meaning, as they serve simultaneously as resistance to and reification of the power forces that 
engender them” (130). This ambiguity is inherent in moments, like with Elly and Iphy, when 
characters assume control over their bodies only to sell them in new ways. Worthington’s 
emphasis on the technology that creates the children opens up space for consideration of other 
concerns over eugenics. Worthington correctly observes, “It is the application of science to 
practical purpose—that turns the children into capital” (113).  This is representative of a shift in 
attitudes towards the usage of eugenics. During the late nineteenth century, eugenics was thought 
of as a way to “improve the human race” by “attain[ing] human perfection” and “combat[ing] 
social problems such as poverty and crime” (Burke and Castaneda 6). The racist and elitist 
undercurrents of this approach were laid bare in a variety of abhorrent ways, like the horrific 
culmination of the Nazi belief in racial superiority, as well as the heinous idea that the poor 
shouldn’t reproduce. In retrospect, the nineteenth century eugenics ideas, like that of Montaigne, 
mistook cultural and social issues for issues of nature. Even now, however, there are similar 
issues playing out on the individual level. There is a concern that “consumers with the resources 
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and access to health services can seek out perfection through biological manipulation” (Burke 
and Castaneda 7). Contemporary concerns over eugenics are less worrisome, perhaps, to the 
public at large because they reposition societal debates over eugenics and personhood onto a 
smaller scale; they become issues of individual choice rather than public or social policy.27 
Furthermore, by situating these concerns within the marketplace, the social dimension of 
eugenics gives way to an economic one. This mirrors the Binewski children’s reality. Al even 
comes up with his idea for commodifying children after seeing experimental roses with designed 
coloration. The rose garden gives Al an epiphany: “The roses started him thinking, how the 
oddity of them was beautiful and how the oddity was contrived to give them value … He 
realized that children could be designed” (10–11). Al’s encounter with aesthetic beauty causes 
him to reimagine the social in economic terms; the rose garden becomes the impetus for creating 
children that are commodities. Of course, Al turns the eugenicists’ concern over the individual 
search for perfection (whether for one’s self or their children) on its head. He manipulates 
biology so he can accumulate resources, and his ideal children are the nightmares of other 
parents, not exemplars of physical perfection. Geek Love’s interest in eugenics in an age of 
commodification emphasizes the ugly aspect of eugenics’ history, while simultaneously 
imagining it in relation to contemporary neoliberal practices, which reposition social concerns, 
like family and childhood, as economic ones. What Worthington does not account for is that it is 
the application of science that turns the children into spectacles to be commodified, but the 
internalization of their commodity status, as passed down by their parents, reinforces this 
construction and allows it to continue. Nancy Bombaci argues that freaks were used in modernist 
American literature to undermine dominant discourses. She writes, “While oppressive dominant 
                                                          
27 Consumer choice is often identified as individual choice, even as consumerism is capable of circumscribing 
choice or presenting the illusion of choice when there may not be much choice at all. 
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narratives celebrating normality and progress have inevitably constructed oddity as marginal and 
undesirable, freakishness has emerged, nonetheless, as a competing (albeit marginalized) 
discourse of power” (4). The emphasis on the freak’s subversive element is present in the 
scholarship on Geek Love, like in Katherine Weese’s point that Miranda undermines patriarchal 
hierarchies (361). However subversive the Binewski bodies may be though, they are 
conservative in their internalization of the dominant ideology. Even Miranda, raised outside of 
the carnival with no knowledge of her parentage, ends up commodifying her abnormality, even 
as she has the potential for a more positive future away from the carnival’s exploitation. Weese 
contends that Miranda is fundamentally different from the earlier Binewski generation because 
she doesn’t “use her deformity to earn a living” because her expenses are covered from a trust 
established by Oly (357). Miranda is an exotic dancer by choice, not necessity. The fact that she 
chooses to commodify herself when she doesn’t need the money, however, speaks to the 
pervasiveness of bodily commodification in the novel, even outside the carnival. This is not to 
say Miranda isn’t making her own decisions in a way that her family members initially couldn’t 
or that she should or shouldn’t dance, but the use of her abnormality—her dance culminates in 
the reveal of her tail—isn’t radically different from other forms of commodification. She is able 
to make her decision without the patriarchal influences of Al or Arty, which is significant and 
prompts Weese’s contention that “Dunn’s real interest lies less in physical difference than in 
gender—in possibilities for female grotesques who must find modes of self-expression outside 
the literal carnival setting, a space where they are oppressed by the carnival’s entirely 
conventional patriarchal practices” (349). This patriarchal dominance within the carnival is part 
of the reason that the Binewski children’s bodies aren’t quite as subversive as they appear; the 
children’s embrace of their bodies is an embrace of Al’s ideology. Weese’s emphasis on 
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Miranda’s potential coincides with Rachel Adams’ argument that Oly, by leaving Miranda her 
family history, provides Miranda with an option unavailable to the previous Binewski 
generation: 
to keep her tail but to understand it as the product of a family history rather than 
simply as a fetishized object of male desire. This choice is paradigmatic of the 
novels’ insistence on the historical nature of embodied identity. Knowing your 
own history becomes a means of negotiating between institutions that attempt to 
impose an official version of identity and those that seek to erase the past 
altogether. (280)  
Those who would see Miranda solely for her tail and its sexual or commodifiable potentials, like 
the Binewski men, represent those who would impose their own version of identity onto 
Miranda. Miss Lick, with her desire to get rid of Miranda’s tail so that men cannot fetishize it, 
thus cutting Miranda off from her family heritage, represents those who would erase the past. For 
Adams then, Miranda is less subversive, but still represents an option unavailable within the 
carnival. Miranda’s multivalent possibilities are possible because her tail impacts who she is but 
does not completely define her.  
The complexity of Miranda’s feelings about her bodies exemplifies the shifting use of the 
grotesque within literature. David Mitchell writes, “The literary grotesque—those physical and 
cognitive anomalies, malformations and deformities placed in the service of symbolic social and 
artistic meanings—is a fantasy that invokes physical aberrancy as a visible symptom of social 
disorganization and collapse” (348). Although modernist grotesques represent social dimensions, 
“traditional interpretations of the grotesque in literature end up reinscribing biology, rather than 
social institutions, as the causal agent of physical aberrancy” (348). In modernist literature, then, 
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even as the grotesque is a metaphor for social collapse, its cause is the biological rather than the 
social. Postmodernist authors, however, interrogate the grotesque’s use, rather than rely on 
previous uses that reinscribe biological rationale; and Dunn’s novel is “a caricature of  artistic 
desire to yoke physical aberrancy to metaphors of denigration and perversity” (348). Mitchell’s 
is ultimately incorporating postmodern subjectivity into the field of disability studies (349), by 
arguing that Geek Love mediates on the relationship between the constructed nature of freaks and 
“the conflicted meanings of physical difference in the public and private realms” (357; 360). 
Geek Love’s aberrant bodies symbolize a social institution, neoliberalism, through physical form. 
The Binewski children’s bodies do not symbolize neoliberalism itself, rather they symbolize the 
distortions created by the merger between the economic and the social. In this way, Dunn’s work 
grapples with contemporary issues of culture and identity.  
Geek Love shows the possibility and danger regarding how children internalize their own 
commodity status. It shows moments of true economic or emotional self-worth; but it also 
creates situations where the characters are unable to see beyond their status as objects. This 
ultimately reifies their assigned identities because they have no understanding of how they might 
define themselves outside of the system into which they were born. Like most economic models, 
neoliberal capitalism forces children into the market system. But some scholars, like Henry 
Giroux, understand neoliberal capitalism as especially dangerous because of how little it allows 
for social welfare. For children under neoliberal capitalism, this means that “youth are denied the 
ability to define themselves” and “when adult society talks about children, they are usually 
described as commodities or as threats to society” (14). Geek Love argues that children, 
immersed in an economic system, define themselves by it. Defining people as commodities leads 
them to think of themselves as commodities. This creates a self-sustaining system wherein the 
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environment shapes children’s conceptions before they are consciously aware that there are other 
alternatives. Of course this makes sense, because for many neoliberals, as Thatcher put it, “There 
is no alternative” (Blyth 98). At the same time, however, the novel does posit an alternative. It 
coopts patriarchal and economic dominance by redeploying it in service to the individual 
(female). This can lead to tragedy, but it can also allow individuals to assert some of their own 
agency within the system that exploits them. 
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Less Than Human: The Commodification of Clones in Never Let Me Go 
Introduction 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 novel, Never Let Me Go, takes place in Britain in the “late 1990s” 
(NP). The novel is about clones1 raised from childhood to become organ donors for humans. The 
tension between the clones’ status as humans deserving of dignity and agency and their intended 
purpose as organ stock takes the form of the grotesque. According to Philip Thomson, the 
grotesque is “the unresolved clash of incompatibles in work and response. It is significant that 
this clash is paralleled by the ambivalent nature of the abnormal as present in the grotesque: we 
might consider a secondary definition of the grotesque to be ‘the ambivalently abnormal’” (27). 
Justin D. Edwards and Rune Graulund argue, “Thomson’s words in this passage – unresolved, 
incompatible, ambivalent, clash – speak to the ambiguities, juxtapositions and uncertainties 
surrounding the term [grotesque]” (3). Edwards and Graulund, like other scholars of the 
grotesque, believe that the incongruity and uncertainty of the grotesque leads to productive 
insight into who and what we are “through the indeterminate space of conflicting possibilities, 
images and figures” (3). Never Let Me Go subtly utilizes the grotesque in its exploration of 
personhood. The clones are grotesque; but because the grotesque is often concerned with the 
corporeal (Edwards and Graulund 1–2), the clones, who look exactly like humans, are not 
immediately identifiable as grotesque. Their grotesque nature, however, is present in their 
ontological uncertainty: they exist between human and non/human, person and object.  
Paul Sheehan argues that posthuman bodies are generally tied to technological 
frameworks but finds that myth, not science, provides the conceptual basis for posthuman 
theorizing. As a result, he finds “analogous to the techno-body is the monstrous or grotesque 
                                                          
1 I use the terms “clones” in keeping with the language of the novel. However, another way to think about the 
clone/human dichotomy is “clone human” and “non-clone human.” 
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body” (245). He argues that “the clone has come to represent the most clear-cut posthuman body 
of all – where the ‘post’ is decisively severed from the ‘human’” (253). He writes, “clones are 
defined by what they lack … individual identity. Both ‘mind’ and ‘identity’ are, of course, 
proxies for the soul” (253). Whether clones have souls is a question the novel poses, and, as a 
result, the association between individual identity and the soul factor into discussions of the 
clones. However, it is another point Sheehan makes regarding clones that is central to 
discussions of the grotesque. He asserts, “[Clones] show sameness to be a form of monstrous 
otherness; not a monstrosity of appearance, however, but of ontology” (253). Clones have 
monstrous, or grotesque, bodies not because of their differences, but their similarities. Their 
bodies unsettle ontological classifications of the human. Humans reject clones as distinctly 
human simply by naming them clones, thus foregrounding their difference in origin. At the same 
time, the tenuous nature of this difference is evident because humans are unable to recognize 
clones outside of the confines of where clones are kept separate. Sheehan’s associations of 
clones with ontological uncertainty and techo-bodies with the monstrous and grotesque positions 
the clones as grotesque bodies paradoxically predicated on sameness rather than difference.  
Never Let Me Go is written from the viewpoint of Kathy H., who recalls growing up with 
her friends, Ruth and Tommy. Kathy, Ruth, and Tommy are raised at an English boarding school 
named Hailsham before moving into transitional housing known as cottages, where they live 
together without adult supervision. After leaving the cottages, they become carers and donors. 
The reader gradually learns that Kathy and her friends are all clones and are raised and trained to 
donate their organs. Before donating themselves, however, clones serve as caretakers for other 
clones donating organs. As children, the characters have a general sense of their role in society 
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but do not seem to fully grasp the ramifications; and, the mistreatment of the clones is not 
immediately obvious to the reader, as their horrific fate is couched in euphemistic terms.  
The titles “carer” and “donor” are initially confusing. The novel gives few clues as to 
what these positions entail. It begins, “My name is Kathy H. I’m thirty-one years old, and I’ve 
been a carer now for over eleven years … My donors have always tended to do much better than 
I expected. Their recovery times have been impressive, and hardly any of them have been 
classified as ‘agitated,’ even before fourth donation” (3). Because the novel begins in media res, 
and the reader is not yet familiar with the terms Kathy uses, the ramifications of Kathy’s 
introduction is unclear. The reality under which the clones live is slowly revealed so that by the 
time the whole picture and process is visible, the clones are already firmly established in these 
roles. Furthermore, euphemisms make the roles seem positive. Carers sound like social workers. 
Kathy’s work sounds positive; she helps speed recovery times and calm donors. At this point, 
carer seems a noble profession, and perhaps it is; but because the narrator assumes knowledge on 
the part of the reader, Kathy does not explicate the fact that by excelling at her work, she allows 
donors to move more quickly through their donation process and increases the likelihood they 
will live through multiple donations so that more of their organs may be harvested before the 
donations kill them. In addition, the reader initially fails to understand that donors are not given a 
choice. The clones’ creation predetermines their donations. They serve no other purpose. Mark 
Currie argues that the euphemisms create a space between the closed world of Hailsham and the 
“brutal domain of inequality and social injustice” and that within this space, the novel deals with 
“remembered forgetting and recollected anticipation” (103). For this chapter, this gap is 
imperative to consider, as the clones reside in one world, but are shaped for another. In addition, 
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it also mirrors the grotesque status of the clones, as they reside within the space between two 
different worlds: human and non/human.  
Carers may help prepare donors for death, but they also genuinely care for their donors. 
They help donors meet death with a semblance of dignity and provide them with a witness to the 
end of their life. Jill Casid argues that novels like Never Let Me Go give us a space to entertain 
tough but necessarily possibilities relating to death and care (132). For her, the novel combines 
issues of human and non/human with the commodification of bodies and additional questions 
relating to power, reproduction and economies. She argues that “love makes a difference” even 
though the carers can’t save the donors (129). Her argument emphasizes the precarity of the 
world, or the  lack of social support for systems of care in a time of great economic inequality 
(122). For Casid, a “good” death can still exist in such a world. This is the power of her 
argument. Although an individual may be diminished in a world that fails to allow them adequate 
economic opportunity or support, he or she can still assert dignity. 
In addition to the immaterial value of the carer’s work, caring causes two additional 
effects. On the one hand, it prepares carers to die. Care-giving is a brutal and difficult labor that 
emotionally drains the carer. Kathy notes, “Carers aren’t machines. You try and do your best for 
every donor, but in the end, it wears you down. You don’t have unlimited patience and energy” 
(4).2 In fact, after working as carers, many clones request to become donors. On the other hand, 
making clones take care of donors helps to shelter the outside world from the clones. While the 
doctors and nurses must be humans, having other clones assist donors helps minimize the contact 
between clones and humans. Of course, clones might also provide better care because they can 
relate with the donors, but this does not negate the structural benefits of having clones care for 
                                                          
2 The difficult emotional labor that the clones engage in as carers and donors, which frees humans to do other things, 
is reminiscent of Chick’s emotional labor on behalf of the Binewski family. See pages 152-153. 
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clones. Although serving as carers prepares clones for their eventual organ harvesting, this 
preparation begins when they are children. It is at Hailsham that Kathy and her peers internalize 
the logic of their own objectification. This internalization helps facilitate the transformation of 
the clones into commodities, which is why Hailsham is also where the grotesque nature of the 
clones first surfaces. 
Hailsham 
Hailsham is the boarding school where the children grow up, and it is the source of their 
earliest memories. It is much like any other school: brimming with laughter and pain. It is also 
where the clone children begin internalizing their “class,” which later attaches them to their 
“professional life” as carers and donors (Fluet 268). Thus, Hailsham features prominently in the 
students “becoming” (Villiers and Slabbert 90). The emphasis on becoming helps explain the 
processes by which the clones are trained, and it mirrors the emphasis of developmental 
psychology on children as future adults (Wall 25–29). The emphasis on childhood as becoming 
presages the clones’ exploitation as adults. Karen Sánchez-Eppler writes, “Children are often 
presented as not yet fully human, so that the figure of the child demarcates the boundaries of 
personhood, a limiting case for agency, voice, or enfranchisement” (xxiv).3 Because the clone 
children have limited agency and personhood, their disenfranchisement is more easily enacted. 
The power to shape the clone children’s future is aided by their limited personhood in the 
present, both as children and clones. They are “commodit[ies] and [are] special only in terms of 
utility” (Bone 4).4 
Hailsham is the locus of the clones’ childhood. Kathy, Ruth, and Tommy all recall their 
time there positively, despite its role in shaping their bleak futures. Jane Elliot writes, “Although 
                                                          
3 For more on the developmental discourse of childhood, see pages 10-11 and 85-86 
4 For more on children as commodities, see pages 12-21. 
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the boarding school has made the clones into docile bodies in just the fashion that one would 
expect from such a disciplinary institution, Kathy in particular experiences the school as a site of 
intense nostalgia, as a cozy and protected heaven to which she constantly returns to in her mind” 
(94). This is because, despite the disciplinary role of Hailsham in preparing Kathy for her future, 
Kathy recalls her past as relatively carefree. The fact that Kathy constantly remembers Hailsham 
positively is a testament to how effective Hailsham is as a disciplinary institution in its ability to 
mold her for exploitation without creating animosity. However, Kathy’s fondness for Hailsham 
is also due to her lived experience. The reality of Hailsham as an institution is that it prepares 
clones to become organ donors. The reality of Kathy’s time at Hailsham is that she made friends 
and interacted with caring guardians. This is not the case for all clones. Many grow up in places 
that are not as permissive as Hailsham, but these clones and their abuse is kept out of sight, with 
only the occasional oblique reference.  
The narrator’s first description of Hailsham involves Kathy, Ruth and their friends watch 
some boys pick soccer teams, and it foregrounds the novel’s interest in the grotesque. As a great 
soccer player, Tommy expects to be picked early, if not first, but no one picks him. Kathy 
narrates, “‘Look at him,’ someone behind me said. ‘He’s completely convinced he’s going to be 
first pick. Just look at him!’ There was something comical about Tommy at that moment, 
something that made you think, well, yes, if he’s going to be that daft, he deserves what’s 
coming” (8–9). As other players are picked, Laura, Ruth’s friend, pantomimes Tommy’s facial 
expressions, and, outside “Tommy is left standing alone, and the boys all began sniggering” (9). 
Sniggering turns to laughter and the boys run off, leaving Tommy alone. This leads Tommy to 
explode: “He began to scream and shout, a nonsensical jumble of swear words and insults” (9). 
This soon escalates into the novel’s first grotesque image: “[Tommy] was just raving, flinging 
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his limbs about, at the sky, at the wind, at the nearest fence post. Laura said he was maybe 
‘rehearsing his Shakespeare.’ Someone else pointed out how each time he screamed something 
he’d raise one foot off the ground, pointing it outwards, ‘like a dog doing a pee’” (10). This 
scene is grotesque because students take pleasure in the pain and humiliation of Tommy; secure 
in the knowledge that they are in no danger of similar abuse. Kathy’s use of the word “comical” 
and Ruth’s pantomime adds a comic element to the scenario, as cruel as it may be. For Tommy, 
the horror of this situation reveals itself as he realizes that not only will he not be picked first, but 
he won’t be picked at all. For the others, Tommy’s gradual realization serves to build up to the 
culmination of the joke: the explosive outburst. Tommy’s inability to articulate his pain and 
frustration, as evidenced by the “nonsensical jumble”, leads him to indiscriminately lash out at 
everything: “sky … wind … fence post” (10). Laura turns this into a joke by comparing this 
inarticulate expression of rage to Shakespeare.5 This comparison yokes together high culture and 
low culture, the greatest playwright of Western history and a bullied teen screaming in a field, 
whose gestures are compared to a urinating dog. The joining of high and low culture in a scene 
of this nature conjures images of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque. But whereas Bakhtin’s 
conception of the carnivalesque is subversive in that it suspends hierarchy and emphasizes 
equality (10), here the low is kept low through mockery. This moment reinforces hierarchical 
social status instead of undermining it. The laughter at the expense of Tommy is “a gesture of 
expulsion that establishes [their] distance from the absurdity” (Carroll 308). 
 Tommy’s constant rage is brought on by his abuse, but it also reflects his ability to intuit 
his own fate. As adults, Kathy tells Tommy, “I was thinking maybe the reason you used to get 
                                                          
5 The association between Tommy’s impotent rage and Shakespeare is an apt comparison. It resonates with 
Macbeth’s line, “And then is heard no more: it is a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying 
nothing” (Macbeth 5.5, 26-28). 
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like that was because at some level you always knew.” Tommy initially disagrees, but then 
considers it: “… that’s a funny idea. Maybe I did know, somewhere deep down. Something the 
rest of you didn’t” (275). Tommy’s rage is a very human reaction, and it contributes to the sense 
that the clones are almost completely indistinguishable from humans.6 His rage is also a reaction 
on two different levels. On one level, Tommy rages against the abuse he suffers at the hands of 
his peers. On another level, he somehow unconsciously comprehends what life has in store for 
him and impotently rages against the unfairness of his situation. Shameem Black notes that “the 
question of what it means to be human pervades” the novel and that the “clones struggle to 
comprehend the significance of their own circumscribed personhood” (785). Tommy’s rage is 
part of his struggle to understand his role in the world; it’s a reaction against the unfairness of 
circumstance. Whether it’s the isolation of his peers or the isolation of the clones from the rest of 
society, Tommy is equally frustrated. Both demean and dehumanize Tommy.   
One of the ways that Hailsham prepares the clones for their lives of giving is by taking 
their art. “If you wanted to praise someone’s work,” Kathy says, “ you’d say: ‘That’s good 
enough for the Gallery’” (31–32). Though the clones don’t know this at the time, their art is used 
in the outside world to try and encourage people to recognize the souls of the clones. This appeal 
is empowered by the idea of childhood itself. The appeal to recognize the souls of the children is 
buttressed by the notion that children are innocents in need of protection from exploitation.7 The 
appeal fails, perhaps, because the protection one owes to the idealized child or children requires 
a recognition of one’s own responsibility to such a child; but most adults apparently do not see a 
                                                          
6 Other than the clones’ creation, which the novel keeps vague, the only major difference between clones and 
humans is that clones cannot reproduce. However, this is something that humans also often deal with, and it may be 
by design to prevent the clones from having alternatives for their emotional labor and to shelter humans from having 
to deal with the children of clones, who would further complicate the clones’ exploitation. The novel isn’t clear on 
this. 
7 For more in childhood innocence, see pages 1-12. 
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responsibility to the clones.  The ability to take the clones’ work, without recompense, also 
foreshadows their positions as forced organ donors, where they are expected to give of 
themselves until it kills them. Shameem Black argues that the novel critiques humanist art 
because this art prevents the students from seeing themselves as inhuman by obfuscating their 
mechanical origins and preparing them for exploitation (790). As an alternative, Black argues, 
the novels ennobles the “inhuman," an “aesthetics of replication” which “reinvents empathy for 
the posthumanist age” (786). Black’s argument is tantalizing in its exaltation of a new aesthetics, 
but it lacks an appreciation of the moments the clones are at their most sympathetic. These are 
the moments when they demonstrate their their humanity through stereotypically human actions: 
when they rage, when they cry, when they give up. While Black acknowledges this dynamic 
(792), he instead champions a reading that asks us to extend our sympathies beyond the human 
(803). The practicality of getting humans to see the inhuman in themselves seems less feasible 
than getting people to see humanity in others.8 While the authority figures in the novel 
admittedly fail in their attempt to demonstrate that the clones have souls, it still seems a more 
realistic means of getting the clones into humanity’s embrace than the alternative. It is easier to 
accept others’ inhumanity than to accept our own. It’s the sentimental appeal to the 
fundamentally human nature of the clones, despite their inhumanity, that calls for recognition. 
The ability of the novel to elicit recognition of the clones’ humanity and condemnation regarding 
the way in which they are treated places the text within a tradition of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century sentimental and abolitionist literature (Shaddox 448; 450).  
                                                          
8 There is a tendency in posthumanist scholarship to exalt the posthuman, even more than in scholarship on the 
grotesque. I think that the reality of posthuman bodies will be quite challenging, however, as they become more 
common. They may become the object of fear, derision and even jealousy, and one of the ways to combat this might 
be to emphasize their connections to the human. 
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The work produced for the gallery, and the way in which it systematically trains the 
children to selflessly give is reinforced by two other aspects of Hailsham: Exchanges and Sales. 
The Exchanges occur four times a year. Students produce different forms of art for the 
Exchanges: “paintings, drawings, pottery,” etc. (16). Students are given “Exchange Tokens” for 
what they enter into the Exchanges, which they then use to purchase art from other students. 
Guardians give tokens based on how many they feel a particular item is worth. Participation in 
the Exchanges is used as a way to solidify communal bonds amongst the students, as the 
Exchanges, along with the Sales, are the “only means … of building up a collection of personal 
possessions” (16). Much of the popularity of students also depends upon their ability to create 
(16). Tommy’s initial abuse is, in part, because of his inability to create, which Ruth articulates 
when she scoffs, “…He didn’t have a thing for Spring Exchange. And has he got anything for 
next month? I bet he hasn’t” (15–16). The reliance of the students on each other for much of 
their sentimental objects has a “subtle effect” on the students because, as Kathy puts it, “being 
dependent on each other to produce the stuff that might become your private treasures—that’s 
bound to do things to your relationships” (16).  Kathy is correct, but her sense that is does 
“something” is vague. A more specific description is that it teaches the students to value each 
other based on what they can produce. The entire structure of Hailsham is designed to place 
students together, even as it separates them as much as possible from humans. Students spend all 
of their time together. They eat, play, and learn together. They sleep together in dorm rooms. 
And the Exchanges make them rely on each other for almost all of the objects to which they may 
become attached, as well. This constant reification of the bonds of the students sets the stage for 
their future, as they gradually move out of Hailsham and begin becoming carers and donors. 
When the students move beyond Hailsham’s walls and segue into their new roles, they are 
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supposed to keep themselves separate from humans and care for each other. It may be that the 
lack of desire to escape their fate, and their willingness to take care of each other, is predicated 
on how tightly woven the tapestry of their lives is.  
Of course, the clones’ best art is taken by Marie-Claude for the Gallery. This creates 
tension as the clones grow up. Kathy remembers, “By the time we were ten, this whole notion 
that it was a great honour to have something taken by Madame collided with a feeling that we 
were losing our most marketable stuff” (39). For all the institutional training the Exchanges and 
tokens provide for the clones, they also give them an awareness of exchange value. Some 
students take this up with Miss Emily, who subsequently gives students tokens for their art, but 
not as much as it might be because of the honour associated with the Gallery (39–40). Despite 
Miss Emily’s compromise, the reimbursement for art is not a sacrifice on the part of the 
guardians. It still involves the students giving up what they are taught to cherish for tokens that 
hold no value outside of the Hailsham. Thus, the clones are trained to give of themselves without 
any real sort of compensation, and their training as future-donors is still intact. The various ways 
in which artwork is circulated, according to Black, mirrors “the circulation of vital body parts” 
and “repress[es] the student’s possible resistance” by cultivating a reliance on community for a 
sense of self, by tying their value to their ability to produce art, and by making the clones feel as 
if “they actually partake in a real exchange” as opposed to being part of “an economy of … 
extraction” (795). The Gallery and Exchange systems are thus troubling in that they prepare the 
clones for lives of exploitation, while masking their intended goals. These systems are a 
metaphor for the inequality of “national and global economies systems” where “First World 
economies desire labor without the inconvenient presence of human laborers” (Black 796). 
Black’s concern over the circulation of goods at Hailsham show up in one other event: Sales. 
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At Sales, students use tokens to purchase personal possessions from the outside world. 
Once a month, a white van arrives with items from the outside. Kathy remembers, “It’s where we 
got our clothes, our toys, the special things that hadn’t been made by another student” (41). 
These vans are always greeted with excitement, and yet the Sales seem to generate 
disappointment: 
There’d be nothing remotely special and we’d spend our tokens just renewing 
stuff that was wearing out or broken with more of the same. But the point was, I 
suppose, we’d all of us in the past found something at a Sale, something that had 
become special; a jacket, a watch, a pair of craft scissors never used but kept 
proudly next to a bed. We’d all found something like that at one time, and so 
however much we tried to pretend otherwise, we couldn’t ever shake off the old 
feelings of hope and excitement. (41) 
The amount of tokens the students accumulate is barely enough to cover the replacement of 
items. Perhaps this is part of a larger effort to keep the clones used to living their lives with little 
in the way of commodities, but it also demonstrates the precarity in which so many struggle just 
to maintain. The clones value the Sales’ items even though the items are mundane: clothing or 
unused items one can find in most households. The possibility that they find something of value 
fills them with hope and excitement. This seems in line with contemporary consumerism in that 
the excitement produced by the possibility of a purchase often leads to a letdown after the 
purchase, a process which may then repeat itself. One also gets the sense that the items at the 
Sales are the cast-offs of humans (Black 796). They arrive in cardboard boxes and seem random, 
as the students never know what will be there. If this is the case, the students are exchanging 
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their tokens, worthless to the outside world (though, admittedly, not to them), for the items 
which humans don’t want.  
The clones get so worked up at the prospect of finding something they can treasure at the 
Sales that things get violent. Whereas the Exchanges have a “hushed atmosphere,” the Sales are 
“crowded and noisy”; a place where “pushing and shouting was all part of the fun … Except … 
every now and then, things would get out of hand, with students grabbing and tugging, 
sometimes fighting” (42). The atmosphere is reminiscent of a shopping mall or store during 
Black Friday, as reports often indicate violence among customers (Piccoli). The fighting at a Sale 
leads to an admonishment by Miss Emily: “we were all very special, being Hailsham students, 
and so it was all the more disappointing when we behaved badly” (43). The students at Hailsham 
are, we learn, treated better than many other clones; although, it is unclear exactly how less 
fortunate clones are treated. But in relation to the wider world, a world of both clones and 
humans, describing the clones as special is complex. They are, of course, special in that their 
creation is so distinct from humans. Yet the clones’ special aspect is the reason they are 
commodities. In this sense, “special” becomes another euphemism, like “carer” or “giver,” and 
helps to ennoble their future roles. The euphemistic use of special to describe the clones comes 
up in other places too. Miss Lucy is asked about whether she has smoked. She says yes, “but 
what you must understand is that for you, all of you, it’s much, much worse to smoke than it ever 
was for me … You’ve been told about it. You’re students. You’re … special. So keeping 
yourselves well, keeping yourselves very healthy inside, that’s much more important for each of 
you than it is for me” (68–69). The clones are not special because they are children, of course, 
but because of the unspoken reality of their origins. Children are often called special in Western 
societies. We exalt them, and they are special, each being unique in their own way; and yet they 
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are not special, each being reminiscent of others. The clones are not special because they are 
unique; they are special because they are commodities. 
 It is an encounter with Marie-Claude when Kathy is a child which most directly exposes 
Kathy to how special she truly is and situates the clones themselves in the realm of the grotesque, 
as opposed to their earlier encounter with Tommy where only he is the grotesque object of 
derision. The clones intuit that Marie-Claude fears them. To test this hypothesis, Ruth, Kathy, 
and others contrive to quickly and suddenly come upon Marie-Claude and then walk closely past 
her. Kathy recalls Marie-Claude’s reaction: “I can still see it now, the shudder she seemed to be 
suppressing, the real dread that one of us would accidently brush against her. And though we just 
kept on walking, we all felt it. It was like we’d walked from the sun right into the chilly shade” 
(35). The horror which Marie-Claude feels towards the clones is palpable, expressing itself both 
in her bodily reaction and the clones’ ability to feel Marie-Claude’s dread. This is confusing for 
them. They have no idea what the Gallery is truly for, and no idea why an adult would fear them, 
as their origin and future are minimized at Hailsham. Marie-Claude’s fear gets even stranger, 
“Madame was afraid of us. But she was afraid of us in the same way someone might be afraid of 
spiders. We hadn’t been ready for that. It had never occurred to us to wonder how we would feel, 
being seen like that, being the spiders” (35). Spiders are often associated with the grotesque due 
to their ability to unsettle people (Kayser 182; McElroy 8–9), and the connection of the clones to 
arachnids forces the children to consider their own dehumanization. Their grotesque ontology is 
innately terrifying for Marie-Claude. Not because she thinks them inherently dangerous, but 
because she knows they are inherently different even though the clones’ difference in origin 
leaves no distinguishable trace, or, more precisely, because the clones’ biological differences 
leave no distinguishable trace.  
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This seems contrary to the grotesque, which often registers itself on the body. Noël 
Carroll notes, “[T]he grotesque subverts our categorical expectations concerning the natural and 
ontological order” (297). This, in turn, has the potential “to elicit certain affective states, such as 
horror, comic amusement, and awe” (298). Furthermore, for Carroll, the grotesque is embodied. 
He writes, “[S]omething is grotesque only if it is an image, whether verbal or visual, of an 
animate being that violates our standing biological or ontological concepts and expectations” 
[emphasis added] (297–298). While the clones are animate beings, their images are of “normal” 
humans. It’s not their image that violates our “concepts and expectations,” but knowledge of 
their origins. In this way, the clones may be considered more metaphorically than literally 
grotesque. Carroll does recognize the potential for the metaphorical grotesque, he’s just more 
interested in creating a taxonomy for the literal grotesque (297). What is paradoxical about the 
clones’ bodies, however, is that they are grotesque precisely because they don’t appear any 
different from non-clone humans. If the cloned humans had some sort of striking differences 
between their bodies and non-cloned humans’ bodies, they might still be grotesque. But Marie-
Claude is terrified precisely because of the normalcy of their bodies; she is terrified because they 
look like her but upset her notions what’s natural pertaining to the “biological [and] ontological” 
categories of the human. 
Kathy connects her experience with Marie-Claude to that of the readers’:  
I’m sure somewhere in your childhood, you too had an experience like ours that 
day; similar if not in the actual details, then inside, in the feelings. Because it 
doesn’t really matter how well your guardians try to prepare you … So you’re 
waiting, even if you don’t quite know it, waiting for the moment when you realise 
that you really are different to them; that there are people out there, like Madame, 
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who don’t hate you or wish you any harm, but how nevertheless shudder at the 
very thought of you—of how you were brought into the world and why—and who 
dread the idea of your hand brushing against theirs … It’s like walking past a 
mirror … and suddenly it shows you something else, something troubling and 
strange. (36). 
Kathy’s identification of a shared clone experience with her reader invites the reader to join her 
world. It compels the reader to identify with the experience of the exploited other, even if Kathy 
has yet to be exploited at this point. Asking a reader to relate to the protagonist from a position of 
otherness is a powerfully seductive call, even if the reader is an imagined one. This moment 
emphasizes a unity based on the shared feelings of strangeness, on the ability to relate to feeling 
inferior or dejected. It’s important that Kathy calls the reader to recognize the shared feelings 
rather than specific experiences. This gets to the empathetic power of liberal humanism. The 
clones are people too. Not solely because of their capacity to reason, though they certainly have 
it. But also because of their capacity to experience and share emotions, like love, loss, or 
alienation. The shared identification of the emotional aspect of Kathy’s experience is even more 
powerful in that it comes from a position of weakness. It’s one thing to call upon others to relate 
to one another when coming from a position of health and happiness. It’s another to ask people 
to consider their personal moments of wretchedness and relate to each other based on shared pain 
and feelings of inadequacy. In this respect, it emphasizes humanity by acknowledging how 
anyone can be dehumanized, either by ones’ self or others. John Marks observes that clones are 
considered “less than human” in the popular imagination despite their human appearance and 
that clones are often positioned as others (331; 333). Kathy’s appeal, however, situates the 
otherness of the clone as a shared experience and central to that of others.  
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Marie-Claude’s fear of the clones is further complicated during another encounter with 
Kathy. Kathy becomes obsessed with a song on a Judy Bridgewater cassette tape she gets at a 
sale. The song is the titular “Never Let Me Go”:  
What was so special about this song? Well, the thing was, I didn’t used to listen 
properly to the words; I just waited for that bit that went: “Baby, baby, never let 
me go . . .” And what I’d imagined was a woman who’d been told she couldn’t 
have babies, who’d really, really wanted them all her life. Then there’s a sort of 
miracle and she has a baby, and she holds this baby very close to her and walks 
around singing: “Baby, never let me go . . .” partly because she’s so happy, but 
also because she’s so afraid something will happen, that the baby will get ill or be 
taken away from her. Even at the time, I realised this couldn’t be right, that this 
interpretation didn’t fit with the rest of the lyrics. But that wasn’t an issue with 
me. The song was about what I said, and I used to listen to it again and again, on 
my own, whenever I got the chance. (70) 
Kathy’s interpretation, though inaccurate, is prescient. The clones, like the character in Kathy’s 
imagination, cannot have children; but it’s the identification of a moment of unanticipated 
happiness and connection combined with the foreboding that something bad will happen which 
foreshadows her adult relationship with Tommy and his eventual death. It also sets the stage for 
an encounter with Marie-Claude that resonates through the years. 
 Kathy is dancing alone in a room, with a pillow pressed against her chest as if she were 
cradling a child, and listening to “Never Let Me Go.” Kathy describes what happens when 
Marie-Claude comes upon her: “She was out in the corridor, standing very still, her head angled 
to one side to give her a view of what I was doing inside. And the odd thing was she was crying. 
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It might even have been one of her sobs that had come through the song to jerk me out of my 
dream” (71). This event leads to confusion on the part of Kathy, who is unsure about how to 
react, because “ [Madame] was just standing out there, sobbing and sobbing, staring at me 
through the doorway with that same look in her eyes she always had when she looked at us, like 
she was seeing something that gave her the creeps. Except this time there was something else, 
something extra in that look I couldn’t fathom” (72). Marie-Claude crying over the image of 
Kathy cradling the child, as they are separated by a doorway, is a moment of connection where 
artificial boundaries between clones and humans are erased, just as the door fails to separate the 
two characters. This moment of connection, however, is confusing because of Marie-Claude’s 
earlier reaction towards the clones. This moment connects to the grotesque, as Marie-Claude’s 
eyes register multiple emotions on seemingly contradictory registers.9 Kathy inspires aversion, 
but also something extra. This something extra is capable of driving a grown woman who fears 
clones to tears when confronted with one of the clones during an intimate moment. Tommy 
guesses that Marie-Claude was crying because she knew clones can’t have babies, but pushes his 
hypothesis further: “‘Maybe Madame can read minds. She’s strange, Maybe she can see right 
inside you. It wouldn’t surprise me.’ This gave us both a little chill, and though we giggled, we 
didn’t say any more about it” (73). As Kathy and Thomas experience a touch of both terror and 
humor, this moment inverts the perception of who is grotesque. For Marie-Claude, the clones 
are. For the clones, it’s Marie-Claude and her seemingly preternatural ability to know the mind 
of Kathy during a moment of vulnerability. This inversion reveals the subjective nature of the 
grotesque, which is often concerned with audience reactions (Chao 169; Edwards and Graulund 
78; Korsmeyer 3). There are plenty of scholars who emphasize one aspect of the grotesque over 
                                                          
9 For more on the emotional aspect of the grotesque, see pages 23, 53-54, and 140-141. 
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another: horror over humor, and vice versa. Baudelaire, for example, deemphasizes the horror, 
while Kayser highlights it. Here the grotesque is about perception.10 To Marie-Claude, the clones 
are grotesque because they defy the defining experience of humanity, birth (ironically enough, an 
experience no one remembers); yet they seem in almost every other way to be human. For Kathy 
and Thomas, Marie-Claude is human, but the uncanny ability to read people’s minds that they 
bestow upon Marie-Claude makes her different. Of course, Marie-Claude cannot read minds, but 
this moment highlights the subjective nature of the grotesque and how boundaries almost always 
end up being porous. The line between humans and clones might seem reasonable, but it only 
remains stable if the clones never exhibit humanity, which they clearly do. Of course, Kathy and 
Thomas do not know Marie-Claude’s mind, but Marie-Claude, during a later confrontation when 
the clones have grown, tells them what she was thinking at the time: “I saw a new world coming 
rapidly. More scientific, efficient, yes. More cures for the old sicknesses. Very good. But a harsh, 
cruel world. And I saw a little girl, her eyes tightly closed, holding to her breast the old kind 
world, one that she knew in her heart could not remain, and she was holding it and pleading, 
never to let her go” (272). The reality which causes Marie-Claude to cry is not their inability to 
reproduce. It’s sadness over what she sees as an increasingly cruel world, a world where 
scientific advances for some lead to cruelty towards others. Of course, the pain of the phrase 
“never let me go” in the song is partly due to the fact that the metaphorical child is not holding 
Kathy, but the opposite. Kathy is holding the child, giving it comfort, while pleading for comfort 
in return. The phrase helps us consider how one might both accept and even “beseech [our] own 
confinement” (Currie 91), such as the clones do. The old world the pillow/child represents has 
already let Kathy go, if it ever comforted her to begin with. Marie-Claude’s reading has Kathy 
                                                          
10 See page 102 for another example of this. 
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clinging to a world that was always indifferent to her, if it ever acknowledged her at all. The new 
world may not care much about Kathy and the clones, but it refuses to let them go, as it 
harnesses them for its own use. The cruelty of this world which Marie-Claude identifies is 
important when considering the exploitation of the clones. They are created as objects, and so in 
a sense their objectification is inverted. They are objects that become human, rather than humans 
who are objectified.11 And yet, they are objects meant to replicate humans, and quickly reveal 
themselves to be fundamentally the same. Processes of objectification still apply. Once the 
clones’ humanity rears its head it cannot be lain to rest. Mark Currie’s references the grotesque, 
as he considers Never Let Me Go in relation to Kafka. Never Let Me Go is Kafkaesque in part 
because of “the more general predicament of Kafka’s narratives in which characters accept the 
unacceptable, treat the grotesque as if it were normal, or confer a kind of homeliness on the most 
offensive of social justices” (Currie 93). In this way, the system which objectifies the clones is 
grotesque, in addition to the way in which the clones are described in grotesque terms. 
Miss Lucy articulates the cruelness of the system when she chastises some students for 
talking about having jobs when they grow up. “None of you will go to America,” Miss Lucy 
says, “none of you will be film stars. And none of you will be working in supermarkets as I 
heard some of you planning the other day” (81). The fact that a generally unattainable 
profession, film star, is juxtaposed with a supermarket worker reveals even the most low-skilled 
jobs to be unattainable for the clones; it denies the clones a place of their choosing in society, 
regardless of their aspirations. Lucy continues, “Your lives are set out for you. You’ll become 
adults, then before you’re old, before you’re even middle-aged, you’ll start to donate your vital 
                                                          
11 While the children in Geek Love and Elephantmen are also created to be objects, I’m referring specifically here to 
the fact that the clones are not birthed. They are grown in tubes. In this way, they initially exist closer to objects that 
are created rather than people who are born. 
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organs. That’s what each of you was created to do … You were brought into this world for a 
purpose, and your futures … have been decided” (81). What can the clones reasonably do in this 
situation? Their lives are outside the bounds of law. Not because the clones are lawless or 
unbound by law; but because they are placed outside of the protection of the law and become 
objects rather than subjects, akin to nonhuman animals (Villiers and Slabbert 91; Wolfe 10).The 
ability to treat others as animals is highlighted by another event. The children are in Miss Lucy’s 
class learning about WWII and prison camps. Kathy recalls, “One of the boys asked if the fences 
around the camps had been electrified, and then someone else had said how strange it must have 
been, living in a place like that, where you could commit suicide any time you liked just by 
touching a fence” (78). The children have a strange reaction to this consideration: they laugh and 
Laura “got up on her seat and did a hysterical impersonation of someone reaching out and getting 
electrocuted” (78). The children’s reaction is, once again, grotesque, as they laugh and mime 
when discussing the holocaust. “Hysterical” carries additional weight as it describes the humor 
the students see in the situation, but also serves as a potentially appropriate description of those 
who might hear about a family member or friend who chose to electrocute themselves. Their 
reaction is also sad because it reveals an utter lack of self-awareness of their own situation. They 
are the oppressed minority; prisoners of Hailsham. Kept separate for future use; valued for their 
body, not their identity. Miss Lucy reifies the metaphor of Hailsham as prison when she says, 
“It’s just as well the fences at Hailsham aren’t electrified. You get terrible accidents sometimes” 
(78).  
The clones’ status as grotesque objects, both in their own eyes and as objects for others, 
is further elucidated when Tommy cuts his elbow. Another student tells Tommy that moving his 
elbow too quickly can cause his arm to “unzip like a bag opening up” and that this has happened 
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to another student who “[woke] up to find his whole upper arm and hand skeletally exposed, the 
skin flopping about next to him” (85–86). Tommy eventually discovers the joke, but the notion 
of “unzipping” stays with the clones. Kathy remembers, “[it] bec[a]me a running joke among us 
about the donations. The idea was that when the time came, you’d be able just to unzip a bit of 
yourself, a kidney or something would slide out, and you’d hand it over” (87–88). This bit of 
gallows human in the face of abjection provides another example of their humanity. This scene is 
also the most direct connection the clones make between themselves and objects, even though it 
is done as a joke. The joke itself is ludicrous, one cannot unzip oneself and take organs out. It 
elides the organ transplant process by taking the corporeal effect of scalpels on bodies and 
making it comically simple. But from the perspective of most humans in the novel, clones are 
body bags, who carry the organs humans need but are otherwise faceless and unknowable.  
Hailsham is both a shelter and a prison to the clones. It shelters them from detailed 
knowledge of their commodity status, so they have a time of relative innocence, and it mostly 
keeps them away from humans who might discriminate against them. Many clones in places 
other than Hailsham are treated horribly. But Hailsham also imprisons the clones. The clones 
aren’t allowed to leave, and they are kept away from humans, so they can be exploited out of site 
and mind. Everything the clones learn at Hailsham also trains them to be commodities. The dual 
nature of the Hailsham as shelter and prison connects to Ewa Kuryluk’s association of the cave 
with both protection and threat (20).12 This positions the clones as female grotesques, despite the 
fact that there are both male and female clones. We have seen, however, that male grotesques 
traditionally take on female characteristics (Miles 91; Russo 13). In this case, the clones, male 
and female, become carers, which involves the (traditionally female) emotional labor of helping 
                                                          
12 See pages 145-148 for a longer discussion of the female grotesque.  
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other clones prepare for and recover from organ donations. The novel doesn’t talk of 
compensation for this labor, and, if there is any, it can’t be much. In this way, the emotional 
labor remains undervalued. Those clones, like Tommy, who don’t care for the work, quickly 
become donors and are placed in communities of donors before they give (organs) until it kills 
them. Furthermore, the clones’ infertility more visibly upends traditional female gender roles. 
It’s seems more grotesque to create female clones incapable of having children, at least based on 
constructions of gender and the ongoing, though problematic, association of females with 
domestic spaces.13 
Cottages 
After Hailsham, the clones spend a transitional period akin to college at places known as 
cottages. The cottages are isolated locales consisting of a handful of buildings where the clones 
go after graduating from Hailsham. At the cottages, the clones mix with some older peers, as 
well as peers who grew up outside of Hailsham. Their only contact with the wider world is a man 
who occasionally brings them supplies. The clones ostensibly have a larger academic project to 
work on, Kathy’s is Victorian novels, but it doesn’t matter whether they actually complete it or 
not. The project simply gives them a focus as they transition into a new place and towards their 
intended futures. The cottages are essentially a place for the clones to live until they get bored 
and decide to become carers. A kinder interpretation of the cottages would be that they gives the 
clones a few years of unsupervised freedom to enjoy themselves before they live their lives 
confronted by the mortality of themselves and others. The exact intention of the cottages isn’t 
immediately clear, though they end up serving both functions. 
                                                          
13 This may also fit within the subversive aspect of the grotesque if one is interested in understanding how the clones 
might push against dominant conceptions of the human and/or gender. 
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At the cottage, Kathy worries about her sexual appetite. She ends up having sex with 
other clones at various times, but they are not clones with whom she is interested in having a 
relationship. These encounters do “funny things to [Kathy’s] feelings” (128). Kathy asks Ruth, 
“Do you ever get so you just really have to do it? With anybody almost? … There might be 
something not quite right with me, down there. Because sometimes I just really, really need to do 
it” (128). The irony of this moment is that her struggles with her body and sexuality convey 
Kathy’s humanity, but Kathy, unsure of how to process her feelings and urges, understands them 
as wrong, somehow. She thinks her urges grotesque. This moment aligns with Leslie Fiedler’s 
generalization that when adolescents enter puberty, “at a point in life when one feels himself 
primarily a sex machine,” that their bodies seem either “monstrously deficient or excessive” 
(32). While Fiedler is generalizing, this description coincides with Kathy’s feelings. She sees her 
appetite as monstrously excessive or unnatural, as evidenced by the fact she thinks something 
might be wrong with her. Kathy believes this may be a result of her possible, the woman she was 
cloned from. Kathy recalls, “The basic idea behind the possible theory was simple … Since each 
of us was copied at some point from a normal person, there must be, for each of us, somewhere 
out there, a model getting on with his or her life” (139). However, the clones are uncertain as to 
what age their possibles should be. Humans could be cloned at any age. For some clones, the 
“models were an irrelevance, a technical necessity for bringing us into the world, nothing more 
than that … At the same time, whenever we heard reports … we couldn’t help getting curious” 
(140). The possibles are a mirage. Nowhere in the novel does a clone meet their possible. The 
one trip to get a better look at Ruth’s potential possible ends with the certainty the potential 
possible isn’t it. The clones believe that glimpsing a possible is like “glimps[ing] your future” 
(140). But this is incorrect. A possible may give the clones a sense of what they would look like 
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later in life, but it cannot give them a glimpse into a future because their future is pre-
determined. A more accurate articulation of what the possible reveals is an alternative future, a 
might-have-been. It’s emblematic of the world of the clones that their fantasy of viewing their 
future is also one that sees future as predetermined. If someone can view their future by seeing 
their possible, then that means their future would be dictated by the possible, the genetic make-
up from which they come. It’s a more individualized predetermined future than the organ 
donations, but it is still predetermined.  
The clones’ attitude towards the possibles connects with Kathy’s feelings of being 
sexually grotesque because she believes that if her possible is a sexual person that this accounts 
for her sexual urges. Kathy scans pornographic magazines to determine if the women in them 
look like her. Kathy never finds a possible in the magazines, as it’s an impossible search. But to 
some, pornography might be an appropriate place to look, considering the social stigmatization 
attached to it. Ruth, upon learning her office worker possible is not related, explodes, “We’re 
modeled from trash. Junkies, prostitutes, winos, tramps. Convicts, maybe, just so long as they 
aren’t psycho. That’s what we come from. We all know it, so why don’t we say it? … If you 
want to look for possible, if you want to do it properly, then you look in the gutter. You look in 
rubbish bins. Look down the toilet, that’s where you’ll find where we all came from” (166). 
There’s logic to Ruth’s diatribe. As a disposable body, Ruth sees herself as part of a heritage of 
“disposable” groups who are kept outside the bounds of “civil” society and often refused the type 
of social support they would benefit from, as Western societies like the United States often 
emphasize the punitive over the rehabilitative. This relates to a troublesome eugenics argument, 
the notion that selective reproductive can help prevent social ills, which was popular during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Because it was believed that “human mental, 
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temperamental, and moral traits were determined by heredity,” there was broad appeal for the 
eugenicists’ arguments that “society ought to foster the breeding of those who possessed 
favorable traits (‘positive’ or ‘constructive’ eugenics) and discourage or prevent the breeding of 
those who did not (‘negative’ eugenics) seemed obviously to follow” (Paul 1).14 While some 
early eugenicists encouraged the state to support eugenics movements, “Almost no one today 
would profess such a belief. Indeed, the dominant view is now its opposite: that the nature of 
reproductive decisions should be no concern of the state” (Paul 71). Never Let Me Go isn’t about 
eugenics in the strictest sense, but it does carry elements of it. For example, the clones cannot 
reproduce, which is negative eugenics writ large: rather than discouraging the undesirable clones 
to reproduce, they take away the option. In this light, as well as the notion that the state has a 
vested interests in creating the clones, the novel moves away from the dominant view that 
reproductive decisions are best left to the individual and places this power back in the hands of 
the state. The clones are so undesirable as to be below the homeless or most convicts, who still 
retain control over their reproductive systems. While the nature of the relationship between 
eugenics and the clones is complicated by the ontological differences between clones and 
humans, “All eugenicists shared at least one conviction: that reproductive decisions should be 
guided by social concerns” (Paul 72). Despite the speculative world of the clones, it does mirror 
contemporary concerns over eugenics, as “some have argued that eugenics is being revived by 
our increased ability to choose the kind of children we want” (133). Medical geneticists argue 
that their work is different. They “tend to insist on a narrow definition of eugenics; for them, 
eugenics implies state interference with reproductive decisions. Such definitions sharply 
distinguish eugenics from medical genetics” (133). The geneticists’ disavowal of a relationship 
                                                          
14 Negative eugenics has at times been forced on poor and minority populations. 
 
 
196 
 
to eugenics may be reasonable, but the fact that the disavowal needs to be made makes it clear 
that eugenics are on at least some people’s minds in relation to medical genetics. Whether Ruth 
believes, or is even aware, of the particularities of eugenics’ history and practice, she is speaking 
from a position of powerlessness, and she thus situates herself within a community or heritage of 
the powerless in relation to eugenics.15 Ruth is a disposal commodity, whose organs are 
harvested until she expires. If she could have children, her children would be birthed by natural 
means, which would erode the only biological distinction between clones and humans. This 
would trouble the ability of the state to utilize clones as commodities and give the clones reasons 
for resistance. Ruth’s acknowledgement that “psychos,” whether mental or moral, would be unfit 
to be cloned coincides with negative eugenics interest in disallowing some people to reproduce.16 
Leonard Cassuto notes that the grotesque can be used to depict the iniquities heaped upon the 
lower classes. He writes,  
[Jack] London uses the grotesque to try to make a visceral impact on an order that links 
humanity to social station, and which keeps the lower orders from living like the human 
beings they are … The grotesque in London’s hands therefore becomes a hard-hitting 
social tool with which to attack the moneyed interests who are ruining the lives of the 
innocents. In effect, London is willing to sacrifice the humanity of some of these 
innocents, a loss taken in the interest of exposing the inequities of the system. (“Jack 
London’s Class-Based Grotesque” 123–124) 
                                                          
15 See pages 164-165 for more on eugenics. 
16 Furthermore, it’s not clear who gets the clones’ organs, but it’s currently the case that rich or upper class citizens 
have unequal access to positive eugenics/geneticists.  
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In this context, Ruth and her peers, who associate their possibles with the lower classes and who 
are considered undesirable among humans are metaphorically sacrificed to highlight an 
environment wherein the lower classes are considered expendable. 
Shadowy Objects 
 The clones are not actually sacrificed until they are adults. This may be partially because 
it would be more difficult for humans to countenance the use of child clones, and it may also be 
because the organs of children aren’t yet fully grown. As adult clones, Kathy takes care of Ruth, 
who wants to set up Kathy and Tommy. Ruth believes she kept them apart when they were 
younger, so she tracks down Marie-Claude’s address and gives it to Kathy. Her hope is that a 
rumor that Hailsham students in love can defer donations for a few years to be with each other is 
true. When Ruth dies, Kathy eventually becomes Tommy’s carer and they develop a relationship. 
Kathy tells Tommy about Marie-Claude and they concoct a plan to get away from the hospital 
for the day to approach Marie-Claude. When they confront Marie-Claude, they also encounter 
their old headmistress, Miss Emily. Miss Emily reveals that she and Marie-Claude were part of a 
movement to treat clones more humanely. She argues that they protected the Hailsham clones 
from the “worst of those horrors” involving the deplorable conditions other clones are raised in. 
She states, 
Most importantly, we demonstrated to the world that if students were reared in 
humane, cultivated environments, it was possible for them to grow to be as 
sensitive and intelligent as any ordinary human being. Before that, all clones—or 
students, as we preferred to call you—existed only to supply medical science. In 
the early days after the war, that’s largely all you were to most people. Shadowy 
objects in test tubes. (261) 
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Despite the accomplishment of Hailsham and institutions like it, it ultimately fails to effect any 
large scale changes. In fact, by this time in the narrative, Hailsham and other more humanist 
schools have closed. The failure of Miss Emily’s vision can be seen in Miss Emily’s description 
of the clones “as sensitive and intelligent as any ordinary human being” [italics added]. She 
keeps the clones positioned as other, regardless of their similarity. This is especially problematic 
because it reveals a failure on the part of Miss Emily’s humanist ideology, which seeks to 
establish the humanity of the clones without granting them status as humans. Miss Emily may 
prefer to call clones students in an attempt to emphasize the ability of the clones to thrive under a 
humanistic education emphasizing the arts, but Miss Emily’s inability to see them as human 
reveals the crucial flaw in the plan. If the clones’ most vocal supporters, that we know of, are 
unable to fundamentally imagine the clones as anything but, then they remain unable to convince 
the clones’ greatest adversaries. Yet Miss Emily and her ilk do seem able to claim a tangible 
success. If all clones were thought of was “medical supplies,” as “shadowy objects in test tubes,” 
then the clones have been humanized despite their ongoing objectification. The clones’ 
objectification is inverted from the other children discussed in this dissertation. In other chapters, 
humans are dehumanized, in whole or part. In Never Let Me Go, according to Miss Emily, 
objects are humanized. The commodity status isn’t the result of the imposition of value onto 
humans, but instead remains with the clones as elements of humanity are gradually attributed to 
them. At the same time, however, the movement towards recognizing the humanity of the clones 
seems short-lived. Their social well-being is currently being sacrificed as the humanist schools 
close. This seems to indicate that clones are once-again being turned into “shadowy objects.” 
The descriptor “shadowy” is especially appropriate in light of this chapter’s contention that the 
clones are grotesque. The shadowy nature of the clones gets at the uncertainty regarding the 
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clones. A shadowy object in a test tube is difficult to make out. Its exact nature is uncertain. 
Shadows also instill fear, representing the unseen and unknown, and thus provide a metaphor for 
the fear that Marie-Claude and others feel in the presence of the clones. The shadow also 
connects to the world of Hailsham and of carers and donors. The clones exist in a second world, 
a shadow of the wider world. The clones’ world is no less real than the humans’ world, but they 
are kept separate. This allows the humans to willfully keep themselves in the dark regarding the 
clones, who are kept out of sight. The clones may no longer be “shadowy objects in test tubes,” 
but they are still objectified and kept out of sight within specific, acceptable places. Miss Emily 
notes, “However uncomfortable people were about your existence,” that their overriding concern 
was their own families (263). “So for a long time you were kept in the shadows,” Miss Emily 
explains, “and people did their best not to think about you. And if they did, they tried to convince 
themselves you weren’t really like us. That you were less than human, so it didn’t matter” and 
that so long as students were forced to donate, “there would always be a barrier against seeing 
you as properly human” (263). The clones inspire discomfort because they remind humans of 
themselves. Humans have to convince themselves of the clones’ difference because this allows 
humans the willful ignorance necessary to commodify clones and reap the benefit. Those 
crusading on behalf of the clones lose ground due to experiments that demonstrate children can 
be born with “enhanced characteristics.” This scares people even more than the clones used for 
donation. Humans “recoiled” from that (263–264). This leads to the corporations and politicians 
supporting Hailsham to withdraw their support: “they didn’t want to think about you students, or 
the conditions you were brought up in. In other words, my dears, they wanted you back in the 
shadows” (264–265). The tenuous nature of Hailsham and other institutions interested in the 
social good, whatever faults they may have, is emblematic of the precarious nature of social 
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institutions when moral imperatives, such as supporting society’s most imperiled citizens, are at 
the fickle whims of corporate and government interests, especially neoliberal governments who 
gradually disinvest in social programs. 
 In spite of her support of the clones, Miss Emily, like Marie-Claude, fears them: “We’re 
all afraid of you,” Miss Emily says, “I myself had to fight back dread of you almost every day I 
was at Hailsham. There were times I’d look down at you from my study and I’d feel such 
revulsion … But I was determined not to let such feelings stop me doing what was right” (269). 
The revulsion Miss Emily feels, like Marie-Claude, demonstrates the grotesque nature of the 
clones in the eyes of humans. The clones are positioned as inferior to human to justify the way in 
which the clones are used. At the same time, they clearly are human, or at least resemble humans 
so thoroughly that it makes humans uncomfortable with the clones. This is why they must be 
kept in the shadows, so that people can forget about the ways in which the clones challenge their 
definitions of humanity and the widespread exploitation of the clones. According to Leon Kass, 
we feel repugnance and revulsion towards cloning as “an emotional expression of deep wisdom” 
in that cloning is rife with potential for abuse and is inherently wrong (20).17 Miss Emily is able 
to work with the clones in spite of her feelings of revulsion because she focuses on their rights. 
Perhaps Miss Emily doesn’t see clones as fully human, but the better life Miss Emily seeks to 
win for the clones wouldn’t be a necessity if the clones didn’t remind Miss Emily and her 
supports of humans. Black notes that the novel expresses “concerns about the state of England 
and … transnational fears about rising inequality” (785). The clones represent a permanent 
underclass locked into roles as exploited caregivers, whose ability to make decisions is 
circumscribed by their environment (Elliot).  Lisa Fluet observes that immaterial laborers, those 
                                                          
17 I agree with the former concern, that cloning may be abused, but not the latter one, that cloning is inherently 
wrong.  
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who work but do not produce tangible products, have “no future in Ishiguro’s novels” but that 
this “enables their more ethical approach to the demands of the present” (268). This also allows 
readers to consider our own immaterial labor in the present, without hope for a better future 
(285). In this sense, the inevitability of Kathy’s death, and the accompanying loss of her 
memories of Tommy and Ruth, speak to a harsh truth outside the novel: a world that accepts the 
commodification of individuals and their disposability is a cruel world indeed. What future do 
any of us have in such a time and place?
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Unsettling Language: Grotesque Description in The Flame Alphabet 
Introduction 
Ben Marcus’ 2012 novel The Flame Alphabet takes place in a world where language 
becomes toxic to adults. Poisonous language is first attributed solely to children but eventually 
encompasses all speech and written communication, no matter who produces it. The language 
plague’s effects are monstrous: it breaks down a person’s body, causing an “intolerable 
squeezing in the chest and the hips” (4), and an unyielding lethargy. Tongues harden, faces 
become “slightly smaller” (22). Bodies decompose into pillars of salt. The novel’s main 
characters are Sam, his wife Claire, and their daughter Esther. The novel is divided into three 
parts, all of them from Sam’s perspective. In the first part, Sam recounts the plague’s onset and 
the disconnect between himself and his daughter. The second part explores Sam’s time at a 
compound where adults experiment to come up with new ways of communicating and 
counteracting the devastating effects of the plague. These tests are conducted on children and 
other adults. The third part follows Sam, now outside of the compound, as he seeks to reunite 
with his family. 
Critical reviews of the novel are mixed, but these mixed reviews all address, to a greater 
or lesser degree, Marcus’ imaginative prose. The New York Times review calls Marcus’ 
sentences “excessive” (Lennon); NPR’s review agrees, calling entire sections “superfluous” 
(Diamond). These negative comments come after disclaimers that stylistic prowess is generally 
one of Marcus’ strengths. The Guardian review, on the other hand,  praises the “cold beauty of 
[his] prose” (Lezard); and the review from the Los Angeles Times asserts “there are rich 
pleasures in Marcus’s words” and that Marcus is “wildly inventive in his imagery” (Barton). The 
emphasis on Marcus’ vivid prose is in line with his positioning as a writer. His work is 
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categorized as experimental and he authored a piece for Harper’s where he seeks to carve out a 
place for experimental fiction amid the dominance of literary realism by emphasizing 
experimental fiction’s capacity to challenge readers and stimulate critical thinking (“Why 
Experimental Fiction Threatens to Destroy Publishing, Jonathan Franzen, and Life as We Know 
It.”).  
Marcus’ imagery often utilizes the aesthetics of the grotesque. In doing so, the novel’s 
imagery breaks down traditional classifications between human and nonhuman, and it provides 
the diegetic space where abstract concepts like the grotesque are imprinted onto physical bodies, 
transforming them. These grotesque transformations most pointedly mark the plague victims; but 
they also metaphorically represent the willingness of people to behave in grotesque fashion.  
The Grotesque  
Shung-Liang Chao argues that metaphor is what makes “the grotesque, which is 
primarily visual or pictorial … also verbal” (14). Chao’s comparative study of Crashaw, 
Baudelaire, and Magritte situates the grotesque as “a corporeal, or flesh-made, metaphor which 
produces within itself (and within the reader/viewer’s response) intellectual uncertainly, 
emotional disharmony, and hermeneutic indeterminacy” (14). Chao understands the grotesque 
“as a metaphor whose literalness tampers with its structural unity or totality” (14). Chao’s 
emphasis on the grotesque as a metaphor is predicated on the bodily aspect of the grotesque. Ewa 
Kurlyuk situates visual metaphors in relation to the grotesque, which corresponds to her 
emphasis on art. She argues, “The creation of metaphors in language corresponds to the 
formation of images in the visual arts, and every artist who does not simply reproduce a visible 
reality but conveys a symbolic meaning plays with metaphors” (71). Geoffrey Galt Harpham 
connects myth and metaphor. He writes, “At the margin of figurative metaphor and literal myth 
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lies the grotesque, both and neither, a mingling and a unity” (53). Harpham sees boundary 
crossing as central to myth, such as when animals marry like humans. This provides the rationale 
for myth’s connection to the boundary crossing of the grotesque. Dieter Meindl also situate the 
grotesque in relation to metaphor. Drawing upon the work of Paul Riceour, Meindl writes, “The 
kinship between metaphor and the grotesque should be noted … [Paul Riceour] emphasizes the 
factor of categorical transgression in metaphor, which results in a redescription and redistribution 
of reality. The grotesque conflates categories and is notable for the effect of defamiliarization 
and estrangement it produces in the reader” (81). Metaphor and the grotesques share the ability 
to conflate categories and estrange readers, and metaphors are ideally suited to the literary 
grotesque because they are predicated on the yoking together of disparate elements to provide 
fresh insight into things. The notion that the grotesque involves metaphors with physical 
structures that resist classification resonates deeply with how the abstract struggle between social 
and economic worth transforms bodies.1 The emphasis on metaphor is especially appropriate in 
relation to the powerfully evocative imagery of The Flame Alphabet. While not all its stunning 
images are metaphors, the effects of language on the body and the unique and sometimes 
horrifying images often generate their power through comparison. The novel is about grotesque 
transformations, both physically and psychologically. These grotesque transformations are 
brought on, literally, through language, and the text uses unsettling description as a way to 
embody this strange but familiar world. While the grotesque metaphors are not always corporeal, 
the children, for example, are not physically grotesque even though they are compared to 
animals, the novel draws its power from evocative and grotesque imagery. 
Esther as grotesque 
                                                          
1 See pages 26-27 for more on how the grotesque embodies this tension. 
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The association of children with animals predates the onset of the language plague. Early 
in the book, Sam recounts a time when he was with his family at a picnic. At the picnic, “kids 
would devour their food” before they “formed a roving pack, moving like one of those clusters 
of birds that seem to share a single, frantic brain” (27). “A roving pack” connotes animals like 
dogs or wolves. The image of the bird cluster is another animal comparison, and it highlights 
groups that operate as a single unit (which hunting canines may also do): multiple individuals 
functioning as a single unit. There is, of course, a significant difference between kids moving 
“like” a cluster of birds and of being such a cluster, a difference of comparative degree. The 
simile lacks the direct yoking together of the metaphor. Here, “like” is comparative, but it also 
simultaneously asserts children’s autonomy. Children may be behaving as part of a cluster 
without individual autonomy, but their individuality is still her own; they are not animals, just 
like them. This becomes complicated, however, when the book later depicts children harming 
others. The references to pack and cluster mix animal metaphors regarding biological type, but 
they share an emphasis on nonhuman animals acting on instinct rather than emphasizing 
individuality. For this reason, Sam’s adolescent daughter, Esther, refuses to play with the other 
youths. She tells her parents, “I’m not an animal. I don’t follow people around simply because 
their asses smell good to me” (28). Esther’s rebuke encapsulates a disaffected teen’s angst. Her 
rebuke also rejects behavior that impinges on her distinct personhood. Esther does not want to be 
someone who follows the crowd; especially a crowd predicated on instinct. However, Esther 
begins to take on the pack mentality as the novel progresses. 
 As adults begin getting sick from language, Esther and the relationship she has with her 
parents transforms. Her parents start hiding from her, as if she’s a monster or animal predator. At 
one point, Sam and Claire sit on the bathroom floor for “what felt like hours” until Esther goes to 
 
 
206 
 
bed: “Only then was it safe to come out” (40). Esther’s transformation into a monster, as 
something her parents fear, is later connected to the animality that Esther initially rejects. As 
children and adolescents begin actively harming adults, they are increasing described as animals. 
They form “feral pack[s]” that attack strangers by yelling and screaming at them, “And together, 
when they spoke in unison on their nighttime tours, their weapon was worse” (54). Later on, Sam 
and another man are caught outside when a group of children approach:  
A din rose out of the north field beyond the school, and as the sound bloomed it 
grew piercing, wretchedly clear, borne so quickly on the wind, we shuddered 
when it hit. Voice-like, childlike, a cluster of speech blaring out of the field. The 
sound crushed out my air. Behind the noise ran a pack of kids, so shadowed and 
small at that distance, they looked like animals springing across the field. Coming 
right toward us. In front of them came a wall of speech so foul I felt myself 
burning. (74) 
This troubling moment continues the metaphor of the children as nonhuman, as monstrous 
animals trampling adults underfoot. They are again a pack, who spring rather than walk. While 
they are still “like” animals, their “cluster of speech” is now also “childlike,” which 
metaphorically positions the children as neither animals nor children, but like animals and 
children; now they are truly something in-between. Markus P.J. Bohlmann and Sean Moreland 
discuss the term “childlike” in the introduction to their anthology on monstrous children in 
cinema. They argue the adjective is “imaginatively empowering,” as opposed to the adjective 
“childish,” which is an “infantilizing” description (14). Because of the preexisting connotations 
of the preceding terms, Bohlmann and Moreland thus  propose “childness” as a way of 
apprehending the “elusive quiddity” of the child and the way it is perceived, while providing 
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distance from “the reality of actual children” (15–16). “Childness,” then, is about how society 
imagines children to be and what qualities it ascribes to them, without describing actual children. 
It is important to understand that children’s lived experiences are not the same as theoretical 
understandings. At the same time, theory does shape people’s perceptions of children, both in 
their day-to-day interactions and the way in which they discuss children, such as in political 
arenas. Separating the theoretical child from the actual child does provide clarity; at the same 
time, however, divorcing them too much may make it more difficult to understand how theory 
and practice intersect. Nonetheless, Bohlmann and Moreland’s proposal is compelling, even 
though I choose not to employ their term. Their distinction between “childish” and “childlike,” 
however, is worth further examination. “Childish” is an infantilizing pejorative because it 
embodies regression. Idealized attributes like innocence which are associated with childhood 
cannot be re-attained. Calling someone “childish” is in essence an assertion that a person has 
gained no knowledge or perspective despite their loss of innocence and exposure to the wider 
world: a poor trade. Calling someone “childlike” (as opposed to “like a child,” which is 
sometimes closer in meaning to “childish”) is a more neutral descriptor which depends upon 
what is “childlike” about him or her. Bohlmann and Moreland assertion that the term is 
imaginatively empowering focuses on the idealized child, but “childlike” depends on the quality 
for its positive or negative connotations. For example, saying someone has a childlike 
imagination is an association with a positive quality. This bestows on a person a desirable 
attribute that stays with him or her despite maturation and its corresponding knowledge and 
perspective. Saying someone has a childlike temper, is an association with a negative quality, 
which ideally should have been shed as one matures and learns how to better control themselves. 
Of course, when The Flame Alphabet tells us that the “cluster of speech” was “voice-like, 
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childlike,” it’s functioning differently from Bohlmann and Moreland’s description.  It shows the 
ontological slippage between the animalistic children, who, at this moment, are closer to animals 
behaving as humans. The difference in Marcus’ usage of childlike compared to Bohlmann and 
Moreland’s isn’t a critique of Bohlmann and Moreland’s assessment; rather, the difference helps 
illustrate the conceptual baggage that Marcus is unpacking in such a brief comparison. 
Describing animalistic children as “childlike” divorces children from their privileged status in 
the social imagination. Everything the children do could reasonably be described as “childlike” 
because children are doing it. At the same time, describing children as animals who sound 
childlike is a comparative move that both divorces children from, and points out, their 
ontological underpinnings. In doing so, the novel asserts the constructed and ambiguous nature 
of both language and childhood. Here children exist in between the world of animal and human, 
fully residing in neither.  
This ambiguity resurfaces in subsequent descriptions of Esther. The reader learns that 
Esther is part of the child mob. One kid catches a man and attacks him with speech. The attack is 
described “as if a cattle prod shot electricity from [the boy’s] mouth” (75). But the attacking boy 
is actually Esther: “When the boy stood up we saw his face in the streetlight, so long and solemn 
and awful to behold. Except the kid wasn’t a boy. It was my Esther. Her hair was wild and she 
wore an outfit I didn’t recognize, some long coat that was too big on her” (75). Esther’s 
grotesque transformation into something not fully human becomes so complete that she is 
initially unrecognizable to her own father. Her wild hair and unfamiliar, ill-fitting coat speak to 
the transition of Esther from alienated daughter to feral other. Her transformation is imprinted 
upon her body and clothing, which can now be read as a metaphor for her ontological shift. Of 
course, the children are not literally transformed into part human/part animal. This ontological 
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blurring is created through the extended use of comparisons. It’s also interesting the violence is 
gendered male, even though a female commits it.2 This suggests a further blurring between 
notions of masculinity and femininity, even though the subversion of this binary division is not 
maintained throughout the novel.   
The comparison of the children to animals is sustained throughout the novel. When Sam 
sees a video of children in a community without adults. He narrates,  
One’s first assumption of a child-run community, supervision-free, calls up 
wolflike youngsters crawling through dirty hallways, eating each other’s torsos 
with lazy relish. But the evidence I reviewed presented a subdued crowd. The 
children, in the footage we had, their faces turned bland by the editor [so no one 
could see their lips move and thereby harm themselves], had set up a long table 
with plates. They raced across a room, bringing supplies to this table, then sat 
down to eat. But with their features smoothed over they seemed to be spooning 
food into the blurry holes of their necks. (181) 
Sam’s acknowledgement that one might assume unsupervised children would behave as animals 
coincides with the way in which he’s thought of Esther and other children throughout the book. 
The fact that the children in the monitor are behaving “civilized,” by sitting down to eat dinner 
together rather than cannibalizing each other, doesn’t undo the earlier comparisons; rather it 
emphasizes the complex and contested nature of childhood. The comparison of children to 
animals is a way of understanding the sometimes disconcerting behavior of children and the 
fearsome changes upending the world. This is partly why the ontological blurring of the 
animal/human, and, later, human/object, resonate so strongly: they upend categories and 
                                                          
2 Though the novel doesn’t engage with the female grotesque specifically, this could be a moment where it coincides 
with such discussions. See pages 145-148 and 191-192. 
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hierarchies within a world that seems thoroughly upended or altered. The novel’s diegetic space, 
one of collapsing order, both informs and is informed by its characters. 
The animal comparisons eventually extend beyond children. Sam, for example, receives a 
package from an associate named Murphy which includes some materials from LeBov. LeBov is 
supposedly someone studying the language plague. Murphy is the man who Sam later goes to 
Forsythe to work on curing the plague with, where it’s revealed that LeBov is a cover identity 
used by Murphy and his associates that they use to publish information regarding the plague 
under. The materials Sam receives, known as The Proofs, include drawings where “germs were 
people or beasts, and viruses looked like the world seen from miles away. Speech from the faces 
of children was rendered in ugly rushes of color, with each color coded to some kind of distress” 
(81). The Proofs association of the plague’s germs with “people or beasts” [italics added] seems 
to differentiate distinctly between human and animal. In reality, it continues the association 
between these two diverse groups. “Or,” in this case, conjoins the terms. It can be one or the 
other. The drawings of both human and beasts are adequate for depicting plague bearers; they are 
almost interchangeable in this context. But this isn’t literally true. Beasts, lacking the capacity 
for language based communication, do not spread the plague. The “beasts” are metaphors for the 
people, and both terms are visual metaphors for germs. The use of “people” encompasses more 
age groups than children and extends the blame for the plague’s progression to all humans. The 
novel later admits this more specifically, as it reveals, “The toxicity had spread beyond children” 
(116), but the The Proofs movement from depicting germs as “people or beasts” to showing the 
“ugly rushes of color” coming from children resituates the plague as primarily child-based. 
Nonetheless, this moment starts to expand the connection of the metaphor of the chaotic other to 
people aside from children, and foreshadows future events, such as when Sam and Claire’s town 
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is evacuated. Claire flees the car she is in because she cannot leave Esther behind. But there are 
people with dogs sweeping the area to make sure no one stays behind. “From the woods trotted a 
pack of dogs,” the novel reads, “like old men in animal suits, barking with human voices. Behind 
them trudged a human chain of jumpsuited rescuers, arms linked so they’d miss no one” (142). 
The term “pack” is now directly associated with animals, as opposed to people behaving like 
animals, but now the animals are like humans. Dogs like old men pretending to be dogs. The 
comparison of dogs to men dressed as dogs is practically an ouroboros of a metaphor. It circles 
around on itself. The novel compares humans to animals, and then compares animals to humans 
behaving as animals. It’s also appropriate that the subsequent image is of a human chain, or 
humans behaving as an object. 
Esther’s ontological shift from human child to feral other is initially predicated on 
comparisons of herself, and other children, to animals. But once this association is made, the 
novel mostly foregoes the animal comparisons in favor of a variety of other dehumanizing 
moments that position children as transformed and dangerous. For example, Sam notes, “Esther 
had changed. Her face was older, harder. Filthy from her outings, but spectacularly beautiful. Of 
course I must think this, I’m her father. Fathers do not easily succumb to assessments of ugliness 
where their children are concerned. Esther had never been a cute child, but she’d grown 
threateningly stunning in the last few months” (99). On its own, this doesn’t position Esther as 
grotesque; when combined with Esther being situated as monstrous other, it reaffirms such a 
reading because the recollection also resonates with the transformative aspects of adolescence. 
Esther is at that age where she’s leaving childhood behind. Diegetically, however, the fear is 
based on Esther’s chaotic behavior and dangerous impulses in relation to the language plague. 
Esther is filthy presumably because she has been attacking adults and roaming in packs, rather 
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than staying at home. She is now “threateningly stunning” which takes the motif of the awkward 
child growing into their bodies and, perhaps, worrying parents about potential romantic interest 
from their child’s peers, and uses the language as a direct referent to Esther’s capacity for 
damage. Esther’s speech is threatening and literally stuns adults into submission.  
When the plague gets worse, Sam searches for Murphy, hoping for some answers. As 
he’s driving, his car is struck by something. He narrates, “A pack of children tore across a yard, 
fled from sight. I locked my doors” (117). He feels his car lifting, and revs the engines, but 
something blocks the car. Next, “One of them pressed his little face into the driver’s side 
window, so close. He smiled, his lips moving, as if he were singing. With his finger he tapped on 
the glass, made a twirling motion for me to roll down the window. His hands formed a posture of 
prayer under his chin and I believe he mimed the word please” (117). Sam lays on the gas and is 
able to drive over “whatever had been blocking [the car]” (117). In his rearview mirror he sees 
“them … they formed a circle, went to their knees and that was all I saw” (117). Sam’s constant 
refusal to use the term child or children, or to confront the fact that what is stuck underneath his 
car is a child—not animal road-kill or an object—marks the full-scale conversion of children to 
things in his mind. The animal comparisons are minimal here, just one ambiguous use of “pack,” 
but the danger they pose is salient. This danger is predicated on the appeal to innocence from the 
child at the car window. His smile, pretend prayer, and miming of “please,” are all things a 
normal child might do to get their way; and they also manufacture an image of an innocent child 
that belies the danger he represents at this moment. The child is appealing to a different, less 
harmful, conception of childhood than the chaotic one to try and draw the adult out. In the 
novel’s terms, however, this goes against the child’s nature, animalistic and violent, and 
highlights an additional danger: the child can deceive others by drawing upon idealized 
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depictions of childhood.3 The child can draw upon what adult’s imagine children to be before 
revealing his or her true, dangerous selves. 
 The fears over the grotesque nature of Esther and the other children are historically 
aligned with the Puritan discourse on childhood, which asserts that children require shaping and 
regulation because their natural instincts are animalistic and chaotic.4 Other scholars affirm the 
Puritan connection between children and beasts. Daniel Cook, in his history of the American 
clothing industry and the dialectical relationship between clothing manufacturers and children, 
writes “Infants were seen as a danger to both the cosmic and social orders, their crawling placing 
them in postural proximity to members of the animal kingdom” (28). The idea that crawling 
children are bestial situates some of their natural impulses as animalistic, which is the same 
rhetoric which The Flame Alphabet draws on in its depiction of animalistic children. 
Furthermore, the Puritan legacy contains ambivalent “hope and fear” for the future that the 
Puritans saw embodied in children. Mintz observes,  
Beginning in the 1660s and 1670s, Puritan presses and pulpits produced a stream 
of jeremiads lamenting the sins of the rising generation and the degeneration of 
the young from the religion and godliness of their forebears.  Young people were 
made to carry an awesome psychological burden.  Morality, religion, indeed the 
future, depended on them.  In secularized form, it is this mixture of hope and fear 
about the rising generation that remains Puritanism’s most lasting legacy. (31)  
The lament over the degeneration of children may be cliché to contemporary audiences, but the 
notion that children are emblematic of the future is as prominent as ever.5  
                                                          
3 See pages 1-12 for a discussion of childhood innocence. 
4 See pages 5-12 for a discussion of chaotic children. 
5 This is part of the reason why scholars, like Henry Giroux and Cindi Katz, who study childhood in relation to 
neoliberalism are so concerned by the lack of investment in children. 
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Whether religious or secular, attitudes toward children include the idea that they 
represent the future, good or bad, but these futures are always extrapolations of the present. 
Lamenting the degradation of a generation is to assign that generation responsibility for 
contemporary changes that may seem intimidating or fearsome to adults. In The Flame Alphabet, 
parents cannot control their children, and the result is catastrophic; children discipline adults, and 
they do so in seemingly capricious fashion. Parents seem to know little about contemporary 
childhood and adolescence, despite having experienced these stages in the past. Sam and Claire 
initially do their best to relate to Esther, but she will have none of it. The parents’ emotional 
labor is lost in a void of rejection and thinly-veiled animosity.  Yet they keep giving until their 
physical health no longer allows for it because Esther’s language, and the language of all 
children, physically breaks them down.6 Adults then begin sacrificing children in the hope they 
can save themselves. This coincides with another shift, as the novel, although initially positing 
the children as dangerous, alters its trajectory and associates monstrous behavior with adults. 
Grotesque adults 
The grotesque, yet pitiful appearance of the adults is due to the breakdown of their bodies 
due to their exposure to the language of children. This gives the parents a monstrous appearance. 
For example, Claire, Sam’s wife and Esther’s mother, is described as having a “face … the 
weight of clay” and when she smiles, Sam sees “… a shadow had spread under her gums, a 
darkness inside her mouth” (98; 99). She has “a dry body … rank-smelling hair, [a] bruised 
neck” and wears a mouth guard “to keep her from gnashing into the exposed nerve pulp of her 
teeth” (132). The “darkness” residing in Claire’s mouth, and her disgusting hair and exposed 
                                                          
6 Leslie Fiedler writes that we initially encounter “Freaks not as creatures from elsewhere but as monstrous children 
born into their own families” (229). Though the children The Flame Alphabet aren’t coded as freaks (eventually 
everyone’s language is toxic), the notion that parents initially encounter the monstrous other in “their own families” 
resonates.  
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“nerve pulp” positions her as monstrous, yes, but even more specifically as a zombie.7 The 
decomposing mouth, combined with the emphasis on the gnashing teeth and the inability to 
prevent them from doing harm is reminiscent of zombies. Indeed, Claire is literally the walking 
dead: her lethargy and decomposition cause her to move slowly and spend much of her time in 
bed, uncommunicative. She doesn’t live so much as exist in a state of perpetually worsening 
decay. Outside Forsythe, the place where experiments are taking place in the hopes of recovering 
some form of language and finding a cure for the plague, “hordes of people sought entrance … A 
mob of bodies swelled before the gate as if suspended in emulsion” (168).  This horde is 
evocative of zombie imagery in contemporary narratives. The bodies of the adults become 
horrifying, but the monstrosity of the adults is also emblematic of the way in which Marcus 
explores the slippage between language and meaning. For example, there are hints that the 
monstrous adults can be associated with vampires too. There is Claire’s bruised neck, which isn’t 
unique to vampires or their victims, but is more directly associated with them than zombies. An 
early description of the plague’s onset compares it to a bite: “At first we thought we were bitten. 
Something had landed on our backs and sucked on us. Now we would perish” (14). The vector 
for the disease and the subsequent lethargy Sam and Claire experience is tied up in the draining 
of their essence, which they think is caused by a bite. The vampirism metaphor resonates in other 
ways. The temporary reprieve developed at Forsythe involves draining the essence of children, 
which is similar to what the children do to the adults with their speech. When Sam first sees a 
demonstration of an adult person able to withstand the deleterious effects of speech, that adult is 
with a child, and there is “a bag of fluid” that “dangled from the little neck of the child, 
                                                          
7 Another way to understand the lack of teeth in the larger context of this project could be as a metaphor for the 
malnourishment associated with poverty, however, within the specific context of the novel, the parents appear 
upper-middle class. 
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puckering from his skin into the tube. From this it flowed directly into the man. Allowing him to 
speak, one presumed. A fluid drawn directly from the child” (The Flame Alphabet 192). The 
withdrawal of the children’s fluids for the sustenance of adults (from their neck, no less) is 
metaphorically vampiric.  The adult is even dressed in a tuxedo, “almost a gentlemen” (191), 
which coincides with aristocratic depictions of vampires. The vampiric sacrifice of the children 
is an inversion from the first section of the book, where Esther, as a standoff-ish adolescent, 
metaphorically drains her parents’ vitality.  
The simultaneous comparison to both zombies and vampires is the result of the 
intentional disconnect between language and meaning that Marcus employs to show the 
difficulties that arise when language lacks a clear referent and communication breaks down. The 
novel asserts the problematic relationship between language and indexicality. For Derrida and 
subsequent post-structuralist accounts of language, all communication involves some sort of 
spacing: the discrepancy between a sign and its referent (Bennett 75). Marcus plays within that 
space. Vampires and zombies are different creatures, but, in the context of the narrative, it 
doesn’t matter. Both are creatures that feed on others and so they provide enough of the right 
meaning that Marcus can slide between different signifiers. Animals and children are different, 
but they have some conceptual connections, so Marcus bridges that space. He still asserts the 
slippage between language and meaning. When Sam confronts LeBov (previously known as 
Murphey) about Lebov faking his own death, LeBov shrugs it off by saying, “Look, that’s 
nothing. That’s cosmetic. Not even cosmetic. I moved around some grains of sand. Or not even 
that. I can’t invent a small enough metaphor for what I’ve done. It’s that insignificant. It adds 
some maneuverability, that’s all. Some spaces open up” (127). LeBov’s description of his faked 
death speaks to post-structuralist accounts of language and the fallibility of communication. 
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LeBov’s fake death being “the last story before the blackout” (127) speaks to the failure of the 
media as a form of communication. The inability to provide a metaphor small enough to describe 
an action is perhaps downplaying the incident; LeBov did, after all, fake his death. But it also 
involves his inability to find in language an adequate comparison for his behavior. He can’t find 
a sign in a sea of signs. LeBov’s description of his trick opening up space to maneuver also 
speaks to the book’s play with language.  
The space between language and meaning is also embodied in the religion Sam and 
Claire practice. They are what’s known as “Forest Jews,” who worship in small huts or holes 
which contain a transmission coming from underground from a Rabbi Burke. This secretive 
worship is meant, in part, to keep others from hearing the sermons. Sam narrates,  
The true Jewish teaching is not for a wide consumption, is not for groups, is not to 
be polluted by even a single gesture of communication. Spreading messages 
dilutes them. Even understanding them is a compromise. The language kills itself, 
expires inside its host. Language acts as an acid over its message. If you no longer 
care about an idea or feeling, then put it into language. (44) 
If communication pollutes the Jewish teachings, then it is because it cannot adequately embody 
or express the teachings; their dissemination “dilutes them.” That language obstructs 
communication, is “an acid over its message,” is contrary to what people value most about 
language, which is its ability to convey messages or help one express oneself. This creates a 
situation where communication does violence to the message; an idea mirrored in the destructive 
capacity of language within the novel.  The space between language and meaning, it seems, can 
be one of exploration and experimentation, but it can also be dangerous because it’s an area of 
distortion.  
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 Although the Sam and Esther practice an invented branch of Judaism, it does draw upon 
the Jewish tradition, specifically in its invocation of the golem. The golem is a construct of mud 
and/or clay animated through language. A golem may have a word written on its head or a piece 
of paper with the name of God inserted in its mouth. Removing the word deactivates the golem. 
The golem may also serve as a protector. When Esther’s mother, a practicing Jewish woman, is 
described as having a “face … the weight of clay” it also evokes the Jewish golem (98). The 
Golem reference highlights the space between human and monster. Golems are 
anthropomorphized creatures. They appear in human shape but are not human, which has 
thematic similarities to the grotesque. This is why they look fearsome and is similar to the 
uncanny valley effect, where beings who appear too similar to humans are disturbing. The golem 
also raises the issue of individuality that Esther first brought up with her rejection of her peers. 
The golem serves others and lacks the capacity to shape their own destiny. In this way, it 
provides an inchoate metaphor for the relationship between parents and children. Golems, though 
they are intended to serve as protectors, are also capable of violence and destruction. Children 
are ostensibly guided by their parents, but in The Flame Alphabet Esther initially rules her 
parents. Yet as the novel progresses the parents reassert their dominance over their children. 
Adults transition from unappreciated protectors to the destroyers of children, a transformation 
depicted through Sam. 
Marcus’ text constantly explores the changing nature of people and how they shift 
categories. In addition to the monstrous metaphors used to describe the appearance of the adults, 
their monstrosity also surfaces in their behavior, as Sam shifts from victim to victimizer. In this 
way, the monstrous appearance of the adults becomes a grotesque metaphor with dual resonance: 
adults are both grotesque subjects and objects, capable of exerting agency in grotesque ways and 
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transforming into grotesque creatures via exposure to the plague. The plague doesn’t just 
transform the bodies of adults, though it certainly does that. It also causes some to engage in 
horrific behavior.  
The grotesque behavior of the adults begins small, before reaching its horrific crescendo. 
When the plague starts, Sam engages in what he calls “smallwork.” He constantly measures and 
tests what he can, hoping to find ways to find out the causes and effects of the plague to contain 
its damages. His “smallwork” eventually encompasses his attempts at Forsythe to create a new 
language, as well as his extraction of children’s essence. Initially, he runs tests on Claire, but 
Claire stops willingly participating. Sam observes, “Claire retired as my test subject. She stopped 
appearing in the kitchen for night treatments, declined the new smoke. When I served infused 
milk she fastened her mouth shut. If she accepted medicine from me she did so unwittingly, 
asleep, whimpering when the needle went in” (97). Claire sends a clear message that she no 
longer wishes to partake in his “smallwork,” but Sam continues with some of the experiments 
anyway. Calling his concoctions “medicine” implies a palliative effect that belies the amateur 
and speculative nature of his “smallwork.” Saying Claire unwittingly accepts the medicine is 
euphemistic, at best. Her earlier actions indicate she clearly rejects his tests, and she cannot 
accept something, even unwittingly, she is unconscious for. The “whimpering” registers her 
discomfort with what’s happening, even in sleep. Sam’s penetration of an unwilling Claire with a 
needle metaphorically registers as rape. He is denied consent but does what he wants, regardless. 
Sam’s transformation into a monster continues. As Sam and Claire become increasingly 
sick, Esther goes on a tirade, harming Claire and Sam with her foul language. Sam enters the 
room late, but imagines the tirade started with Esther “climbing up on her mother and assum[ing] 
a feral crouch, opening her throat for the pure injury to pour out” (132). This continues Esther’s 
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depiction as a dangerous animal. In a moment of desperation, Sam jams a needle into his own 
ear. The needle was given to him by LeBov and is supposedly capable of providing temporary 
immunity from language, but it works for Sam in another way. It shocks Esther into silence: 
“Esther had stopped speaking by then … My activities with the needle had rendered her mute. 
She stood watching me, a mostly convincing look of fear on her face. An effective display of 
crying, soft crying that she seemed to want to suppress, came next. She performed her grief for 
my benefit” (133). When the scene starts, Sam fears Esther and her ability to harm Claire and 
himself. This scene is evocative of a common parenting scenario, where an adolescent child 
lashes out at her parents. But Esther’s pernicious language entails physical consequences for her 
parents. But when Sam slams the needle into his own ear, power dynamics shift. “I would 
literally stab my own ears out,” his actions scream, “then be subjected to your tirade.” Sam 
shocks Esther into submission, causing her to become fearful and cry. Sam’s distrust of Esther’s 
actions show the void opening up between Sam and his daughter, as he believes her fear and 
grief a performance. Sam’s distrust may be warranted, but it’s also a sign of his own 
transformation. Esther becomes dangerous and animal-like, but controls herself after witnessing 
her father’s actions. Sam, however, becomes more callous and monstrous, at least in readings 
sympathetic to Esther. This becomes even clearer as the moment continues. Esther approaches 
Sam and signals to him that she’ll be quiet. She tries cleaning up some of the fluid from Sam’s 
ear. Sam rejects this help and drags Esther from the house. Marcus writes,  
Esther stood outside our house with her head down, shoulders small. I rushed her 
again, moved my daughter yet farther into the yard, and she slumped over me, let 
herself be carried. At the sidewalk I dropped her and with my hands I made the 
most terrible gesture I could. It was the most fluent I’d ever been without speech. 
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Stay, stay there. Do not come in this house again. You are forbidden from here. 
We do not know you. Esther looked up at me and nodded. With her little finger 
she crossed her heart. (133) 
Esther is diminished: her “shoulders small,” she slumps and is carried. She lacks the will to resist 
but is unwilling or unable to move away unassisted. Sam is violent and aggressive. He drops her 
and makes “the most terrible gesture [he] could.” This gesture indicates a moment where 
nonverbal communication succeeds while language fails. What single gesture could be so terrible 
as to contain all the hurt that Sam communicates? Any actual description of the gesture would 
fail and render its power obsolete. A description may even lower the terrible power of the gesture 
to a joke, as a description may well fall so far short of communicating the precise language Sam 
believes it entails. Sam’s terrible gesture may not evoke quite the language Sam thinks. Esther 
could get the gist without grasping his full meaning. This creates a paradox where an allusion to 
a thing is more precise than a description of that thing. The reference is effective because it 
obscures its referent. The description remains vague because giving the gesture precise definition 
would neuter it. The moment has power because it appears to reference a specific gesture that 
doesn’t actually exist in any knowable way, even though it has concrete meaning for Sam. 
Esther’s understanding of the gesture, whether approximate or exact, leads her to a heartbreaking 
moment of acceptance. The subtle nod is understated. The crossing of her heart is a child-like 
promise—cross my heart and hope to die—which reinforces the nod. This is a gesture that can be 
understood without any explanation at all because of its Western context. Esther’s gestures 
communicate something like, “I understand, and I promise to honor your wishes.” A narrative 
description of Sam’s gesture would fail because the Western world has no gesture that can 
encapsulate such a specific and terrible meaning as he wishes to communicate. On the other 
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hand, Esther’s gestures succeed without explanation of their content because of Western 
familiarity with such gestures. These gestures illustrate the difficulty in creating meaning 
disconnected from context, a problem Sam faces later in the novel. They also show a reversal 
between Sam and Esther. Now Sam is the metaphoric monster. One might reasonably argue that 
Sam is just doing what he must do survive—a common refrain used to whitewash violent, 
selfish, and totalitarian impulses in many post-apocalyptic narratives—but this argument does 
not account for Claire, who would rather not separate from Esther, even though Esther’s 
presence is harmful. Whereas Sam will initially sacrifice his relationship with his daughter in his 
quest for survival, Claire would sacrifice herself and forego survival. This is demonstrated when 
the adults evacuate the town, and Claire jumps out the car because she’d prefer to stay near 
Esther. 
Sam’s shift from victim to victimizer coincides with the language plague becoming part 
of everyone’s language, not just children’s. Children are still immune, but adults also harm each 
other by communicating. Furthermore, some adults, in an attempt to combat the plague, establish 
a testing facility in an abandoned school. They try to understand what’s causing the plague and 
how to counteract it. But these experiments are largely in vain because they are done in isolation 
and even reading written language damages people. There is, however, at least one success. A 
serum is developed that provides temporary immunity to speech; but it’s developed from 
children. Fluids are siphoned from their bodies and distilled into powder. Children and less 
fortunate adults are forced into being test subjects for both potential cures and new languages. 
Many of the adults who become test subjects are tricked into coming to the compound because 
they are shown pictures of their missing children and it is implied that families will be reunited. 
Instead the adults are used as test subjects: “To be thorough,” Sam recalls, “we tested on men 
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and women alike, young and old, sick and well. There was a healthy supply of subjects on hand. 
People lined up for this work. They volunteered, fought to be first, scratched at each other 
without mercy, as if they’d been profoundly misled about what waited for them at Forsythe. 
Which of course, well, they had” (171). Sam watches some of the “volunteers.” He observes, 
“From my office the specimens were brought downstairs and readied for testing against people, 
people already shattered and near death, overexposed to the very thing I made more of every 
day” (169). Sam’s description of the people as specimens is part of the process of objectification 
where people are dehumanized. At the same time, Sam isn’t able to complete this objectification 
in his own mind, as he subsequently uses the word “people” twice. This sort of tension between 
thing and person is a constant tension in discussions of children and of test subjects. Children are 
referred to as “the ultimate asset” and Sam observes the people at Forysthe “struck gold in those 
kids,” thus situating children as commodities and currency (180; 193). 
When Sam first witnesses a demonstration of the child-serum that provides temporary 
immunity to language, it involves a demonstration with an adult and child test subject. As the 
adult first enters, it’s clear he’s one of those who have been overexposed: “Onto the stage came 
an old man, his head draped in testicle skin. When he rubbed it and blinked into the lights I saw 
it was merely his face, beset with a terrible, taffy-like drop. I did not want to reflect what sort of 
experiments, or what sort of life, had led to possessing a face like that” (190). The image of a 
man with testicle skin draped over his head is absurd, but it also highlights Sam willful ignorance 
regarding the test subjects. Sam refuses to see the man as someone transformed by the 
experiments he’s subjected to. He refuses to contemplate what the man may have experienced, 
and then he hedges further by thinking it could be the life the man led instead of the experiments: 
a mental maneuver that decontextualizes the suffering the man must endure at Forsythe.  
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This self-justification and willful disconnect consistently manifests in the author’s use of 
euphemisms and constant understatement. After the demonstration is finished, “The child had to 
be carried off, but first they threw a sheet over him” and Sam notes that in further 
demonstrations, “The child was never the same one, though sometimes the man was” (192). The 
unstated detail is that the children are killed in the process of creating the serum. In the final 
section, Sam abandons Forsythe and ostensibly reunites with Esther, though she looks different 
and they cannot effectively communicate with her, so it’s unclear as to whether it’s actually 
Esther or not. While outside of the compound, and before he finds who he thinks is Esther, Sam 
hunts children and experiments on them; his hope is to unlock the secrets of the immunity serum. 
He recounts stumbling onto the secret by accident, “One of my subjects, strapped to an old 
bottled respirator, so large it dwarfed his little face, began the rapid breathing one never likes to 
see in a small person. Too often it foreshadows the unproductive kind of stillness” (281). It’s 
then that Sam notices some powder in the respirator, which Sam distills into the serum. Sam’s 
use of the term “specimen” positions the child as an object, not an individual, and recalls Sam’s 
time at Forsythe. It positions him as a scientist or expert, something he’s been playing at the 
entire novel. The image of the large machine dwarfing the small child highlights the power 
differential between Sam and his experiment and the child. Then Sam uses a euphemism: “the 
unproductive kind of stillness.”8 At worst, this refers to death; at best, a momentary lapse of 
consciousness. I find it more likely to be death, especially when taking into account the earlier 
children being shrouded and carted away, never to return to the demonstrations at Forsythe. Even 
so, while “unproductive stillness” allows for both possibilities, it clearly is a physical stillness 
that prevents Sam from finishing his work unhindered. “Unproductive,” in this instance, also 
                                                          
8 Recall the use of euphemisms in Never Let Me Go, such as carer and doner, which mask the brutal realities of the 
world in which the clones live. 
 
 
225 
 
situates the child further in the realm of objectified commodity, like “specimen”: he, like the test 
subjects at Forsythe, has a very specific use value. His worth is predicated on what can be 
extracted from him. On what his body can provide in terms of knowledge or relief, which is 
entirely disconnected from who he is as a person. When Sam laments the fact that rapid 
breathing “too often” leads to “unproductive stillness,” it’s an understated lament for the 
inconvenient loss of a test subject. Even Sam’s terminology for what he’s doing is euphemistic. 
“Smallwork,” while initially an accurate portrayal of the scale of his amateur testing, eventually 
fails to encompass the harm it does to others. The serum made from children is called “Child’s 
Play,” thus associating something created through a harmful and laborious process with 
connotations of both ease (making it was child’s play) and harmless play (the play of a child).  
A reasonable defense could be mustered for the experiments on behalf of the human race, 
but Sam, at this point, just wants to reunite and communicate with his family; and, even at 
Forsythe, test subjects are often tricked by showing parents pictures of their children and 
implying they could be reunited. Consent is also an issue. Adult cannot communicate what 
everything would entail to each other, and they cannot stand speech, nor even the acts of reading 
and writing language. Furthermore, the children Sam kidnaps to experiment on are currently 
immune to the plague. It’s what makes them valuable, but it also creates a situation where there’s 
no benefit for the children to go along with what’s happening, even if they had a choice. Sam 
isn’t going to cure the plague at their expense, nor does he try and convince them he will. 
Sam’s grotesque dehumanization sometimes involves the aesthetic dehumanization of the 
children he objectifies. For example, having associated children with threatening animals for so 
long, it’s less of a jump for him to experiment upon them. Sam views the children he 
experiments on as commodities. After finding “the first child” upon leaving Forsythe, he starts 
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his “project with assets, with person-derived inhibitors” (277). In this example, the inhibitors, 
which temporarily suppress language’s toxicity, are the assets. But the children are also assets. 
The inhibitors are derived from them. In this way, not only are the children valued for their status 
as fungible commodities used to produce more valuable commodities, they are also seen as less 
valuable then their parts.  Sam later says, “When I need some [language serum], I pull it out of 
little ones. I used it first at Forsythe. The crude kind, the roughly gained immunity, drawn on the 
priceless account of the child’s person” (278). The initial reference to “little ones” rather than 
children is an abstraction that is no less horrifying then simply saying “little children.” Sam’s 
behavior has become so abhorrent that euphemisms began losing their understated power, 
including the “roughly” in the subsequent sentence, which acknowledges some violence but not 
the full scope. Sam’s observation that the serum that provides him immunity is “drawn on the 
priceless account of the child’s person” is a direct subversion of the association of the 
emotionally priceless child, which in Pricing the Priceless Child, Viviana Zelizer argues is the 
result of a transition away from valuing children for their economic potential.9  This transition 
helps reify the figure of the innocent child, becomes it makes it easier for many people to shelter 
children from work and some of the realities of outside the home.  A child may be “priceless” in 
the sense that they have unique and irreplaceable emotional value to their family and friends, but 
they have become literally “priceless” in Sam’s world because money is worthless, whereas the 
child’s body has immense value; and accounts, by their very nature, cannot be priceless because 
they have a finite amount to draw from, whether the account is credit or not. This mirrors the 
finite nature of the children, who seem to have a limited supply of whatever it takes to create the 
                                                          
9 See pages 14 and 49. 
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serum. In this way, the account isn’t “of a child’s person” but “from a child’s body.” As their 
essence is vampirically drained, their body weakens.  
The grotesque dehumanization of people takes place in other ways, beyond the abstract 
animal/human and human/object comparisons. At Forsythe, the mechanical is sometimes 
combined with the human. Some subjects are entwined with nonhuman technology: “Antenna 
wires grew like creepers up their faces. Test subjects with cages for mouths, human antennas. 
From their faces came nothing but white noise” (248). Here the test subjects become scientific 
instruments, spewing white noise rather than speech; “human antennas” encapsulates the tension 
between human and object, as it describes a human object. When Sam experiments on the child 
from whom he first extracts Child’s Play, he observes, “The child on the floor looked to be 
squirming in mechanical postures designed to trigger a reaction. I noted the repetition of his 
gyrations, the unimaginative way he thrashed” (281). “Mechanical postures,” “designed to 
trigger a reaction,” and “[unimaginative] gyrations” all position the child and his behavior as 
machinic rather than human. Within a different context, the “designed” and “gyrations” wouldn’t 
necessarily evoke such a sense, but coming after “Mechanical postures,” they do. Ironically, Sam 
seems to be the most machine-like at this moment, in the sense that he fails to experience 
emotion over the struggling human child. He carries a clinical detachment in his observation. 
This moment also reveals Sam’s skepticism. He thinks the child is manufacturing his thrashing 
to elicit a desired response, rather than associating the thrashing with the effects of Sam’s own 
malfeasance, even though Sam is the one whose behavior is suspect. Earlier, when Sam hit a 
child with a car but refused to roll down the window, thinking he’d be attacked, Sam’s mistrust 
seemed understandable. Here, it’s less so. In fact, Sam is constantly misreading his own actions. 
When children cry, he blames it on his “unfriendly appearance” or grants “Perhaps the children 
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felt I was displeased.” Sam believes he’s a “gentle [and benevolent] guardian” (280). Sam 
potentially misconstrues what might actually be fear over Sam and the extractions he performs, 
as opposed to his appearance or displeasure.  
This is especially ironic because Sam himself was once placed in the position of 
dehumanized other by the Forsythe researchers. He is initially a subject. When he arrives at 
Forsythe, he’s violently brought in for examination and study, disrobed and prodded, language is 
tested on him (151–152). When Claire arrives later, she’s stripped and put through shows, which 
aren’t “strictly water, because what collected in the drain had a soapy, black foam in it” (218). 
The showers, combined with the inhuman testing on people and the Jewish elements of the 
novel, gives Forsythe an Auschwitz-like feel. Sam is hung in a room where “mesh baggies of 
hair hung from the ceiling, repelling flies. Possibly the hair attracted them instead” during the 
“year of the sewn-up mouth” (153). This marks Sam’s setting as grotesque. The strange 
containers of hair make no sense, whether they attract or repulse, but the uncertainty over their 
function gets at the ambiguity within the grotesque itself, which can both attract and repulse 
(Edwards and Graulund 78). The year of the sewn-up mouth provides a metaphor for the 
inability of the adult’s to communicate by depicting a form (mouth) disconnected from its 
function (speech). Sam resides in his cell until he notices an orange cable, similar to the cables 
that deliver the Jewish sermons in their places of worship, and places it into his mouth in the 
attempt to use his flesh as a conduit for the messages passing through the cable (152). It works. 
Sam spews a sermon from his mouth, transforming himself into a human conduit. This also wins 
him his freedom because LeBov, who monitors him, hadn’t yet heard the sermon Sam projects; 
so he promotes Sam from test subject to tester, in the hopes Sam has insights which LeBov does 
not. Sam’s grotesque body is always a sliding signifier, shifting between a physical 
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representation of his own objectification and the objectification he inflicts on others. That Sam 
can so easily become a tester is especially upsetting, especially considering the 
Forsythe/Auschwitz comparison, perhaps because it demonstrates the capacity in everyone for 
violence and grotesque behavior. Sam’s transformations encapsulate the novel itself, where the 
grotesque shifts from child to adult, animal to technology, subject to object. 
Conclusion 
Adults become grotesque, both in their monstrous appearance and in the way the 
language of the novel positions them as both human and object. In this way, their broken bodies 
provide a metaphor for how, as Evan Calder Williams puts it, “real abstractions affect real 
bodies” (73). Williams is specifically talking about zombie narratives and how the body of the 
zombie metaphorically embodies the effects of capitalism, as the zombies represent capitalism’s 
“unwanted poor … more mouths to feed … the sick repetition of want let loose on a global 
scale” (74). In The Flame Alphabet, the bodies of the adults provide a metaphor for the 
victimhood of the adults, as well as their monstrous actions. This is similar to how Leonard 
Cassuto sees both the objectifier and the objectified as grotesque (6), only the adults’ appearance 
in The Flame Alphabet provides a visual metaphor. The grotesque runs throughout novel, but the 
decomposition of the adult bodies, when viewed in light of the adult test subjects, demonstrates 
how objectification breaks down a person. Recall that the bodies of the adults are monstrous; 
Claire, for example, has a “dry body” with “rank-smelling hair” and requires a mouth guard “to 
keep from gnashing into the exposed nerve pulp of her teeth” (132). The bodies of the objectified 
adults, which is what Claire becomes, provide a way of seeing a person run down by society. She 
loses the capacity to care for herself under the constant barrage of others; her child, yes, but also 
adults who put her to work for their own purposes. The bodies of adult victims eventually 
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become nothing but salt. Their nutrients are stripped from them, and when there is nothing left 
they become, as the Scorpions so eloquently put it, dust in the wind. 
At the same time, however, the disturbing appearance of the adults also provides a 
grotesque metaphor for those who victimize both adults and children. Their monstrous behavior 
is written onto their features not only because they are metaphors for those broken down, but 
because some adults become inhuman monsters. The book ends with Sam abducting a young 
adult he thinks is Esther, who, having aged, is now susceptible to the poison of language. But it’s 
highly likely it isn’t Esther. Sam grants, “It was marginally possible I’d rescued, instead of 
Esther, a stranger with a different name” (257). Having captured Esther/not-Esther, Sam spends 
his time hunting for children so that he can extract their essence. He says, “What I was seeking is 
small and it has a face and it breathes so prettily, in little wet gusts of air. Often it comes alone 
willingly. It harbors a medicine inside its delicate chest” (255). The constant repetition of “it” 
adds to the horror because it demonstrates the child stalker’s objectification of his victims. Here 
the child is almost completely objectified, and Sam is at his most monstrous. By making Sam’s 
appearance match his grotesque behavior, the novel provides a visualization of what the 
adjective grotesque is often used for; to position heinous behavior as inhuman. 
That the same grotesque bodies can provide two separate metaphors may still seem 
counter-intuitive. How can the grotesque bodies be a metaphor for both victims and their 
victimizers? Part of this is due to the nature of the novel. It opens itself to metaphoric 
examination on a variety of levels, but it constantly refuses tidy interpretations. One reviewer 
wrote “Marcus' imagination fills his plague with so many arresting yet confounding details that 
the reader is left to puzzle over their meaning” (Barton). Another laments, “whatever allegory or 
message is being intimated at in The Flame Alphabet never becomes clear” (Diamond). One 
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reviewer observes “‘The Flame Alphabet’ … is laden with metaphor; everything might mean 
something, but nothing is certain”(Lennon). Another notes, the novel “both invites and strongly 
resists allegorical interpretation” (Lezard). The novel’s simultaneously invitation to interpret and 
its refusal to validate interpretation is its most confounding and rewarding attribute. It makes 
everything and everyone grotesque, and alters these relationships as the novel progresses. This 
makes the grotesque uniquely suited to this novel. Scholars often note the ambivalence which the 
grotesque inspires. Grotesque images often have the potential to inspire both attraction and 
repulsion, though the novel prefers repulsion, which the repulsive sex scenes illustrate. When 
Sam and Claire are reunited at Forsythe, for example, they are “determined to extract pleasure 
from each other” and their “pleasure centers” are “cold and shielded by brittle walls of hair” 
(236). A repulsive description. The Flame Alphabet takes the grotesque a step further, by 
locating ambivalence in the concept of the grotesque itself. Everyone is grotesque to varying 
degrees, and our sympathies shift as the novel progresses. In this light, we may be faced with a 
chilling reality: the grotesque, rather than being an intrusion into the natural order, may itself be 
the natural order. Not everything or everyone will always be grotesque, but the capacity is 
always there, beneath the surface, waiting. 
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